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4Abstract
In this thesis, I study the effects of market power and financial constraints on arbitrage,
liquidity provision, financial stability and welfare. In Chapter 1, I consider a dynamic model
of imperfectly competitive arbitrage with time-varying supply. The model can explain the
well-documented empirical features that (quasi)-identical assets can trade at significantly
different prices; these price differences vanish slowly over time, resulting in apparently slow-
moving capital; the price differences can invert over time; market depth is time-varying. I
also show that entry does not necessarily correct these effects, although the mere threat of
entry may improve liquidity.
In Chapter 2, I introduce in the model the realistic feature that trading requires cap-
ital and assume that arbitrageurs’ positions must be fully collateralized, which rules out
default. I compare liquidity provision, asset prices and welfare in the monopoly case to the
perfect competition case studied by Gromb and Vayanos (2002). I show that relative to
the competitive case, the monopoly is less efficient but also less capital-intensive, as rents
captured over time allow her to build up capital. Consequently, when capital is scarce,
financially-constrained competitive arbitrageurs may provide less liquidity at later stages
than an unconstrained monopoly. In some cases, this increases aggregate welfare but with-
out being Pareto-improving. I discuss implications for market-making via a specialist.
In Chapter 3, I assume that some arbitrageurs have deeper pockets than others and allow
for default. The capital-rich arbitrageurs (predators) either provide liquidity to other mar-
ket participants (competitive hedgers) or engage in predatory trading against a financially-
constrained peer (prey). In this strategy, predators depress the price of the asset to trigger
a margin call on the prey’s position and gain from her subsequent firesales. I show that
the hedgers’ reactions to the possibility of predation can make predatory trading cheaper,
reducing the prey’s staying power. In anticipation of the prey’s firesales, hedgers may run
on the asset, strengthening and to some extent substituting to the predators’ price pressure.
Further, their reaction leads to a reduction in the prey’s price impact, which decreases her
already limited ability to support the price and avoid a margin call. Predatory trading is
likely to occur when hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse or the asset sufficiently risky.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Strategic Arbitrage
Abstract: Real-world arbitrage often involves a limited number of large financial intermediaries
(e.g. dealers, hedge funds) with price impact. I study a multi-period model of imperfectly com-
petitive arbitrage, in which supply shocks generate price differences between two identical assets
traded in segmented markets. Arbitrageurs seeking to exploit these price differences split up their
orders to limit their price impact. I show that order split-up and specific supply shock patterns
can explain the empirical evidence that i) identical assets can trade at different prices, ii) these
price differences revert slowly over time, as if capital was slow-moving, and iii) the sign of price
differences can switch over time. The model also yields new predictions about the determinants
and evolution of market depth, about which arbitrage strategies attract arbitrageurs in equilibrium,
and how the number of arbitrageurs in a given strategy evolves over time.
1.1 Introduction
In contrast to the textbook case, in which many atomistic investors ensure that the law of
one price holds, arbitrage opportunities and mispricings are often chased in the real world by
only a limited number of large, highly specialized financial institutions (e.g. broker-dealers,
hedge funds, proprietary trading desks). These arbitrageurs manage sizable portfolios and
recognize that their trades affect asset prices, implying that arbitrage should be studied as a
strategic choice.1 In this chapter, I study how the behaviour of a limited number of strategic
arbitrageurs affects the dynamics of asset prices and market liquidity. I also determine which
markets attract arbitrageurs and how the level of competition between arbitrageurs changes
over time.
1For instance, Quantum Fund and Tiger Management closed funds in 2000 because their sizes impaired
their ability to take advantage of pricing anomalies (Attari and Mello, 2006). Chen, Stanzl and Watanabe
(2002) find evidence of substantial price impact costs in equity markets.
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Arbitrageurs who recognize their price impact avoid trading too aggressively against
mispricings and split up their orders to preserve the profitability of their strategy. Based on
this simple insight and variation in the supply of assets that can be arbitraged, I show that
imperfectly competitive arbitrage can explain three well-documented empirical phenomena:
i) assets with identical cash-flows can trade at different prices, ii) this price difference vanishes
only slowly over time, resulting in apparently slow-moving capital2; iii) price differences
between identical assets may switch sign over time (sign inversion). Sign inversions between
pairs of similar assets have been documented during the recent crisis in the interest rate
swap spread and the municipal bond market (Bergstresser, Cohen and Shenai, 2011).
In addition to these price dynamics, I determine how the endogenous number of arbi-
trageurs depends on entry costs3, the risk-return profile of the arbitrage opportunity, or the
existing market structure. This allows me to characterize which markets or arbitrage oppor-
tunities are likely to be - or remain - concentrated, and the implied effects on asset prices
and liquidity. First, the model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the volatility
of fundamentals and the number of arbitrageurs, confirming a conjecture made by Shleifer
and Vishny (1997): more volatile markets do not necessarily attract more arbitrageurs,
in particular if the risk-bearing capacity of other market participants is low. Second, the
model generates new predictions about the evolution of competition and its implications
for liquidity and the speed of arbitrage. When new arbitrageurs can enter a strategy over
time, incumbents attempt to deter them. They are likely to succeed when entry costs are
sufficiently high, so that a concentrated structure may persist over time even though con-
centration means that large rents are available. With lower entry costs, however, the mere
threat of entry can bring prices closer to fundamental values. With even lower entry costs,
the model predicts that liquidity, defined as market depth, improves ahead (more precisely,
in anticipation) of future entry. Hence a novel prediction of the model is that market depth
should be a leading indicator of the number of arbitrageurs active in a given strategy.
I consider a setting with two identical assets (say A and B) traded in segmented markets
and a risk-free asset. Risk-averse local investors operate in the segmented markets and receive
2Price differences between (quasi) identical assets are well-documented for Siamese stocks (Froot and
Dabora, 1999, Lamont and Thaler, 2003), on-the-run / off-the-run bonds (Krishnamurthy, 2002). The swap
spread and the CDS-bond basis are two other prominent examples. The second phenomenon - slow-moving
capital - has been documented at different frequencies and in various markets. See, for instance, Duffie
(2010), Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) and Coval and Stafford (2007).
3One can imagine that trading across different exchanges, identifying mispricings and / or setting up
arbitrage desks require some fixed investment in the first place.
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endowment (liquidity) shocks over time. The shocks are correlated with the fundamental
of the assets, and thus affect local investors’ valuation for their local assets. Since local
investors in market A receive opposite shocks to local investors in market B, trading would
help investors to fully share risk, but cannot take place because of market segmentation.
This pushes the prices of assets A and B apart. Another group of risk-averse investors,
the arbitrageurs, have the ability to trade freely across markets and can exploit this price
difference by intermediating trades between A- and B-investors. There is however only a
finite number of arbitrageurs, who understand how their trades affect prices in each market.
In particular, arbitrageurs understand that by fully intermediating the trades across markets,
they would bring prices in line with fundamentals, and earn zero profits. As a result, they
limit the quantities they buy from local investors with low valuation for the asset and sell to
investors with high valuation, keeping the spread between the prices of assets A and B open,
and earning profits. Of course, as competition among arbitrageurs intensifies, the pressure
to intermediate trades increases and the spread decreases. Hence the model predicts that the
magnitude of mispricings should increase in the concentration of arbitrageurs. Ruf (2011)
finds evidence consistent with this prediction in the commodities options market.
As arbitrageurs’ trades bring prices closer to each other in a permanent manner, ar-
bitrageurs are willing to split up orders to limit their price impact over time and exploit
mispricings as long as possible. Time-variation in the endowment shocks received by local
investors cause changes in the supply of assets that arbitrageurs can arbitrage. Changes in
the supply may be known in advance or be uncertain. The first contribution of the paper
is to provide an interesting laboratory to understand the effects of known (and potentially
time-varying) and risky shocks on the dynamics of asset prices.4 When shocks are constant
over time, corresponding to a constant arbitrage supply, arbitrageurs increase gradually their
positions to limit their price impact, which leads to gradual convergence of prices towards
fundamentals. Hence the arbitrageurs’ strategic considerations can account for the observed
slow movement of capital towards buying opportunities documented after supply shocks
(Oehmke, 2010, Duffie, 2010). Again, an increase in competition reduces this effect, and
increases the speed of convergence of the arbitrage.
When shocks are known to decrease over time, arbitrageurs’ activity leads to sign inver-
4In papers analyzing price impact in other Cournot-based models (e.g. DeMarzo and Urosevic, 2007,
Pritsker, 2009), the supply of the asset is constant. Introducing time-varying shocks is equivalent to consider
a time-varying risky asset supply in these models. The model also allows for uncertainty about future shocks
/ asset supply. See Section 1.3.2 for an analysis of arbitrageurs’ risk-management strategies in the presence
of uncertain shocks.
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sion. Suppose for instance that a large positive shock in market A is followed by a small
positive shock (and vice versa in market B).5 In this case, the equilibrium spread is first pos-
itive and then negative, even if the sign of shocks is unchanged, implying that the same asset
should be more expensive throughout. A-investors, who receive a positive supply shocks,
first sell the asset to hedge their risk. As shocks decrease, they find that they have oversold
the asset, and seek to buy back. Arbitrageurs limit liquidity, pushing the price of asset A
above its expected value. It is then optimal for A-investors to remain excessively short the
asset, as the price of asset is expected to revert to its expected value (on average) when the
asset pays off.
The prediction of sign inversion may shed light on recent anecdotal and empirical ev-
idence. In 2010, the swap spread turned negative for the first time. Bergstresser, Cohen
and Shenai (2011) find that insured municipal bonds became cheaper than similar uninsured
bonds issued by the same city. The present model highlights the role of the market struc-
ture of dealers / arbitrageurs to explain sign inversion in these markets. Further, one can
interpret the decrease in shocks as an easing of supply imbalances or liquidity needs in the
market, which seems to correspond to a post-crisis situation.
If the magnitude of future shocks is uncertain, arbitrageurs face a risky trading oppor-
tunity. Uncertainty about future shocks increases local investors’ willingness to hedge, and
consequently the profitability of the arbitrage. However, arbitrageurs do not necessarily re-
act to an increase in uncertainty by an increase in their positions, even if they tend towards
risk neutrality. In fact, as uncertainty also raises local investors’ reluctance to hold their
assets, arbitrageurs’ price impact increases, and this may prompt them to decrease their
positions. Further I show that even if arbitrageurs increase their positions, their reaction
does not offset local investors’ increased liquidity demand, so that in equilibrium, heightened
uncertainty about future shocks always leads to less efficient pricing. These predictions are
novel relative to the limits of arbitrage and noise trader risk literatures, which focused on the
level rather than the uncertainty of supply imbalances / noise trader risk (see e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008).
These predictions obtain with a fixed market structure. However rents available from
strategic arbitrage should attract new players over time. Indeed, successful trading strate-
5For the sake of exposition, I assume that shocks are known in advance, i.e. the arbitrage is risk-free.
I show that similar effects obtain when the arbitrage is risky, i.e. when future shocks are random. In this
case, there is an additional effect since arbitrageurs must also adjust their strategies when they learn about
the size of the shock.
1.1. INTRODUCTION 11
gies or financial innovations tend to attract copycats and imitators. For instance, LTCM’s
relative-value and convergence strategies became increasingly popular as the hedge fund
produced double-digit returns in the 1990s.6 What determines the number of arbitrageurs
active in a given strategy? How does the market structure evolve over time?
The second contribution of the paper is to formally address these questions by i) analyzing
a simultaneous entry game between risk-averse arbitrageurs - the previous literature has
considered risk-neutral arbitrageurs; and ii) analyzing a strategic deterrence game between
incumbent arbitrageurs and new entrants.
My results about simultaneous entry show that allowing for entry does not necessarily
correct the strategic rationing of liquidity (measured as the spread) caused by imperfect
competition among arbitrageurs. The risk-averse arbitrageurs must decide ex-ante whether
to enter (and sink a fixed cost) under uncertainty about the arbitrage profitability. An
increase in average shocks makes the arbitrage more profitable, and increases entry. But
an increase in the volatility of shocks does not necessarily increase entry, in particular if
local investors are sufficiently risk-averse. Indeed, on one hand, a higher volatility makes
the arbitrage more risky, which hurts the risk-averse arbitrageurs, and on the other hand,
it increases local investors’ willingness to hedge their exposure to liquidity shocks (indirect
effect), and thus the arbitrage profitability. The first effect dominates and reduces entry
if the risk-bearing capacity is small (highly risk-averse investors), and / or the market is
concentrated, and / or if volatility is small relative to the average shock (most likely, a
large shock will hit the market). Hence entry depends on the “market structure of risk-
bearing capacity” (Pritsker, 2009). These results imply that, all else equal, the number
of arbitrageurs may first decrease or be stable and then increase along the northeastern
direction of the mean-variance frontier of arbitrage opportunities (Figure 1.1).
Once arbitrageurs are in place, their ability to move prices can help them limit future
entry, in particular if entry costs are high for new arbitrageurs, and even if the arbitrage
is risk-free. Deterring new entrants requires to decrease the profitability of the arbitrage,
i.e. by reducing the spread between A- and B-asset prices more quickly. This contradicts
arbitrageurs’ objective to decrease the spread only gradually. When entry costs are suffi-
ciently large for the entrant, the cost of deterrence is low for incumbents. As entry costs
6Similarly, there is anecdotal evidence that Leland and Rubinstein’s portfolio insurance strategy became
widely imitated in the 1980s:“The LOR principals could do little to prevent rivals from producing similar
portfolio insurance products. (...) the competition accelerated and firms like Morgan Stanley, Bankers Trust,
Chase Investors Management and Kidder Peabody entered the business.” (Kyrillos and Tufano, 1994)
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decrease, arbitrageurs must tackle the mispricing more aggressively ex-ante, which increases
liquidity and the speed of arbitrage. In this sense, the arbitrage is contestable and the mere
threat of entry improves market efficiency. As entry costs decrease further, this deterrence
strategy becomes very costly as incumbent arbitrageurs must bear the cost of their adverse
price impact. As a result, they engage in less aggressive preemptive buying and let the new
arbitrageur enter.
When entry occurs in equilibrium, market liquidity improves along two dimensions. First,
arbitrageurs keep trading more aggressively than without entry threat, which decreases the
spread. This effect is consistent with evidence presented by Tufano (1989), who shows
that intermediaries launching new financial products charge nearly competitive prices even
during the early stages where they enjoy a monopolistic position in the product. Second,
local investors’ current demand becomes more elastic as they rationally anticipate a more
favourable market structure in the future. This leads to an increase in market depth and
shows that with low entry costs, an improvement in market depth should be a leading
indicator of an increase in the number of arbitrageurs. More generally, this result highlights
a key feature of the model: market depth is endogenously determined by the current and
anticipated market structure, as arbitrageurs’ market power and its evolution determine the
risk-sharing opportunities available to local investors, and thus the prices at which they are
willing to absorb arbitrageurs’ trades.
This paper introduces time-varying and uncertain shocks and an endogenous market
structure in models where large investors competing a` la Cournot trade with a competitive
fringe of investors (e.g. DeMarzo and Urosevic, 2007, Pritsker 2009).7 The time-variation
in shocks generates time-variation in the arbitrage profitability and encompasses “gradual
arbitrage”, as in Oehmke (2010), with the difference that the market depth is endogenous.
Time variation in shocks also generates a novel sign inversion effect, in which arbitrageurs
prevent prices from converging. Arbitrageurs’ destabilizing behaviour arises as an endoge-
nous response to the deterioration of the arbitrage profitability. This is in contrast to the
predatory trading literature, where arbitrageurs can be destabilizing as a response to the
need of other traders to reduce their positions, or to induce them to do so (Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2005, Attari, Mello and Ruckes, 2006, Fardeau, 2011a).
The analysis of arbitrageurs’ entry in the literature has been either informal (e.g. Shleifer
7There is another class of dynamic models of imperfectly competitive trading without competitive fringe:
see Vayanos (2001) and Rostek and Weretka(2011). I draw some comparisons between the two types of
models in Section 1.3.
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and Vishny 1997, Kondor 2009) or based on risk-neutral arbitrageurs (Oehmke, 2010, Zi-
grand, 2004 and 2006). Allowing for risk-averse arbitrageurs generates new effects such as the
non-monotonic relationship between entry and volatility conjectured by Shleifer and Vishny.
More generally, the model shows that entry decisions depend on the interaction between the
market structure and the risk-bearing capacity of all market participants. Pritsker (2009)
highlights the role of the “market structure of risk-bearing capacity” in a related paper about
large investors, but does not consider entry.
Sequential entry of arbitrageurs has - to the best of my knowledge - not been studied
in an asset pricing context. While the literature has traditionally focused on information
asymmetry and traders’ risk-aversion (or inventory effects) as determinants of market depth,
the model highlights market structure and its potential evolution as a new determinant
of market depth. Sequential entry and contestability are the subjects of classic papers in
Industrial Organization (e.g. Fudenberg-Tirole, 1987, Baumol, 1982).8 In a financial market,
it is interesting to see that the anticipations of consumers (here local investors) of the product
(liquidity) play an important role and make the equilibria self-fulfilling. For instance, the
mere anticipation of entry improves market depth, which makes it harder for arbitrageurs to
deter new traders from coming in. In other words, while classic IO papers typically assume
that there exist a representative consumer with a continuum of asset valuation, here the
elasticity of the liquidity demand (price impact) is endogenous. It affects and is affected by
the firms’ (i.e. arbitrageurs) strategic entry decisions.
Some predictions of the model are observationally equivalent to predictions delivered by
limits of arbitrage models.9 In particular, both types of models predict that assets with
identical cash-flows and risks can trade at different prices and that the spread between these
assets should decrease over time. The drivers of these effects are imperfect competition
on one hand, and capital constraints on the other hand, therefore it should be empirically
possible to disentangle these theories. Ruf (2011) shows that both effects matter to explain
the skewness risk premium in options market.
Imperfect competition among financial intermediaries (market-makers) is the subject of
an extensive literature in market microstructure (e.g. Dennert, 1993, Biais, Martimort and
8Note that simultaneous entry is also studied in the literature on non-competitive foundations of general
equilibrium. See Zigrand (2004) and references therein.
9Some examples of this extensive literature include Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Xiong (2001) , Kyle and
Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2009, 2010) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). A related
strand of literature attempts to explain the well-documented slow movement in capital (Duffie, 2010, and
Duffie and Strulovici, 2010)
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Rochet, 2000). The key difference with these papers is that I assume that all information
is public, which allows me to isolate the effect of market power on liquidity. Instead, Den-
nert considers price competition in a framework were market-makers face adverse selection.
Further, in his model, market-makers post quotes first, while here arbitrageurs compete in
quantities taking local investors’ schedules as given. In Biais et al., market-makers supply
liquidity by posting limit order schedules, whereas in my set-up arbitrageurs submit market
orders (Cournot competition).
I proceed as follows. In section 1.2, I describe the model. I solve for the equilibrium
with a given market structure in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, I endogenize the number of
arbitrageurs. Section 1.5 concludes. All proofs and figures are in the appendix.
1.2 A model of imperfectly competitive arbitrage
The model features two markets for identical assets (A and B). Some investors (arbitrageurs)
can trade freely across both markets, while others (local investors) are constrained to trade
in only one market, a building block similar to Gromb and Vayanos (2002). A key difference
with this paper is that arbitrageurs are imperfectly competitive and are not financially
constrained.
1.2.1 Set-up
Assets and timeline. The economy has three periods 0, 1 and 2, and consists of two
identical risky assets (A and B) in zero net supply. The risky assets pay off a liquidating
dividend at time 2, D2 = D + 1 + 2, where t are iid normal variables with mean 0 and
variance σ2. The fundamental shocks 1 and 2 are realized at time 1 and time 2, respectively,
and are publicly observed. I denote Dt = Et (D2), the conditional expected value of the
dividend. There is also a risk-free asset in perfectly elastic supply with return r normalized
to 0. Trading takes places at time 0 and time 1 and consumption at time 2.
Agents and preferences. The economy is made of two types of traders. First, there are
local investors in markets A and B, each represented by a competitive agent with CARA util-
ity and absolute risk-aversion coefficient a: u
(
Ck2
)
= − exp (−aCk2 ), with k = A,B. Second,
there is a finite number n of arbitrageurs indexed by i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n < ∞)). In the basic
version of the model, n is fixed. Later on, I endogenize the number of arbitrageurs and allow
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for n to change endogenously over time through the entry of new arbitrageurs at time 1. Arbi-
trageurs have CARA utility with absolute risk-aversion coefficient b: U (Ci2) = − exp (−bCi2),
with i = 1, ..., n. Arbitrageurs have no endowment in the risky assets. Importantly, local
investors are restricted to trade their local risky asset, while arbitrageurs can trade all risky
assets. In other words, markets A and B for the risky asset are completely segmented. All
investors have access to the risk-free asset.
Liquidity / supply shocks. The local investors in market k receive endowment shocks
sk01 at time 1 and s
k
12 at time 2. I assume that shocks are opposite across markets: s
A
t =
−sBt = st, for t = 0, 1. The shocks are correlated to the payoff of the risky asset, and
are opposite across markets. Since risky assets are identical and A- and B markets, local
investors could achieve perfect risk sharing by trading with each other in the risky asset.
However market segmentation prevents direct trading between local investors and creates a
trading opportunity for arbitrageurs, who can intermediate trades by buying from investors
with low valuation (in market A) and selling to investors with high valuation (in market B).
Doing so, arbitrageurs will contribute to integrate markets A and B and provide liquidity
to local investors. Thus the endowment shocks create a demand for liquidity and constitute
the “supply” of assets available for arbitrage from the point of view of arbitrageurs.
I consider two situations. In the first situation, all traders know in advance the values of
s0 and s1, i.e. they know the magnitude of the supply. In this case, the trading opportunity
corresponds to a textbook arbitrage since it involves no risk. Allowing for s0 to be different
from s1 helps me understand how changes in supply affect the dynamics of arbitrage. Many
results can be derived in this simple risk-free arbitrage case, in particular gradual arbitrage
and sign inversion. The second situation is closer to a real-life arbitrage opportunity, because
it entails some risk. I assume that the magnitude of the second shock, s1, is random from
the point of view of time 0 for all traders: s1 is normally distributed with mean s¯1 and
variance z21 , and is independent of t. This risky arbitrage case allows me to investigate how
uncertainty affects the dynamics of strategic arbitrage and arbitrageurs’ risk-management
strategies.
Discussion. The framework has two different interpretations. In the first one, arbitrageurs
stand for market-makers providing immediacy for traders with opposite trading motives who
arrive in the market at different times, as in Grossman-Miller (1988). In this interpreta-
tion, assets A and B stand for the same asset in two different subperiods of each time and
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arbitrageurs smooth out the temporary order imbalances by holding the asset in between
subperiods. In the second interpretation, arbitrageurs can be thought of as large hedge funds
or prop trading desks chasing mispricings between identical or quasi-identical assets, such
as on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries, Siamese stocks (e.g. Royal Dutch and Shell), etc.
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) is a standard example of this kind of traders.10
The shocks affecting local investors can stem from institutional or regulatory frictions. For
instance, index trackers and mutual fund managers must rebalance their portfolios following
index additions or deletions because of benchmarking constraints. Negative shocks in one as-
set can force portfolio managers of open-ended funds to sell other assets to meet redemptions,
etc.11
1.2.2 Maximization problems
Local investors. At time 2, local investors consume their entire wealth:
Ck2 = W
k
2 = Y
k
1 D2 + E
k
1 , k=A,B
In this equation, Y k1 and E
k
1 represent investors k’s end-of-period positions in the risky and
risk-free assets at time 1. That is, local investors in market k enter period 2 at which they
only consume with a position Y k1 in the risky asset and E
k
1 in the risk-free asset.
12 I denote
ykt the time t trade in risky asset k and p
k
t its price. The law of motion of positions is:
Y kt = Y
k
t−1 + y
k
t for the risky asset and E
k
t = E
k
t−1 − ykt + skt t+1, for the risk-free asset, for
k = A,B.13 The local investors’ dynamic budget constraint follows:
W kt+1 = W
k
t + Y
k
t
(
pkt+1 − pkt
)
+ skt t+1, k=A,B (1.1)
This equation shows that local investors’ wealth changes either because of capital gains,
Y kt
(
pkt+1 − pkt
)
, or because of shocks, skt t+1. The local investors maximize the expected
10LTCM also provide a good illustration of the issue of size and market impact. As Pe´rold (1999) puts it:
“The firm had also experienced many instances in which prices moved adversely while LTCM was attempting
to exit a position after it had converged, suggesting that the firm’s trades were having a larger market impact”
(than previously).
11Gromb and Vayanos (2010) provide more details and other examples.
12Observe also that at time 2, each market is perfectly liquid, so that pk2 = D2.
13Since local investors have CARA preferences, we can set their initial endowment Ek−1 = 0 without loss
of generality.
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utility of consumption subject to the dynamic budget constraint:
for k = A,B, max
(Y kt )t=0,1
E
[
u
(
Ck2
)]
(1.2)
s.t. W kt+1 = W
k
t + Yt
(
pkt+1 − pkt
)
+ skt t+1
Arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs face a different budget constraint because they can trade in
both markets. Their final wealth W i2 is equal to:
W i2 = B
i
1 +
∑
k=A,B
X i,k1 D2, i = 1, . . . , n (1.3)
Note that X i,kt and x
i,k
t represent the arbitrageur i’s position and trades at time t in asset k,
and are related as follows: X i,kt = X
i,k
t−1 + x
i,k
t . The position in the risk-free asset evolves as:
Bit = B
i
t−1 −
∑
k=A,B x
i,k
t p
k
t . Therefore the dynamic budget constraint is:
W it+1 = W
i
t +
∑
k=A,B
X i,kt
(
pkt+1 − pkt
)
, i = 1, . . . , n
As in Gromb and Vayanos (2002), I will focus on equilibria in which arbitrageurs take
opposite positions in each market: for t = 0, 1, xi,At = −xi,Bt = xit. Given that assets A and
B are both in zero net supply, this implies that arbitrageurs do not bear any aggregate risk.14
With opposite positions in markets A and B, the dynamic budget constraint becomes:
W it+1 = W
i
t +Xt
(
pBt − pAt −
(
pBt+1 − pAt+1
))
= W it +Xt (∆t −∆t+1) , i = 1, . . . , n (1.4)
The arbitrageur’s dynamic budget constraint shows that their wealth changes via capital
gains in the arbitrage. The arbitrageurs’ problem is to choose trades xit, t = 0, 1, to maximize
their expected utility of consumption subject to (1.4) and the price schedules for assets A
and B. The price schedules are derived from local investors’ inverted demand schedules, and
imposing market-clearing:
Y kt +
n∑
i=1
X i,kt = 0, k = A,B, t = 0, 1 (1.5)
14In the more general case where the supply is different from zero, an additional risk-sharing motive would
emerge along the results presented in the paper.
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The price schedules map the effect of arbitrageurs’ trades into the price in each market. That
is, a price schedule represent the market-clearing price at which the competitive fringe of local
investors in each market is ready to trade all possible quantities submitted by arbitrageurs.
Hence arbitrageurs will internalize their price impact in each market when choosing their
positions in the risky asset. Of course, the specific form of the local investors’ demand
schedules also depends on the liquidity / supply shocks, and in particular, on whether future
shocks are known in advance or are random. In the next section, I derive the equilibrium in
the risk-free and risky arbitrage cases.
1.3 Equilibrium with risk-free and risky arbitrage
In this section, I solve for local investors’ and arbitrageurs’ equilibrium strategies, taking the
number of arbitrageurs as given. When the arbitrage is risk-free, the price dynamics depend
crucially on whether the supply shocks are constant or not. The risky arbitrage case allows
me to analyze in details arbitrageurs’ risk-management strategies.
1.3.1 Risk-free arbitrage
Price schedules. Here I assume that s0 and s1 are positive shocks and are known in
advance by all market participants. As a first step, it is useful to look at the price schedules
faced by arbitrageurs at time 1. In our standard CARA-normal framework, local investors’
demand in market A is:
Y A1 =
E (D2)− pA1
aσ2
− s1 (1.6)
Local investors in market A experience a positive shock s1, which reduces their demand
for asset A. In market B, local investors have similar demand functions (in pB1 ), except
that they experience an opposite shock, increasing their demand for asset B. Using the
assumption of opposite positions in markets A and B, and imposing market-clearing (1.5),
these demand functions generate the following price schedules pk1 (Q1), where I use as a
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shorthand Q1 =
∑n
i=1X
i
1:
pA1 (Q1) = E1 (D2)− aσ2
[
s1 −
n∑
i=1
X i1
]
= E1 (D2)− aσ2
[
s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0 −
n∑
i=1
xi1
]
pB1 (Q1) = E1 (D2) + aσ2
[
s1 −
n∑
i=1
X i1
]
= E1 (D2) + aσ2
[
s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0 −
n∑
i=1
xi1
]
Note that we used the assumption that arbitrageurs have no preexisting position in any of
the risky assets, i.e. xi0 = X
i
0. Combining the two schedules, we get the following schedule
for the arbitrage spread, ∆1 (Q1) = p
B
1 (Q1)− pA1 (Q1):
∆1 (.) = 2aσ
2
[
s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0 −
n∑
i=1
xi1
]
(1.7)
The schedule has an intuitive form. The first component, 2aσ2s1 is the price wedge that
would prevail between assets A and B in the absence of trading. That is, A-investors, who
experience a positive liquidity (supply) shock, would have to hold all the additional supply
and would thus value the asset at a discount aσ2s1 relative to its expected payoff E1 (D2).
B-investors would value the risky asset at exactly the opposite premium, as they experience
a negative shock of similar magnitude. Hence in total the price wedge would be 2aσ2s1,
increasing with the risk of the asset, σ2, the risk-aversion of local investors a, and the size of
the liquidity shock s1. The second component of (1.7) represents the impact of arbitrageurs’
trades. Arbitrageurs can bring prices of assets A and B closer by setting up a long position
in the spread (corresponding to a long position in asset A minus a short position in asset B).
Arbitrageurs’ price impact, |∂∆1
∂xi1
| = 2aσ2, depends on local investors’ risk-aversion and the
risk of the fundamental.15 When they are more risk-averse, local investors are more reluctant
to hold the risky asset, and thus will require larger price concessions when trading, resulting
in a larger price impact.
Equilibrium strategies and spreads. To illustrate the strategic choice faced by arbi-
trageurs, note that because arbitrageurs set up opposite positions, their objective at time
1 boils down to maximizing the trading profit, xi1∆1 (.), where ∆1 (.) is given by (1.7) and
depends not only on arbitrageur i’s trade, xi1, but also all other arbitrageurs’ trades
∑
−i x
−i
1 ,
with
∑
−i x
−i
1 + x
i
1 =
∑n
i=1 x
i
1, and on the positions established at time 0,
∑
i x
i
0. Hence at
time 0, arbitrageurs takes into account the dynamic impact of their own trades as well as of
15I take the absolute value of the derivative as it is more intuitive to compare positive numbers.
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other arbitrageurs’ on the spread. In the appendix, I work backwards to derive arbitrageurs’
optimal trading strategies and obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 In the risk-free case, there is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium in which
arbitrageurs’ trades in market A are:
xi0 = x0 =
1
φn
s0 +
n− 1
(n+ 1)2 φn
s1 (1.8)
xi1 = x1 = −
n
(n+ 1)φn
s0 + φ¯ns1, (1.9)
The equilibrium spread is:
∆0 = 2aσ
2
[
ψns0 + ψ¯ns1
]
(1.10)
∆1 = 2aσ
2
[
− n
(n+ 1)φn
s0 + φ¯ns1
]
(1.11)
with φn =
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
(n+ 1)2
; φ¯n =
1
n+ 1
− n (n− 1)
(n+ 1)3 φn
ψn =
n2 + n+ 2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
; ψ¯n =
3n2 + 5n+ 2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
Gradual arbitrage with constant liquidity shocks (s0 = s1 = s)
To gain intuition into the equilibrium, it is useful to consider the special case s0 = s1 = s,
with s > 0, to fix ideas. Then arbitrageurs’ trades are xi0 = κ0,ns and x
i
1 = κ1,ns, with for all
n ≥ 1, κ0,n ≡ 1φn
(
1 + n−1
(n+1)2
)
∈ ]0, 1[ and κ1,n ≡ − n(n+1)φn + φ¯n ∈ ]0, 1[. Further, the total
purchases are:
n∑
i=1
xi0 = nκ0,ns < s and
n∑
i=1
xi1 = nκ1,ns < s
Hence arbitrageurs never fully absorb the asset supply caused by the liquidity shock in each
market. As a result, the spreads between A- and B-asset prices remain strictly positive in
equilibrium:
∆0 = 2aσ
2κ¯0,ns > 0, ∆1 = 2aσ
2κ¯1,ns > 0
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Why does competition not eliminate the mispricing as soon as n > 1? It can be seen
from the time-1 objective:
max
xi1
xi1∆1 (.) = max
xi1
2aσ2xi1
(
s−
n∑
i=1
xi0 −
∑
−i
x−i1 − xi1
)
(1.12)
For a given liquidity shock s, given other arbitrageurs’ trades
∑
−i x
−i
1 , and initial positions∑
i x
i
0, arbitrageur i has no interest to buy the entire residual supply, s−
∑n
i=1 x
i
0−
∑
−i x
−i
1 ,
for he would then close the spread and make a zero profit on his trade. Instead, his best
response, from the first-order condition of problem (1.12), is to trade half the residual supply:
xi1 =
s−∑ni=1 xi0−∑−i x−i1
2
. Since each arbitrageur has the same impact on the price, all arbi-
trageurs play a symmetric role, and in the unique (subgame) equilibrium, all arbitrageurs
trade the same quantity, xi1 =
s−∑ni=1 xi0
n+1
.
This quantity is negatively related to the arbitrageurs’ first period trades,
∑n
i=1 x
i
0. In-
deed, to keep the spread open, arbitrageurs need to limit their price impact, which is perma-
nent, as shown by equation (1.7). The reason why price impact is permanent is that for local
investors in, say market A, who have a low valuation for the asset, selling the asset to arbi-
trageurs helps insure against the first liquidity shock, but also, to some extent, against the
second liquidity shock. Indeed the second shock is also correlated with the asset payoff (and
has same constant part s). Hence hedging at time 0 can serve as proxy hedging for time 1.
Thus there is some substitutability between insurance (liquidity) received from arbitrageurs
at time 0 and that received at time 1. The fact that the liquidity received by local investors at
time 0 “durably” reduces their hedging demand at time 1 erodes arbitrageurs’ market power.
Hence providing liquidity by intermediating trades across markets bears resemblance to the
provision of a durable good by a monopolist and is subject to similar Coasian dynamics.16
The equilibrium implication of these dynamics is that when the profitability of the arbi-
trage is constant over time (s0 = s1 = s), arbitrageurs increase their positions only gradually.
This results in gradual convergence of prices towards the fundamental, even more so if the
market is particularly concentrated. When competition increases, each arbitrageurs buys
16Coase (1972)’s intuitions about the durable goods problem for a monopoly have been formalized by
Stockey (1981), Bulow (1982) Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and Kahn (1986), among others. In an
asset pricing context, see Vayanos (1999), Kihlstrom (2000), DeMarzo and Urosevic (2007), Pritsker (2009),
and Edelstein, Sureda-Gomilla, Urosevic, and Wonder (2010). Here the fixed horizon of the model works as
a commitment device for arbitrageurs. The discrete trading periods also limits the substitutability between
time 0 and time 1 liquidity. In a full-fledged model, with shrinking time among trading periods and an
infinite horizon, the Coase conjecture would apply and the spread would always be zero.
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(sells) a smaller amount in market A (B). However the aggregate quantity traded in equi-
librium increases, as Figure 1.3 shows. In the limit, arbitrageurs fully intermediate trades
between A- and B-investors and the equilibrium spread converges to zero. The following
corollary summarizes these results:
Corollary 1 Suppose s0 = s1 = s, then
• the spread is always positive and decreases with the number of arbitrageurs at time 0
and time 1: ∂∆t
∂n
< 0, t = 0, 1,
• the spread decreases over time: ∆2 = 0 < ∆1 < ∆0,
• and it decreases faster as n increases: ∂
[
∆1−∆0
∆0
]
∂n
< 0.
• When n→∞, the arbitrageurs absorb the entire liquidity shock at time 0 and time 1,
and the spread converges to zero: limn→∞∆t = 0, t = 0, 1.17
These results generalize the idea of “gradual arbitrage” developed in Oehmke (2010) in a
setting where the price schedules against which arbitrageurs trade are endogenous. Owing
to imperfect competition, arbitrageurs can slow down the speed of arbitrage across markets,
resulting in gradual convergence of prices towards the fundamental value.18 Said differently,
as arbitrageurs will set better prices in the future, it is optimal for local investors to hold
some of the excess supply created by their liquidity shock. As Oehmke points out, this mech-
anism can account for the observed slow reversal of prices towards fundamentals following
shocks documented, for instance, by Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002) in the convertible
arbitrage market, and Coval and Stafford (2007) in the equity market.
Time-varying price impact. In Oehmke’s model, as in other related papers in the liter-
ature (e.g. Carlin, Sousa-Lobo and Viswanathan, 2007, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005),
arbitrageurs trade against an exogenous price schedule with constant price impact coeffi-
cient.19 With endogenous price schedules, the arbitrageurs’ price impact is no longer constant
over time. It decreases as time passes and depends on the market structure:20
17Note that this result does not depend on the assumption s0 = s1 = s.
18In Oehmke’s model, the arbitrage is risky but arbitrageurs are risk-neutral.
19As some of these models are framed in continuous time, there is also a temporary price impact component
that helps pin down the equilibrium speed of trading.
20This result is general and does not depend on the assumption that shocks are constant over time, or
that shocks are known in advance.
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Corollary 2 Price impact decreases over time, even more so if the market is concentrated
(n small):
• At time 1, arbitrageurs’ price impact is |∂∆1
∂xi1
| = 2aσ2 (i = 1, . . . , n)
• At time 0, the equilibrium spread schedule is
∆0 (Q0) = 2aσ
2
[
s0 +
s1
(n+ 1)
− n+ 2
n+ 1
∑
i
xi0
]
, (1.13)
i.e. arbitrageurs’ price impact is |∂∆0
∂xi0
| = 2aσ2 n+2
n+1
> |∂∆1
∂xi1
|.
The spread schedule at time 0 has two components. The first component, 2aσ2
(
s0 +
s1
(n+1)
)
,
is the spread that would obtain if arbitrageurs did not trade at time 0 in equilibrium. It is
increasing in s0 and s1, because local investors anticipate that risk-sharing at time 1 will be
limited due to arbitrageurs’ market power. Indeed, an increase in market competitiveness
improves risk-sharing and in the limit eliminates s1. The second component represents the
arbitrageurs’ price impact, aσ2 n+2
n+1
. Two opposite effects determine the evolution of price
impact over time. First, given that new information accrues over time, the conditional
variance of the asset payoff is decreasing over time as uncertainty realizes. This implies that
local investors in each market are “more risk-averse” at time 0 than at time 1. Since the
variance of each innovation t is constant over time, price impact should be twice as large
at time 0 than at time 1. This is not the case, however, because a second effect tends to
reduce price impact.21 As local investors anticipate that arbitrageurs will provide further
liquidity at time 1, they understand that they will have another trading opportunity to
share risk, and this reduces their effective level of risk-aversion ex-ante. Said differently,
local investors are less desperate to receive liquidity if they anticipate that more liquidity
is coming later on.22 The more concentrated the market is, however, the more rationed
liquidity will be (aσ2 n+2
n+1
is maximal for n = 1), and therefore price impact is higher at
time 0 if the market is concentrated - or, more precisely, expected to remain concentrated.23
Note that at time 1, arbitrageurs’ price impact depends only on risk-aversion and not on
the market structure. This is because at time 2, the asset pays off, which is equivalent to
21It is easy to see that, indeed for any n ≥ 1, 2aσ2 n+2n+1 < 4aσ2.
22As noted above, these Coasian dynamics crucially depend on the fixed horizon of the model, and arbi-
trageurs’ inability to commit to trade only once.
23In Section 1.4.2, I allow for a new arbitrageur to enter at time 1 upon sinking a fixed cost, therefore
local investors’ expectations about the future number of arbitrageurs determines price impact at time 0.
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restoring perfect liquidity in the market. If the market was perfectly competitive also at
time 1, the market structure adjustment of time 0 price impact would disappear, and price
impact would be constantaσ2 n+2
n+1
→ aσ2.
This dynamic “contamination” of illiquidity from period 1 to period 0 is therefore due to
imperfect competition and the limited risk-sharing that it implies. The same dynamic effect
is present in Rostek and Weretka (2010), who study a setting with n strategic arbitrageurs
and no competitive fringe. Their model, however, predicts that price impact should increase
over time, because only the second effect, stemming from the opportunity to retrade and
diversify risk further in the future, is present. The comparison of our results therefore reveals
that the direction of change of market depth over time - whether it increases or decreases
over time - should depend not only on the market microstructure but also on the uncertainty
surrounding the asset payoff. Here the model predicts that price impact should decrease as
the date of the asset payoff approaches, but even more so if only a few large arbitrageurs are
active in the trade.
Optimal execution with endogenous market depth. An interesting implication of
the time-varying price impact is that a monopolistic arbitrageur does not equally split his
trade across periods: for n = 1, κ0,1 =
2
5
> κ1,1 =
3
10
, i.e. x0 > x1. (More generally, for
an arbitrary number of arbitrageurs, x0 > x1) This is a key difference with the literature
on optimal execution of large orders (e.g. Bertsimas and Lo, 1998), which shows that with
constant price impact, it is optimal for a monopolistic trader to break up orders equally over
time. Thus the model highlights that in concentrated markets, optimal order execution and
market depth are jointly determined and depend on the deep characteristics of the market,
such as investors’ risk-aversion, asset volatility and the market structure.
Sign inversion with changing supply shocks (s0 ≥ 0, s1 ≥ 0)
The case where the supply of arbitrage changes over time brings further insight into the
mechanisms and generates new predictions. First, proposition 1 shows that the time-0 trade
(1.8) depends on both s0 and s1, unless there is a single arbitrageur. This shows that when
competition increases, the pressure to share risk with local investors increases, so that local
investors are able to start hedging their future risk. Note that, independently of the number
of arbitrageurs, the time-0 equilibrium spread always depends on both s0 and s1, because
future certain shocks are immediately reflected in asset prices.
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Sign inversion. Changes in shocks, i.e. variation in the arbitrage supply, generates sign
inversion: when both shocks are positive, ∆1 may become negative, even though s1 ≥ 0.
Remember that a positive shock implies that A-investors should value the asset less than
B-investors, suggesting that ∆1 should be positive. Note from equation (1.10), that ∆0 is
always positive with s0 ≥ 0 and s1 ≥ 0. The sign of the spread can switch over time if the
profitability of the arbitrage deteriorates:
Corollary 3 Suppose that s0 and s1 are positive.
• At time 0, the spread is always positive and decreases with the number of arbitrageurs:
∂∆0
∂n
< 0.
• At time 1:
– The spread is negative if and only if s1 is small enough relative to s0: ∆1 ≤ 0 ⇔
s1 ≤ αns0, with 0 < αn < 1.
The condition for sign inversion is that liquidity shocks decrease sufficiently over time, i.e.
that the arbitrage profitability decreases sufficiently. An interpretation of the condition is
that sign inversion may occur in the aftermath of a large shock, and close to the time where
assets mature, or where convergence occurs for exogenous reasons (e.g. when an on-the-run
bond is close to becoming off-the-run). Hence the model predicts that sign inversion should
occur following periods of low liquidity (or equivalently large price divergence).
To understand the intuition of the mechanism, consider an example in which s0 > 0
and s1 = 0. In this case, local investors in market A initially short the asset, receiving
partial insurance against the positive supply (liquidity) shock from arbitrageurs who limit
the amount they buy thanks to market power. At time 1, since there is no reason to hedge
anymore (s1 = 0), local investors seek to close their hedge by buying back the asset (indeed,
yA1 > 0). However, arbitrageurs continue to limit liquidity at this time, so that local investors
cannot fully close their short position. This pushes the price of asset A above its expected
value. As a consequence, local investors remain short, Y A1 < 0, as one can see by setting
s1 = 0 in equation (1.6). This is optimal since the price of asset A will (on average) drop
at time 2. (Arbitrageurs are not subject to this effect since they are not exposed to market
risk, taking opposite positions across markets.) Since the opposite must occur in market B,
the price of asset A trades at a premium relative to the fundamental and the price of asset B
at a discount, resulting in a negative spread at time 1. Of course, arbitrageurs earn a profit
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even if the spread sign inverts, because their profit depends on the fact that prices do not
converge and not on the sign. As I show in the proof of Proposition 1, the trading profit at
time 1, x1∆1, is equal to 2aσ
2 (s1−
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+1)2
, with x1 =
s1−
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+1
and ∆1 = 2aσ
2 s1−
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+1
.
Hence, arbitrageurs care about the magnitude of the mispricing rather than the sign.
As Lemma 3 shows, s1 does not have to be zero, but small enough relative to s0. Intu-
itively, the need to revert the hedge must simply be large enough for the spread to invert at
time 1. Hence, the time-1 spread can turn negative even though all liquidity shocks imply
that it should be positive. Interestingly, it is precisely when local investors’ demand pres-
sures decrease that arbitrageurs push the spread to invert. Hence it is when asset prices
should converge towards their fundamental value that arbitrageurs cause a breakdown of the
intuitive relationship between A-and-B asset prices. What causes this breakdown is that
arbitrageurs limit liquidity both when local investors need to sell and to buy. Because it is
driven by the variation in the arbitrage profitability, this result is not present in Oehmke
(2010) in which only the initial shock matters.24
This result may shed light on recent puzzling evidence about closely-related assets. Indeed
several standard and intuitive relationships broke down in the aftermath of the 2007-2009
financial crisis. For instance, the 7-and 10-year swap spread turned negative for the first time
in 2010 (Business Week, 23/03/2010). Uninsured municipal bonds became more expensive
than similar insured bonds issued by the same city also in 2010 (Bergstresser et al., 2011).25
The extent of the mispricing, in particular in the municipal bond market, makes standard
explanation implausible. For instance, a negative swap spread may be justified by heightened
concerns about sovereign risk. Similarly, concerns about monoline insurers may reduce the
premium attached to insured bonds to zero. However, it is hard to see how it could generate a
negative premium. Although these explanations may be partially correct, the model offers a
single complementary mechanism based on market structure and easing of demand pressures.
24Specifically, Oehmke considers the time-inconsistent trading strategies of strategic arbitrageurs facing
two exogenous demand curves for the same asset. Since the strategy is solved ex-ante, all results are a
function of the initial liquidity shock, which eliminates the possibility of time variation in the arbitrage
profitability.
25Inflation-protected Treasuries also became cheaper than similar nominal bonds (Pflueger and Viceira,
2011). Although our explanation could be appealing, the timing seems less consistent with our mechanism,
since the sign inversion occurred in 2009, presumably, in the middle of the crisis instead of at the end.
Pflueger and Viceira show that the negative breakeven inflation in the Treasury market can be attributed
to a larger liquidity discount for the TIPS and not to a sign of deflation expectations.
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1.3.2 Risky arbitrage
In this section, I assume that s1 is not known at time 0. Investors only know that it is
normally distributed with mean s¯1 and variance z
2
1 . I also make the following assumption
about the parameters:
Assumption 1 a2σ2z21 <
(n+1)2
2n+1
Since the second shock is random from the point of view of time 0, the arbitrage is no
longer risk-free. Therefore, even if arbitrageurs can eliminate all fundamental risk by taking
opposite positions in assets A and B, they face uncertainty about the future profitability
of the arbitrage. As in standard noise trader risk models, the potential deepening of the
mispricing is short-lived, and the prices assets A and B converge at time 2 when the assets
pay off. This risky arbitrage case allows me to delve more deeply into the mechanisms and
to analyze arbitrageurs’ risk-management strategies.
Price schedules and equilibrium
At time 1, the problem is not different from the risk-free case. However at time 0, all investors
face uncertainty about the magnitude of the future liquidity shock. I show in the appendix
that at time 0, the spread schedule faced by arbitrageurs is the following:
∆0 (.) = 2aσ
2
[
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
− n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
xi0
]
, (1.14)
with φa =
a2σ2z21
(n+ 1)2 ra
and ra = 1− a2σ2z21
2n+ 1
(n+ 1)2
(1.15)
There are two key differences with respect to the risk-free case, in which the schedule is given
by equation (1.13), which I reproduce here for convenience: ∆0 (.) = 2aσ
2
[
s0 +
s1
(n+1)
− n+2
n+1
∑
i x
i
0
]
.
The first part of the schedule, s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
, represents the price divergence that would pre-
vail in equilibrium in the absence of trade. Given that ra < 1, we have: s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
>
E0
[
s0 +
s1
(n+1)
]
, which captures the effect of convexity, as in Jensen’s inequality. The second
part represents arbitrageurs’ price impact. It increases by a factor 1 +φa > 1 relative to the
risk-free case. The increase is larger if the volatility of the liquidity shock z21 , fundamental
volatility σ2, or risk aversion a is large. The effect of the market structure, captured by
the term n+2
n+1
, is amplified by the uncertainty about future liquidity shocks. Price impact
increases because local investors require larger discounts to hold their risky asset when future
shocks are random.
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Uncertainty about future liquidity shocks also affects arbitrageurs’ strategies at time 0,
both through their own risk aversion and through the change in the price schedules. The
different channels appear clearly in their value function:
Proposition 2 At time 0, the arbitrageurs’ value function is given by
J i0 = max
xi0
−r−
1
2
b exp
[
−2baσ2
(
xi0∆ˆ0 + (1− φb)
(
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
(
2
∑
i
xi0 − s¯1
))]
where ∆ˆ0 =
∆0 (.)
2aσ2
, rb = 1 +
4abσ2z21
(n+ 1)2
and φb =
4abσ2z21
(n+ 1)2 rb
(1.16)
Arbitrageurs’ value function is made of three components:
1. Their time-0 trading profit 0, xi0∆ˆ0, i.e. quantity times (normalized) price gap ∆ˆ.
2. The time-1 continuation profit, in which we can distinguish two parts, depending on
their relation to risk aversion:
(a) The first part, (1− φb) (
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+1)2
, is decreasing in arbitrageurs’ risk aversion b, and
more generally in z21 , σ2, and a. Hence I will refer to it as the precautionary (or
hedging) motive. The coefficient φb measures by how much arbitrageurs reduce
their aggressiveness in tackling the arbitrage gap at time 0 for fear of facing too
much risk at time 1. Note that φb depends on the product of a and b because
an increase in local investors’ risk-aversion makes them more reluctant to hold
the risky asset and thus restricts arbitrageurs’ risk-sharing opportunities. The
hedging motive is, perhaps surprisingly, increasing in the total size of previous
trades,
∑
i x
i
0. This is because trading aggressiveness at time 0 works as an
indirect hedge against large shocks at time 1 by reducing the spread permanently.
The strength of the hedging motive also depends on the number of arbitrageurs.
A change in market structure has two conflicting effects:
Corollary 4 At time 1, when the number of arbitrageurs increases, there is
• a business-stealing effect: ∂
1
(n+1)2
∂n
< 0, which reduces the coefficient 1−φb
(n+1)2
,
• a co-insurance effect: ∂(1−φb)
∂n
> 0, which increases it.
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The business-stealing effect always dominates the co-insurance effect, i.e.
∂
1−φb
(n+1)2
∂n
<
0.
The business-stealing effect is the standard consequence of stronger competition
in a Cournot setting. The co-insurance effect is positive because as n increases,
risk-sharing becomes more effective: more competition means that arbitrageurs
supply more liquidity and each arbitrageur benefits from this collective effect.
(b) The second part of the time-1 continuation payoff represents the “strategic mo-
tive”:
− s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
(
2
∑
i
xi0 − s¯1
)
It is increasing in arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion b and decreasing in previous trades,
as arbitrageurs have an incentive to strategically limit their positions at time 0
to be able to fully exploit the arbitrage opportunity later. The key driver of the
strategic motive is the expected level of arbitrage risk s¯1 instead of the risk of the
arbitrage risk z21 , as explained in more details below.
Proposition 3 When arbitrage is risky, there is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium charac-
terized by:
xi0 =
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
− 2s¯1
(n+1)2rb
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
(1.17)
xi1 =
s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
(1.18)
The equilibrium spread between asset B and asset A is
∆0 = 2aσ
2
[
Φa
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
+ (1− Φa) 2s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
]
, with Φa ∈ [0, 1] (1.19)
∆1 =
2aσ2
n+ 1
[
−n
d
s0 +
(
s1 − n
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1) rb − 2ra
drarb
s¯1
)]
(1.20)
with d = φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb.
The time 1 subgame is similar to the risk-free case, thus I focus on time 0 where uncertainty
about future shocks generates a number of interesting effects. By comparing (1.8) and
(1.17), one can see that arbitrageurs equilibrium trades generalize in a very intuitive way.
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To understand the mechanisms, it is helpful to decompose x0 in two terms:
x0 =
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
−
2s¯1
(n+1)2rb
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
(1.21)
The first term shows that arbitrageurs buy a fraction 1
φn+(n+2)φa+2nφb
of the expected spread
that would prevail in the absence of liquidity provision (the maximum spread), s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
.
This maximum spread represents the demand for liquidity addressed to arbitrageurs at
time 0. Only part of this demand is served as arbitrageurs’ market power allows them to
ration liquidity. Arbitrageurs serve a smaller fraction of the demand as their risk aversion
b increases, due to precautionary concerns, and as local investors’ risk aversion a increases,
because arbitrageurs have a larger price impact at time 0, which prompts them to scale
back their trade (as captured by the coefficient φa). What is interesting is that arbitrageurs
provide less than a fraction of the maximum spread, since the second term in (1.21) is
negative. The second term captures the effect of the arbitrageurs’ strategic motive. It
becomes more negative as risk-aversion decreases. In the limit, as arbitrageurs become risk-
neutral, the strategic motive is strongest:
when b→ 0, xi0 →
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
φn + (n+ 2)φa
−
2s¯1
(n+1)2
φn + (n+ 2)φa
(1.22)
In fact, the strategic motive is present even in the absence of uncertainty about liquidity
shocks. To eliminate uncertainty, consider the limit case where arbitrageurs are risk-neutral
b→ 0, and uncertainty vanishes z1 → 0. Then x0 converges to (1.8), its equilibrium quantity
when the arbitrage is risk-free (assuming s1 = s¯1):
When z1 → 0, b→ 0, xi0 →
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)
φn
−
2s¯1
(n+1)2
φn
=
1
φn
s0 +
n− 1
(n+ 1)2 φn
s1
Hence in hindsight, this decomposition highlights a fact that was hard to identify when
the arbitrage was risk-free. Arbitrageurs respond to their commitment problem by buying
less than a fraction of the maximum spread, s0 +
s1
(n+1)ra
. This reduction, − 2s¯1
(n+1)2rb
, arises
because arbitrageurs strategically refrain from tackling the spread too aggressively at time
0, in the hope that a large shock will increase the local investors’ risk-sharing needs at time
1. Arbitrageurs “speculate” more when the market is more concentrated (n small) and the
expected shock s¯1 is large. Given the partial substitutability between liquidity provision at
time 0 and time 1, arbitrageurs must reduce liquidity provision, i.e. decrease x0, to exploit
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large liquidity needs as much as possible later on.
The strategic motive resembles the standard risk-management mechanism that arises
in models where competitive arbitrageurs face financial constraints. Several papers in the
limits of arbitrage literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Gromb and Vayanos, 2002)
show that financially-constrained arbitrageurs refrain from taking on too much risk early on
in order to save capital and be able to exploit potentially large price discrepancies at later
periods. This mechanism is based on the limited amount of capital available to competitive
arbitrageurs in the short-term. Here the effect is related to market power and is a response
to the perfect foresight of local investors, which erodes arbitrageurs’ market power as in
the classic durable goods monopoly problem. Interestingly, the strategic motive is strongest
when arbitrageurs are risk-neutral, precisely when they are most likely to aggressively tackle
arbitrage opportunities.
Since the precautionary and the strategic motives have opposite dependence on arbi-
trageurs’ risk aversion, an increase in b has an ambiguous effect.
Arbitrageurs’ risk aversion and liquidity
According to Friedman (1953), speculators reduce price volatility by smoothing out tempo-
rary price fluctuations. Given that this view implies a contrarian behaviour, it may seem
desirable to have risk-loving arbitrageurs for markets to be efficient. This is no longer the
case when arbitrageurs have price impact: the spread between assets A and B may increase
as arbitrageurs become risk-neutral. On one hand, a decrease in risk aversion increases
arbitrageurs’ trading aggressiveness to tackle the arbitrage. On the other hand, a lower
risk-aversion makes them more likely to engage in strategic “speculation”, as shown by the
following result:
Corollary 5 An increase in arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion may result in them providing more
or less liquidity at time 0. There are two opposite effects:
∂xi0
∂b
= κ
−n (n+ 1)2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
precautionary motive < 0
+ s¯1
(
d+
2n
rb
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reduction in strategic motive > 0
 , κ > 0
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The reduction in strategic motive dominates iff s1 is large enough relative to s0:
∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0⇔ s¯1
(
d− n ((n+ 1) rb − 2ra)
rarb
)
≥ n (n+ 1)2 s0
The following lemma shows a special case in which the strategic motive is so strong that a
decrease in risk aversion does lead to an decrease in liquidity provision (and conversely, an
increase in risk aversion leads to higher liquidity):
Lemma 1 Suppose that s0 → 0. If n ≤ 2 and local investors’ risk-aversion a is small
enough (or equivalently, σ2 or z21 small enough), then, following a small increase in their
risk-aversion, arbitrageurs provide more liquidity, which decreases the time 0 spread and
increases the expected return of the arbitrage. This effect is stronger if they are not very
risk-averse.
Unsurprisingly, the strategic motive dominates in a very concentrated market, and even
more so if arbitrageurs are not too risk-averse. Note that if s0 is very small, on average, the
spread will decrease between time 0 and time 1, implying a negative return. As b increases,
arbitrageurs increase their trade at time 0, and this reduces the time 0 spread more than
the time 1 spread, leading to a less negative return.
How do arbitrageurs respond to an increase in arbitrage risk?
In the presence of arbitrage risk, it is important to understand whether arbitrageurs’ reac-
tions to changes in risk are stabilizing (i.e. leading to smaller spreads), or destabilizing. In
the limits of arbitrage literature, it is common to study how positions and prices respond to
an increase in “noise trader risk” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), or demand pressures / supply
imbalances (Gromb and Vayanos, 2010, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). It is shown
that arbitrageurs do not necessarily increase their positions ex-ante when they face larger
future shocks, and this may push prices further away from their fundamental values. Here, I
analyze arbitrageurs’ responses to an increase in the level of the future shock, s¯1, and in the
volatility of the shock z1. Surprisingly, the literature on limits of arbitrage has to the best
of my knowledge focused only on the first comparative static (dubbed noise trader risk).
Corollary 6 Following an increase in the expected shock s¯1, arbitrageurs increase their po-
sitions at time 0, but the spread nevertheless increases:
∂xi0
∂s¯1
≥ 0 and ∂∆0
∂s¯1
≥ 0.
1.3. EQUILIBRIUM WITH RISK-FREE AND RISKY ARBITRAGE 33
The two parts of the result may seem contradictory, as one would expect the increase in
arbitrageurs’ positions to lead to a smaller spread. It is not the case because an increase in
s¯1 also causes an increase in local investors’ liquidity demand, and arbitrageurs’ response,
albeit positive, is not commensurate with local investors’ increased need for liquidity. This is
in particular due to the fact that an increase in s¯1 increases the profitability of the arbitrage
butt also arbitrageurs’ strategic motive. This result contrasts with predictions in models of
financially-constrained arbitrage, where an increase in positions leads to more efficient prices
(e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
Next, it is interesting to understand how arbitrageurs respond to increased uncertainty
about the future profitability of the arbitrage. As one would expect, increased uncertainty
reduces arbitrageurs’ strategic motives and increases their precautionary motives. However,
uncertainty about future profitability matters even when arbitrageurs are risk-neutral, as it
affects local investors’ liquidity demand, as well as arbitrageurs’ price impact.
Corollary 7 Consider the limit case where arbitrageurs are risk neutral, i.e. b → 0. Then
arbitrageurs respond to an increase in arbitrage risk z21 by taking larger positions if and only
if volatility is small enough and the expected shock is large enough relative to the current
shock. Otherwise, arbitrageurs decrease their positions.
∂xi0
∂z21
≥ 0 ⇔
{
a2σ2z21 < cn with cn <
(n+1)2
2n+1
s¯1 ≥ θn,as0
No matter how arbitrageurs respond, the spread always increases following an increase in z21:
∂∆0
∂z21
≥ 0.
The result shows that even if arbitrageurs are risk-neutral, they may scale down their posi-
tions when uncertainty about arbitrage profitability increases. There are two effects: first,
local investors are demanding more liquidity, as the convexity effect (i.e. the need to insure
against shocks) increases with z1 (see equation (1.14). This increases the arbitrage supply,
which prompts arbitrageurs to increase their positions, but also increases the spread. Second,
an increase in uncertainty steepens local investors’ demand for the asset in each market, as
local investors are more reluctant to hold the asset. This results in larger price impact, which
pushes arbitrageurs to decrease their positions. When volatility is already high, this effect
dominates, and an increase in volatility leads to a reduction in arbitrageurs’ positions. In-
terestingly, whether arbitrageurs increase their positions or not, the spread always increases,
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showing that the increase in liquidity demand always outweighs the increase in arbitrageurs’
positions.
Market power and spread autocorrelation
Arbitrageurs’ activity also implies a number of properties for the behaviour of the spread
between assets A and B. First, one can see in Proposition 3 that at time 0, the spread is a
weighted average (since Φa ∈ [0, 1]) of the maximum spread (s0 + s¯1(n+1)ra ) and arbitrageurs’
strategic motive. At time 1, the spread is decreasing in the previous shock and reflects
the adjustment between the expected shock s¯1 and its realization s1. Market power also
generates autocorrelation of the spreads at one lag:
Corollary 8 The spread has the following properties:
• Comparative statics: the current shock increases the spread.
∂∆t
∂st
> 0, t = 0, 1
• Serial correlation: suppose s0 is random from the point of view of time -1. Then, when
the number of arbitrageurs is finite, the half spread exhibits negative serial correlation
between time 0 and time 1:
autocov−1
(
∆0
2
,
∆1
2
)
< 0
When perfect competition obtains, the serial correlation vanishes:
lim
n→∞
autocov−1
(
∆0
2
,
∆1
2
)
= 0
Given that arbitrageurs revert trades in proportion of previous shocks to keep the spread
open as long as possible, previous shocks continue to affect the current spread. This generates
serial correlation at one lag. As competition increases, arbitrageurs absorb liquidity shocks
fully in each period, thus serial correlation disappears.
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1.4 Entry
I now turn to endogenize the number of arbitrageurs. I consider ex-ante free entry, as well as
gradual entry. I assume that arbitrageurs only know the distribution of future shocks when
they decide ex-ante. High ex-ante uncertainty about the profitability may in this regard
reduce risk-averse arbitrageurs’ incentive to enter if there is enough risk-bearing capacity.
When new arbitrageurs can enter gradually, arbitrageurs already active can deter new ones
from entering, perpetuating market concentration. The mere threat of future entry, however,
can improve liquidity.
1.4.1 Simultaneous (free) entry
I assume that arbitrageurs must sink a set-up cost I at time -1 to enter the market. Through-
out this section and the next, one can think of I as the investments required to set up an
arbitrage desk, gather information, subscribe to data-providers, etc.
Risk-free arbitrage
For the sake of tractability, I consider the special case s0 = s1 = s and assume that from the
perspective of time -1, s is random and normally distributed with mean s¯ and variance z2.
Proposition 4 At time -1, the arbitrageurs’ expected utility from entering the market (net
of entry cost) is:
J˜ i0 = −
1√
1 + 4abσ2z2pin
exp
[
−b
(
2aσ2pins¯
2
1 + 4abσ2z2pin
− I
)]
(1.23)
J˜ is decreasing in n. Thus there exists n∗, defined as the first integer such that{
J˜ (n∗) ≥ −1
J˜ (n∗ + 1) < −1
Note that as long as I is not too large, arbitrageurs will enter the trade even if there will
be no liquidity shock on average, i.e. even if s¯ = 0. This is because the random nature
of local investors’ liquidity shocks (from the point of view of time -1) creates “optionality”
in the trade, and this induces arbitrageurs to enter. Since J˜ is decreasing in n, there is a
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single Nash equilibrium in the free-entry game. The equilibrium number of arbitrageurs n∗
depends on the characteristics of the segmented markets as follows:
Corollary 9 There is more entry into markets characterized by large arbitrage risk and /
or risk-averse local investors: n∗ increases with s¯, a, and σ2 and decreases with I.
The effect of an increase in the volatility of the arbitrage risk, z, is ambiguous:
• n∗ decreases with z when the market is initially concentrated, or if local investors
(or arbitrageurs) are sufficiently risk-averse, or equivalently, if the asset is sufficiently
risky, and increases in the opposite situations.
• Hence markets that are likely to be illiquid from an ex-ante perspective attract fewer
arbitrageurs.
Arbitrageurs prefer to enter in markets in which the arbitrage gap is large (on average).
However, facing an increasing uncertainty about the size of the arbitrage gap may lead to
more or less entry depending on the level of risk-aversion of investors and arbitrageurs in
the economy. Intuively, uncertainty can be desirable because it increases the “optionality”
of the trade, but at same time, it can be costly because arbitrageurs are risk-averse. I
show in the proof of the corollary that a key driver of the comparative static is the variable
θ = 2abσ2pin, which measures the risk-bearing capacity of the market. If the market has a
small risk-bearing capacity, an increase in the volatility of shocks may discourage arbitrageurs
from entering. Because the concentration of the market is also a (negative) determinant of
risk-bearing capacity, the same applies if the initial number of arbitrageurs is small.26 The
dependance on n highlights the fact that there are both strategic substitutabilities (business-
stealing) and strategic complementarities (co-insurance) between arbitrageurs. Note that
this result does not depend on the entry cost: the effect is present even when I → 0.27
Intuitively, if the market cannot absorb enough risk, arbitrageurs will be reluctant to enter.
Thus, the markets that are the most likely ex-ante to be illiquid (high volatility of arbitrage
risk, and low risk-bearing capacity) are those in which arbitrageurs enter the least. However,
the picture is not entirely bleak because, as shown above, a high level of arbitrage risk attracts
arbitrageurs, which then exert a corrective force on market liquidity:
26One can imagine a situation in which, at t = −1a, all investors believe that the volatility of the arbitrage
risk is z and the number of entrants is determinant. Then at t = −1b, investors learn that the volatility is
actually z
′
> z. The corollary states that if the market was concentrated at −1a, it will be even more at
−1b. Intuitively, the presence of many arbitrageurs has a positive externality in terms of risk-absorption.
27As I decreases, there is more and more entry. However, an increase in the uncertainty about the
profitability of the arbitrage dampens the effect of a reduction in entry costs.
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Corollary 10 Entry of arbitrageurs counters the effect of an increase in local investors’
risk-aversion (or equivalently volatility of the fundamental) on the spread:
d∆0
da
= 2σ2︸︷︷︸
>0
[
ψn∗s0 + ψ¯n∗s1
]
+ 2aσ2
∂ψn∗
∂a︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
s0 +
∂ψ¯n∗
∂a︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
s1

Oehmke (2010) derives results that are similar in spirit. He finds, however, that illiquid
markets attract less arbitrageurs, taking the coefficient of short-term price impact as a
measure of illiquidity. Here, an increase in local investors’ risk-aversion makes the market
more illiquid but also attracts more arbitrageurs. An increase in a in my model would
correspond to an increase in the coefficient of permanent price impact in Oehmke’s model.
Combining the two previous results, we can predict what kind of risk-return profile is
most attractive to arbitrageurs. The number of arbitrageurs unambiguously increases with
the average magnitude of the mispricing s¯. However, there is a non-monotonic relation
between entry and the volatility of liquidity shocks z. I show in the proof of Corollary 9 that
an increase in volatility reduces the equilibrium number of arbitrageurs if
z2 ≤ s2 − 1
4abσpin
Hence for z small enough, an increase in volatility reduces entry. The constraint is looser (i.e.
one can meet the constraint with larger volatility z), if risk-aversion (a or b) is high or the
fundamental is risky (high σ) or the market very concentrated (small n, leading to a large
pin). Figure 1.1 illustrates the analysis. It shows that for a high enough level of volatility
(z ≥ z∗), there should be more arbitrageurs as one goes in the northeastern direction of the
risk-return diagram. In this region, entry plays a corrective role against illiquidity (caused
by large shocks and large uncertainty). It is the opposite in the left-hand side of the graph.
In this region, the number of arbitrageurs should be about stable as one goes towards the
northeast, since two forces work in opposite directions: large shocks (on average) attract
more arbitrageurs, while an increase in volatility reduces entry. The cutoff z∗ increases as
the market structure of risk-bearing capacity in the market becomes weaker and converges
to s¯ as risk-aversion increases.
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s¯
zz = s¯z∗
Lower risk-bearing capacity
More entry
Ambiguous effect
Figure 1.1: Entry as a function of the risk-return profile of the arbitrage
Risky arbitrage
In this section, I assume that the first shock, s0, is unknown at time -1, when arbitrageurs
must decide or not to invest and that it is randomly distributed: s0 ∼ N (s¯0, z20). The
expected utility of entering the market, net of entry cost, is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 At time 0, arbitrageurs’ certainty equivalent is given by
CEi0 = pi0s
2
0 + pi1s
2
1 + pi0,1s0s¯1 (1.24)
At time -1, arbitrageurs’ expected utility, net of entry cost, is:
Jˆ i0 = −
exp
[
−η
(
pi0,1(s¯0s¯1− η2pi0,1s¯21z20)+pi0s¯20
1+2ηpi0z20
+ pi1s¯
2
1
)]
exp (bI)√
rb (1 + 2ηpi0z20)
, with η = 2abσ2 (1.25)
Although the expected utility can be calculated in closed form, it is hard to produce
general comparative statics or monotonicity results as the coefficients pi0, pi1 and pi0,1 are
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complex functions of the parameters. Instead, I investigate some numerical examples.
Numerical examples. Figures 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 show comparative statics of the endoge-
nous number of arbitrageurs with respect to risk-aversion, and the level and volatility of
arbitrage risk. The figures show that Jˆ is decreasing in the number of arbitrageurs, ensuring
that there is a unique equilibrium to the entry game. Arbitrageurs respond positively to an
increase in local investors’ risk-aversion, or equivalently, in the volatility of the risky assets.
The sensitivity to the level and volatility of the arbitrage risk is more complex and seems to
be different across periods. For instance an increase in s¯0 seems to increase n
∗ more than
an increase in s¯1. This seems intuitive, because local investors have more opportunities to
handle future shocks than the immediate shock. The comparative statics with respect to
the volatility of the liquidity shocks at time 0 and time 1 are interesting. An increase in z0
seems to play the same role as z in the risk-free case: it may decrease the number of entrants,
as shown in panel a of Figure 1.7, or increase it (panel b), depending on the risk-bearing
capacity of the market.28 Intuitively, the volatility of the first shock is undiversifiable, since
there is no trading at time −1, thus the risk-bearing capacity of the market plays a key
role in arbitrageurs’ entry decisions. An increase in the volatility of the second shock, z1,
however, seems to have an unambiguous positive effect on n∗. In this case, arbitrageurs can
manage risk ex-ante by trading in the risky asset. Figure 1.8 puts this analysis in perspective
by comparing the impact on n∗ of different parameters in the risk-free and risky arbitrage
cases. For the comparison to make sense, I set the level and risk of arbitrage risk to be
equal from an ex-ante perspective. Namely, I set z2 = z20 + z
2
1 . When the total volatility
of the arbitrage risk increases, whether it comes from z0 or z1 makes a difference. In the
risk-free case, if z2 increases from 1 to 3, n∗ tends to decrease (for other parameter values,
there could be an increase, see Corollary 9). In the risky case, if the increase in volatility is
matched through an increase in z0, the effect is similar: n
∗ tends to decrease (panel a). If it
is matched by an increase in z1, the effect is opposite n
∗ unambiguously increases (panel b).
1.4.2 Gradual entry and strategic deterrence
I the previous section, I analyzed which markets are likely to attract arbitrageurs ex-ante. In
practice, there are many reasons for financial markets to be concentrated at the early stages
of their development (e.g. because of financial innovation, learning, uncertainty etc.), but one
could expect the degree of competition to increase over time as strategies become copied and
28Note however, that it is much harder to obtain the case in which the number of entrants increases: the
variance must be multiplied by 10, while risk-aversion of market participants is divided by 3.
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rents lure new players in. This is particularly true in the financial industry, where trading
strategies are difficult to patent, and personnel mobility, as well as business relationships (e.g.
with broker-dealers and other counterparties) make it hard to keep strategies secret. For
instance, there is anecotal evidence that LTCM’s strategies were widely copied on Wall-Street
following the fund’s high returns between 1994 and 1997.29 Similarly, portfolio insurance
strategies became widely popular in the 1980s, as they were easy to copy and implement.30
To assess whether and when concentration is likely to persist, I now assume that there
are n arbitrageurs in place at time 0 (incumbents) and that at time 1, a new arbitrageur
may enter upon sinking a fixed cost, I. For simplicity, I focus on the risk-free arbitrage case
and assume that the liquidity schocks are identical at time 0 and 1: s0 = s1 = s. The new
arbitrageur (indexed by n + 1) will enter if her expected payoff at time 1 is larger than the
entry cost:
2aσ2
(
s−∑nj=1 xj0)2
(n+ 2)2
≥ I (1.26)
However, as equation (1.26) shows, because the new arbitrageur enters with a lag, the
expected payoff depends on the previous trade by the n incumbents. It may be in the
incumbents’ interests to decrease the rents available at time 1 in order to prevent entry
(deter). When entry costs are low, this can however be significantly costly, as incumbents
must alter their trading strategies and tackle the spread more aggressively at time 0 than
they would otherwise do. Hence incumbents may as well choose to accommodate and let the
new arbitrageur enter. The following result describes the equilibrium.
Equilibrium
Proposition 6 Suppose that s0 = s1 = s and define ρ =
√
I
2aσ2
.
If there is a monopolist arbitrageur at time 0, the new arbitrageur enters at time 1 if and
only if ρ < ρˆ. If ρ > ρˆbmk, the incumbent arbitrageur can deter at no cost.
If there is an oligopoly of n ≥ 2 arbitrageurs at time 0:
• If ρ ∈ ]0, ρ], incumbent arbitrageurs accommodate and the new arbitrageur enters.
29See Perold (1999) and Lowenstein (2000).
30Kyrillos and Tufano (1994) note: “the basic ideas underlying the product were well described in the
academic literature and could not be patented”.
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ρ ρ¯ ρbmk
ρ
Entry
Mult.
Eq.
No entry
but contestable
No entry,
not contestable
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium with sequential entry and strategic deterrence
• If ρ ∈ ]ρ¯,∞), incumbents deter the new arbitrageur from entering. If ρ > ρbmk > ρ¯,
the incumbents deter the new arbitrageur at no cost.
• if ρ ∈ ]ρ, ρ¯], the two equilibria coexist.
The equilibrium has a very intuitive form, summarized in Figure 1.2. When entry costs
are low (or the arbitrage is very profitable because of high local investors’ risk-aversion or
equivalently large volatility of the fundamental), incumbents accommodate and the new
arbitrageur enters at time 1. Given the low entry costs, deterring would carry a large
opportunity cost. Indeed note that if entry costs are particularly high (ρ > ρbmk or ρ > ρ¯bmk
in the monopoly case)), there is no need for incumbents to deter.
When there is an oligopoly of incumbents, the two types of equilibria may coexist. The
multiplicity of equilibria stems from a coordination problem between arbitrageurs at time
0. For instance, when his current competitors decide to deter the new arbitrageur, an
incumbent may decide between altering his optimal strategy to avoid losing market power,
or sticking to it and keep the same market structure. Local investors play an interesting
role for the outcome of the game, even though they take prices as given: if they anticipate
entry, their liquidity demand at time 0 decreases, because they expect the market to be
more competitive in the future. One can see this by comparing the price schedule for the
spread between both assets faced by arbitrageurs at time 0. I show in the appendix that
if local investors anticipate entry, the price impact coefficient decreases from n+2
n+1
to n+3
n+2
.
This optimal delaying of liquidity demand adds a self-fulfilling flavour to the equilibrium
that generates the multiplicity: the anticipation of entry by local investors makes it harder
for an incumbent to decrease the spread and deter the entrant, which, in turn, makes the
anticipation more likely to realize.
When does entry occur in equilibrium? Proposition 6, shows that entry costs are the
key driver of the equilibrium. But the thresholds ρ, ρ¯ and ρbmk are functions of the liquidity
42 CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC STRATEGIC ARBITRAGE
shocks s and the number of incumbent arbitrageurs n. Hence it is possible to calculate the
likelihood that the market remain concentrated as a function of the number of incumbent ar-
bitrageurs. The model delivers an interesting prediction regarding the persistence of market
concentration over time:
Corollary 11 If I, a, σ, s and n are such that ρ < ρ, i.e. entry occurs in equilibrium,
then, all else equal, a decrease in the number of incumbent arbitrageurs n does not modify
the equilibrium.
If parameters are such that ρ ≥ ρ¯, i.e. the incumbent arbitrageurs deter at no cost in
equilibrium, then all else equal, a decrease in the number of incumbent arbitrageurs can shift
the equilibrium towards entry, multiple equilibria, or deterrence. The more concentrated the
market initially is, the more likely it is that the equilibrium remains deterrence (assuming
uniform distribution for ρ).
Intuitively, there are two effects driving this comparative statics. On one hand, a smaller
number of incumbents means that there are larger rents available, which for a given entry cost
will make entry more profitable for the new arbitrageur. On the other hand, a small number
of incumbent arbitrageurs makes coordination on deterrence easier to achieve. Figure 1.11
illustrates the second effect: I plot the likelihood of the accommodate and deter equilibria,
assuming that the variable ρ is uniformly distributed between 0 and ρbmk, i.e. I normalize
entry cost to be always sufficiently low, so it is not possible to deter at no cost. The graph
shows that concentration benefits coordination among incumbents to deter new entrants: the
light-shaded grey area, which represents the deter equilibrium, is largest when n is small.
To take into account the first effect, I construct a different comparative statics. Starting
from given entry costs, number of incumbents and determinants of arbitrage profitability,
I compare the equilibrium that results from an increase in market concentration for the
different regions given in Proposition 6. Since ρ is decreasing in n, for a given level of entry
cost such that ρ < ρ, an increase in market concentration can only widen the region in
which entry is the equilibrium. In this region, the first effect always dominate. Given that
the other thresholds ρ¯, ρbmk are also decreasing in n, it is not necessarily the case when the
initial situation is that ρ ≥ ρ¯ or ρ ≥ ρbmk. A new equilibrium may arise following an increase
in market concentration.
To calculate the probability of the new equilibrium, consider the following example where
ρ ≥ ρbmk (n) for a given level entry costs, volatility, liquidity shock and number of incum-
bents. I assume that ρ is uniformly distributed between ρbmk (n) and ρbmk (n− 1), with
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ρbmk (n) < ρbmk (n− 1), and calculate the thresholds ρ (n− 1) and ρ¯ (n− 1). I find that
ρbmk (n) < ρ¯ (n− 1) and ρ¯ (n) < ρ (n− 1), which implies that the equilibrium must shift if
ρ ∈ [ρbmk (n) , ρ¯ (n− 1)[ or ρ ∈ [ρ¯ (n) , ρ (n− 1)[. Using the uniform distribution assumption
for ρ, I then calculate the probability of shifting to entry, multiple equilibria or remaining
a deterrence equilibrium. My calculations show that the probability of remaining in the
deterrence equilibrium increases as the market becomes more concentrated. For instance,
when the number of arbitrageurs decreases from 4 to 3, and 3 to 2, the probabilities of the
different equilibria are given in Table 1.1. Note that the assumption that ρ’s distribution
Table 1.1: Probability of equilibrium change if ρ > ρbmk
Probability From n=4 to n=3 From n=3 to n=2
Switch to Entry 0.44 0.41
Switch to Multiple 0.14 0.10
Remain Deterrence 0.42 0.49
has an upper bound understates the likelihood that the equilibrium remains deterrence.
Overall, the key insight from Corollary 11 is that when entry costs are sufficiently low, the
first effect dominates, and a decrease in market concentration makes it (all else equal) even
more profitable for a new arbitrageur to enter. Instead, if entry costs are high enough, the
second effect dominates and as the market becomes more concentrated, then the probability
of remaining in the deterrence equilibrium increases as arbitrageurs are able to coordinate
on deterring.
Implications for liquidity and predictions
Since reducing the available rents require to decrease the spread, strategic deterrence leads
to an improvement in liquidity along several dimensions, provided entry costs are sufficiently
low:
Corollary 12 Liquidity, measured by the spread, improves at all dates for any ρ < ρbmk.
Liquidity measured by the price impact coefficient (“Kyle’s lambda”) improves at time 0 for
any ρ ≤ ρ.
The speed of convergence towards the fundamental value is higher than in the benchmark
case without entrant if ρ ≤ ρ.
Panel (c) of Figure 1.11 plots the time-0 spread as a function of ρ. A similar pattern would
emerge at time 1. If there is entry, the spread remains strictly positive as I assumed that
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there is only one entrant.31 Corollary 12 shows that liquidity improves in terms of the spread,
the price impact and speed of convergence if and only if ρ < ρ, i.e. when there is entry in
equilibrium. Hence the model predicts that faster price convergence and a deeper market
should lead the increase in the number of traders. If entry is simply a threat, the model
predicts only a decrease in the spread. When arbitrageurs deter the entrant, the spread
exhibits surprising properties:
Corollary 13 For ρ ∈ [ρ¯, ρbmk[, the spread increases with the entry cost I at all dates and
with the number of arbitrageurs at time 0, and is independent of the liquidity shock s.
A decrease in entry costs can cause a discontinuous increase in liquidity (measured by
the spread and the price impact).
Based on Corollary 13, the model predicts that when entry costs are in the middle range (i.e.
when the market can be contested), the spread should be higher at time 0 in more competitive
markets. The intuition for this result is that more competition exhausts rents available for
the entrant, meaning that the incumbents need not decrease the spread as intensively at time
0. Of course, on this interval, there is substitutability between the size of entry costs and the
deterrence, meaning that the spread will decrease the lower the entry costs are. Because of
the multiplicity of equilibria, there is an interval in which the equilibrium is undetermined. A
small decrease in entry costs can then lead to downward, discontinuous jump in the spread,
as illustrated by Figure 1.11.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study an asset pricing model in which market segmentation and demand
pressure effects cause the prices of two identical assets to diverge. Only a small number of
strategic arbitrageurs can exploit this price difference and internalize their impact on asset
prices. I show that this results in rationing of liquidity, a gradual convergence of prices
towards fundamentals, and, when the demand pressures decrease, an inversion of the spread
between the two assets. I also highlight the role of the market structure of risk-bearing
capacity, i.e. the interaction between the market structure and the risk-bearing capacity of
the economy, as a determinant of asset prices dynamics and the arbitrageurs’ entry decisions.
31With an arbitrary number of potential entrants, the spread would certainly be lower. Discontinuities
due to integer issues may however prevent the spread from falling to 0, even when the entry costs converge
to 0.
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The model shows that arbitrageurs do not necessarily enter more aggressively in markets
with more volatile price differences, although this increases potential rents from liquidity
provision. This holds in particular if the market structure of risk-bearing capacity is not
strong enough. Another interesting conclusion is that the mere threat of entry can improve
liquidity (i.e. reduce price differences), and that the prospect of future entry also improves
market depth ex-ante.
An important feature of real-world arbitrage this chapters abstracts from is that trading
requires capital. In the next chapter, I study how the market structure interacts with
financial constraints. I focus on the case of constant profitability and show that relative to a
competitive market, a monopolistic arbitrageur provides less liquidity but also operates with
less capital in equilibrium. As a result, when capital is scarce in the economy, the monopoly
may provide more liquidity than the competitive market at certain dates. These results
stress the importance of analyzing arbitrage as a strategic choice for our understanding of
capital markets.
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1.6 Proofs and Figures
1.6.1 Two useful results
Lemma 2 Let (p, q) ∈ R2 with p 6= q and consider the (n, n) matrix
Mn =

p q · · · q
q p · · · q
...
...
. . .
...
q q · · · p

Mn is invertible and its inverse is given by:
M−1n =
1
(p− q) (p+ (n− 1) q)

p+ (n− 2) q −q · · · −q
−q p+ (n− 2) q · · · −q
...
...
. . .
...
−q −q · · · p+ (n− 2) q

Proof. Mn being a square matrix with independent lines and columns, it is invertible.
It is straightforward to check that Mn.M
−1
n = M
−1
n .Mn = I.
Lemma 3 Let (A,B) ∈ R2 and X ∼ N (µ, σ2), then
E
(
exp
(−AX2 +BX)) = exp (y)√
2Aσ2 + 1
,with y = B
2σ2+2µ(B−Aµ)
2(2Aσ2+1)
.
Proof. Since X is normally distributed:
E
(
exp
(−AX2 +BX)) = ∫ ∞
−∞
exp (−Ax2 +Bx) exp
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
σ
√
2pi
dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−2Aσ2+1
2σ2
x2 + µ+σ
2B
σ2
x− µ
2σ2
)
σ
√
2pi
dx
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Rewrite the exponential in the integrand as exp
(
− (x−m)2
2z2
)
exp (y). This gives, by identifi-
cation of the terms:
1
2z2
=
2Aσ2 + 1
2σ2
⇒ z2 = σ
2
2Aσ2 + 1
m
z2
=
µ+Bσ2
σ2
⇒ m = µ+Bσ
2
2Aσ2 + 1
This implies that m
2
2z2
− y = µ2
2σ2
, i.e. y = B
2σ2+2µ(B−Aµ)
2(2Aσ2+1)
. Thus,
E
(
exp
(−AX2 +BX)) = exp (y)√
2Aσ2 + 1
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
− (x−m)2
2z2
)
z
√
2pi
dx =
exp (y)√
2Aσ2 + 1
1.6.2 Risk-free arbitrage
Proposition 1
Proof. At each date, going backward, I first solve for the demand of local investors in
markets A and B, and then solve for the arbitrageurs’ optimal trades.
Time 1 - local investors’ problem It is enough to solve for the demand of local
investors in market A, as market B is the symmetric case, thus I drop the superscript A. At
time 1, W2 = E1 + Y1D2 = E0 − y1p1 + s12 + Y1D2. s1 is revealed to all agents at time 1.
The local investors’ maximization problem is
V1 = max
y1
E (W2) = max
y1
− exp
(
−a
(
E0 − y1p1 + Y1D1 − aσ
2
2
(Y1 + s1)
2
))
From the FOC, Y1 + s1 =
D1 − p1
aσ2
(1.27)
Using market-clearing, pA1 = D1 − aσ2
(
s1 −
n∑
i=1
X i,A1
)
(1.28)
By analogy, pB1 = D1 − aσ2
(
−s1 −
n∑
i=1
X i,B1
)
(1.29)
Arbitrageurs’ problem at time 1
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Starting from arbitrageurs’ wealth at time 2 given by equation (1.3), and using the
assumption of opposite positions, we can rewrite wealth as:
W i2 = B
i
0 + x
i
1
(
pB1 − pA1
)
= Bi0 + 2aσ
2xi1
(
s1 −
n∑
i=1
X i1
)
,
where the second line of the maximization problem comes from equations (1.28) and (1.29).
Note that by an abuse of notation, I use i both as a counting variable and to
refer to arbitrageur i. Arbitrageurs maximize their expected utility of wealth, thus:
J i1 = max
xi1
E
[
u
(
Bi0 + 2aσ
2xi1
(
s1 −
n∑
i=1
X i1
))]
We can write
∑n
i=1X
i
1 =
∑n
i=1X
i
0 +
∑n
−i x
−i
1 +x
i
1 =
∑n
i=1 x
i
0 +
∑n
−i x
−i
1 +x
i
1, where −i denote
all arbitrageurs but arbitrageur i, and solve for the zero of the first-order condition for each
arbitrageur i:
2xi1 +
∑
−i
x−i1 = s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0, i = 1, . . . , n
thus, xi1 +
n∑
i=1
xi1 = s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0, i = 1, . . . , n
Stacking the n equations together and using matrix notation gives:
Anx˜1 =
(
s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0
)
I,
where An is an (n, n) matrix with 2’s on the diagonal and 1’s elsewhere, x˜1 is a (n, 1) vector
of trades, x˜−11 = (x
1
1, . . . , x
n
1 ) and I is the identity matrix. We can then use Lemma 3 to find
A−1n , invert the system and get the equilibrium trade at time 1,
xi1 =
s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
, i = 1, . . . , n (1.30)
Then, plugging equation (1.30) into (1.28) and arbitrageur i’s objective function gives the
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equilibrium price and value function in the time 1 subgame:
pA1 = D1 − aσ2
s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+ 1
J i1 = u
(
Bi0 + 2aσ
2 (s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
)
Similarly, plugging the previous expression for pA1 into (1.27) gives the local investors’ equi-
librium certainty equivalent in the subgame:
CE1 = E0 + Y0p1 + Y1 (D1 − p1)− aσ
2
2
(Y1 + s1)
2
= E0 + Y0p1 +
aσ2
2
(s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− aσ2s1 s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+ 1
with E0 = E−1 − x0p0 + s01 = −x0p0 + s01, for simplicity.
Time 0 - local investors
Going backward and using the expression for their certainty equivalent and for E0, the
A investors’ problem is:
V0 = max
y0
−E exp
(
−a
(
−y0p0 + Y0p1 + aσ
2
2
(s1 −
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− aσ2s1 s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
+ s01
))
Hence, evaluating the expectation,
V0 = max
y0
− exp−a
(
−y0p0 + Y0
(
D − aσ2 s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
)
− aσ
2
2
(Y0 + s0)
2
)
. exp−a
(
aσ2
2
(s1 −
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− aσ
2
2
s1
s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
)
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From the first-order condition,
aσ2 (Y0 + s0) = D − aσ2 s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
− p0
i.e. p0 = D − aσ2 s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
− aσ2s0 + aσ2
∑
i
xi0 by market-clearing
i.e. p0 = D − aσ2
(
s0 +
s1
n+ 1
)
+
n+ 2
n+ 1
aσ2
∑
i
xi0
By analogy, pB0 = D + aσ
2
(
s0 +
s1
n+ 1
)
− n+ 2
n+ 1
aσ2
∑
i
xi0
where I also used the fact that xit = x
i,A
t = −xi,Bt for the last equation. The spread between
A and B is thus
∆0 = p
B
0 − pA0 = 2aσ2
(
s0 +
s1
n+ 1
− n+ 2
n+ 1
∑
i
xi0
)
Time 0 - Arbitrageurs
Using this expression for ∆0 and B
i
0 = B
i
−1 −
∑
k=A,B x
i,k
0 p
k
0 = −x0∆0 (again I assume
that Bi−1 = 0 for simplicity and wlog in this setting), arbitrageur i’s problem is:
J i0 = max
xi0
−E0 exp−b
(
2aσ2xi0∆ˆ0 + 2aσ
2 (s1 −
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
)
, with ∆ˆ0 =
∆0
2aσ2
= max
xi0
− exp−b
(
2aσ2xi0
(
s0 +
s1
n+ 1
− n+ 2
n+ 1
∑
i
xi0
)
+ 2aσ2
(s1 −
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
)
From the first-order condition,
s0 +
s1
n+ 1
− n+ 2
n+ 1
(
n∑
i=1
xi0 + x
i
0
)
=
2
(n+ 1)2
(
s1 −
n∑
i=1
xi0
)
, i = 1, . . . , n
i.e.
n+ 2
n+ 1
xi0 +
n2 + 3n
(n+ 1)2
n∑
i=1
xi0 = s0 +
n− 1
(n+ 1)2
s1
Stacking the n equations together and solving for the equilibrium using Lemma 3, I get after
some simple algebra:
xi0 =
s0
φn
+
n− 1
(n+ 1)2
s1
φn
, with φn =
n3+4n2+3n+2
(n+1)2
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The equilibrium quantities for xi1, ∆0 and ∆1 follow from plugging x
i
0 into (1.30) and the
price schedules.
Corollary 2
This result is proved in the proof of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1
Proof. If s0 = s1 = s, then after some algebra, we get:
∆0 =
4n2 + 6n+ 4
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ¯0,n
s
∆1 =
n+ 2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ¯1,n
s
Clearly, for any n ≥ 1, ∆0 > ∆1 > 0 = ∆2, and ∂∆t∂n < 0 (t=0,1). Further, ∆1∆0 = n+24n2+6n+4 is
decreasing in n and limn→∞∆t = 0(t = 0, 1).
In the more general case with s0, s1, limn→∞ φn = 0 implies that ∆0 and ∆1 converge to
0 when n becomes large.
Corollary 3
Proof. The first comparative statics is straightforward.
For the second part of the result, note that ∆1 ≤ 0 iff s1 ≤ n3+2n2+nn3+4n2+3n+2s0 ≡ αns0. The
RHS is smaller than s0 for any n.
I now calculate the first derivative of ∆1 with respect to n:
∂
(
n
(n+1)φn
)
∂n
= −n
4 + 2n3 + n2 − 4n− 2
(n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
and
∂φ¯n
∂n
= −n
6 + 6n5 + 20n4 + 46n3 + 37n2 + 16n+ 2
(n+ 1)2 (n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
Hence ∂∆1
∂n
≥ 0 ⇔ κns0 ≥ s1, with κn = n6+4n5+6n4−9n2−12n−2n6+6n5+20n4+46n3+37n2+16n+2 . Clearly, κ1 < 0 and
∀n ≥ 2, 0 < n6 + 4n5 + 6n4 − 9n2 − 12n − 2 < n6 + 6n5 + 20n4 + 46n3 + 37n2 + 16n + 2,
thus if n ≥ 2, κn ∈ ]0, 1[.
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1.6.3 Risky arbitrage
Proposition 2
Proof. At time 1, the problem is similar to the risk-free arbitrage case. From the proof
of Proposition 1, recall that:
pA1 = D1 − aσ2
s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+ 1
J i1 = u
(
Bi0 + 2aσ
2 (s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
)
CE1 = E0 + Y0p1 + Y1 (D1 − p1)− aσ
2
2
(Y1 + s1)
2
= E0 + Y0p1 +
aσ2
2
(s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− aσ2s1 s1 −
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+ 1
Hence, after rearranging terms,
CE1 = E0 + Y0
(
D + aσ2
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+ 1
)
+ aσ2
(
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
−aσ2s1
(
Y0
n+ 1
− n
n+ 1
∑
i
xi0
)
− aσ2 2n+ 1
2 (n+ 1)2
s21 (1.31)
with E0 = −y0p0 + s01.
Time 0 - local investors
At time 0, the local investors in market A solve the following problem:
V0 = max
y0
Es1,1 [− exp (−a (CE1))]
Es1,1 [− exp (−a (CE1))] = − exp
[
−a
(
−y0p0 + Y0
(
D + aσ2
∑n
i=1 x
i
0
n+ 1
)
+ aσ2
(
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
)]
.Es1,1
[
exp
(
−a
(
−aσ
2
2
(Y0 + s0)
2 − aσ2s1
(
Y0
n+ 1
− n
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
)
− aσ2 2n+ 1
2 (n+ 1)2
s21
))]
By Lemma 3, and setting −A = a2σ2 2n+1
2(n+1)2
, B = a2σ2
(
Y0
n+1
− n
∑
i x
i
0
(n+1)2
)
, µ = s¯1 and σ
2
x = z
2
1 ,
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we have:
E
[
exp
(−As21 +Bs1)] = r− 12a exp [ 12raC
]
(1.32)
with C = a4σ4z21
(
Y0
n+ 1
− n
(n+ 1)2
∑
i
xi0
)2
+ 2s¯1a
2σ2
((
Y0
n+ 1
− n
(n+ 1)2
∑
i
xi0
)
+ s¯1
2n+ 1
2 (n+ 1)2
)
and ra = 1− a2σ2z21
2n+ 1
(n+ 1)2
Thus investors in market A solve the following problem:
max
y0
−r−
1
2
a exp−a
(
−x0p0 + Y0
(
D + aσ2
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
)
+ aσ2
(
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− aσ
2
2
(Y0 + s0)
2
)
. exp−a
(
−a
3σ4z21
2ra
(
Y0
n+ 1
− n
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
)2
− aσ
2s¯1
ra
(
Y0
n+ 1
− n
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
+
2n+ 1
2 (n+ 1)2
s¯1
))
The FOC yields
D + aσ2
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
− aσ2 (X0 + s0)− a
3σ4z21
(n+ 1) ra
(
X0
n+ 1
− n
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
)
− aσ
2s¯1
ra
= p0
By market-clearing: Y0 = −
∑
i x
i
0, since x0 = X0 by the assumption of zero net supply of
the asset and that arbitrageurs do not initially hold the risky asset. After regrouping terms,
this gives:
p0 = D − aσ2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
+ aσ2
n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
xi0 (1.33)
with φa =
a2σ2z21
(n+ 1)2 ra
By symmetry, the price schedule faced by arbitrageurs in market B is:
pB0 = D + aσ
2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
− aσ2n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
xi0 (1.34)
Arbitrageurs’ problem at time 0
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Arbitrageurs’ value function:
J i0 = max
xi0
E
[
u
(
Bi0 + 2aσ
2 s1 −
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
)]
= max
xi0
−E
[
exp−b
(
xi0∆0 + 2aσ
2 s
2
1 − 2s1
∑
i x
i
0 + (
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
)]
(1.35)
Using Lemma 3, I get
E
[
exp
(
− 2abσ
2
(n+ 1)2
s21 +
4abσ2
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
)]
=
r
− 1
2
b exp−b
(
−8a
2bσ4z21 (
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)4 rb
− s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
(
4aσ2
∑
i
xi0 −
2aσ2
(n+ 1)2
s¯1
))
(1.36)
From equations (1.33) and (1.34), I get ∆0 = 2aσ
2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
− n+2
n+1
(1 + φa)
∑
i x
i
0
)
. De-
noting ∆ˆ0 =
∆0
2aσ2
, and using equations (1.35) and (1.36), and rearranging terms gives the
value function stated in the proposition.
Corollary 4
Proof. Direct from Proposition 2.
Proposition 3
Proof. Using Proposition 2, the first-order condition gives, for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}:
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
− n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
(∑
i
xi0 + x
i
0
)
+ 2 (1− φb)
∑
i x
i
0
(n+ 1)2
− 2 s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
= 0
Stacking the n equations together and using Lemma 2 to solve for the equilibrium, gives,
after some algebra:
xi0 =
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
− 2s¯1
(n+1)2rb
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
(1.37)
Note that the facts that 1− φb < 1 and n+2n+1(1 + φa) > n+2n+1 > 1 ensures that the maximand
is concave in xi0, which guarantees that the optimum is a maximum.
Using equations (1.33) and (1.37), one can get the equilibrium price of asset and the
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spread between assets B and A:∑
i
xi0 =
n
d
[
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
− 2s¯1
(n+ 1)2rb
]
pA0 = D − aσ2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
+ aσ2
n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
xi0
⇒ pA0 = D − aσ2Φas0 − aσ2Φa
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
− 2aσ2 (1− Φa) s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
with Φa = 1− n (n+ 2)
(n+ 1) d
(1 + φa)
d = φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
Note that Φa = 1− n (n+ 2) (1 + φa)
(n+ 1) (φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb)
=
n2+n+2
n+1
+ n (n+ 2)φa + 2n (n+ 1)φb
(n+ 1) (φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb)
The second equation follows from the definition of φn given in Proposition 2. Since (n+ 1)φn >
n2+n+2
n+1
, Φa ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 5
Proof. From the expression of xi0 given in Proposition 3,
∂xi0
∂b
=
∂
∂b
[
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
]
− 2 ∂
∂b
[
s¯1
(n+1)2rb
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
]
I first calculate the second term in brackets.
First, note that (n+ 1)2rb = (n+ 1)
2 + 4abσ2z21
Thus
s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
=
s¯1
4abσ2z21 [1 + f (b)]
, with f (b) = (n+1)
2
4abσ2z21
⇒ ∂
∂b
1
(n+ 1)2 rb
= − 1
(4abσ2z21)
2
4aσ2z21
[1 + f (b)]2
= − 1
4ab2σ2z21 [1 + f (b)]
2(1.38)
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Second,
∂φb
∂b
=
∂
∂b
(
1
1 + f (b)
)
= − f
′ (b)
[1 + f (b)]2
Noting that f ′ (b) = − (n+ 1)
2
b24aσ2z21
= −f (b)
b
gives
∂φb
∂b
=
f (b)
b [1 + f (b)]2
(1.39)
Hence, using equations (1.38) and (1.39), and the notation d = φn+(n+ 2)φa+2nφb, gives:
∂
∂b
s¯1
(n+1)2rb
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
=
s¯1
d2
[
− d
4ab2σ2z21 [1 + f (b)]
2 −
2nf (b)
b [1 + f (b)]2 (n+ 1)2 rb
]
= − s¯1
4ab2σ2z21d
2 [1 + f (b)]2
(
d+
2n
rb
)
(1.40)
The second line follows from the fact that f(b)
b(n+1)2
= 1
4ab2σ2z21
. I now turn to the first term in
brackets:
∂
∂b
[
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
]
= −
2nφ
′
b
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
)
d2
= −
2nf (b)
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
)
bd2 [1 + f (b)]2
(1.41)
Comibining equations (1.41) and (1.40), noting that f(b)
b
= (n+1)
2
4ab2σ2z21
and rearranging terms
gives:
∂xi0
∂b
=
1
2ab2σ2z21 [1 + f (b)]
2 d2
[
−n (n+ 1)2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
+ s¯1
(
d+
2n
rb
)]
The rest of the corollary follows immediately.
Lemma 1
Proof. The result follows as a limit case of two lemmata:
Lemma 4 It holds that:
i) The sign of
∂xi0
∂b
is independent of b.
ii) If n ≤ 2, d+ 2n
rb
− n(n+1)
ra
> 0 if a2σ2z21 is small enough. Thus, in this case,
∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0 is
equivalent to s¯1
s0
large enough if s0 > 0, and is always satisfied if s0 ≤ 0.
iii) If n > 2 or n ≤ 2 and a2σ2z21 is large enough, ∂x
i
0
∂b
≥ 0 is equivalent to s¯1|s0| small
enough for s0 < 0, and is never satisfied if s0 > 0.
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iv)
∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0 ⇒ ∂2xi0
∂b2
≤ 0.
Proof. Recall from Corollary 5 that
∂xi0
∂b
= κ
[
−n (n+ 1)2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
+ s¯1
(
d+
2n
rb
)]
with κ = 1
2ab2σ2z21d
2[1+f(b)]2
. Hence the sign of the derivative depends on the expression in
parenthesis. Given that d = φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb, the terms in b are given by
2nφb +
2n
rb
= 2n
4abσ2z21
(n+ 1)2 rb
+
2n
rb
=
2n
rb
(
1 +
4abσ2z21
(n+ 1)2
)
=
2n
rb
rb = 2n
This proves i).
As a consequence, one can write:
d+
2n
rb
−n (n+ 1)
ra
= φn+(n+ 2)φa−n (n+ 1)
ra
+2n = φn+2n+
(n+ 2) a2σ2z21 − n (n+ 1)3
(n+ 1)2 ra
Developing and rearranging the terms,
d+
2n
rb
− n (n+ 1)
ra
=
3n3 + 8n2 + 5n+ 2
(n+ 1)2
+
(n+ 2) a2σ2z21 − n (n+ 1)3
(n+ 1)2 ra
=
−n4 + 5n2 + 4n+ 2− n(6n
3+18n2+14n+4)
(n+1)2
a2σ2z21
(n+ 1)2 ra
Note that if n = 1, the numerator equals 10 − 42
4
a2σ2z21 . From Assumption 1, a
2σ2z21 <
4
3
.
Hence, d+ 2n
rb
− n(n+1)
ra
≥ 0 iff a (or σ2 or z21) is small enough. The same applies if n = 2. If
n > 2, −n4 + 5n2 + 4n+ 2 < 0, thus d+ 2n
rb
− n(n+1)
ra
< 0. ii) and iii) follow.
Finally, I compute the second derivative of xi0 with respect to b:
∂2xi0
∂b2
=
−2nr′bs¯1
r2b
− κ′b
(
−n (n+ 1)2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
)
+ s¯1
(
d+ 2n
rb
))
κ2
It is easy to see that r′b > 0. Recall that κ = 2ab
2σ2z21d
2 [1 + f (b)]2, with f (b) = (n+1)
2
4abσ2z21
.
b2 [1 + f (b)]2 increases with b. Further, d2 and rb increase with b. Hence, κ increases with
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b. Given that
∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0 ⇔ − n (n+ 1)2
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
)
+ s¯1
(
d+ 2n
rb
)
≥ 0, ∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0 implies
∂2xi0
∂b2
≤ 0. This proves iv).
Lemma 5 Define the expected return of arbitrage r0,1 ≡ E
[
∆1
∆0
− 1
]
, then if

∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0
s¯1 ≥ s0n+2
n+1
(1+φa)− 1(n+1)ra
, then
∂r0,1
∂b
≥ 0
Proof. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that
∆0 = 2aσ
2
[
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
− n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
xi0
]
∆1 =
2aσ2
n+ 1
(
s1 −
∑
i
xi0
)
Thus using the definition of r0,1:
∂r0,1
∂b
≥ 0 ⇔
∑
i
∂xi0
∂b
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
)
− n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
xi0
+
n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∑
i
∂xi0
∂b
s¯1 −
∑
i x
i
0
n+ 1
≥ 0
⇔
∑
i
∂xi0
∂b
(
−s0 − s¯1
(n+ 1) ra
+
n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa) s¯1
)
≥ 0
Note that
n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)− 1
(n+ 1) ra
=
(n+ 2) (n+ 1)2 ra + a
2σ2z21 (2n
2 + 4n+ 3)− (n+ 1)3
(n+ 1)3 ra
=
n (n+ 1)2 − (n− 1) a2σ2z21
(n+ 1)3 ra
Thus n+2
n+1
(1 + φa) − 1(n+1)ra > 0 ⇔ a2σ2z21 <
n(n+1)2
n−1 . Note that
(n+1)2
2n+1
< n(n+1)
2
n−1 , hence
Assumption 1 implies that n+2
n+1
(1 + φa) − 1(n+1)ra > 0. Therefore if
∂xi0
∂b
≥ 0 and s¯1 >
s0
n+2
n+1
(1+φa)− 1(n+1)ra
, then the derivative is positive .
The results of Lemma 1 obtain by taking s0 → 0 in Lemmata 4 and 5.
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To plot Figure 1.10, I calculate E (∆1)−∆0. The following lemma gives two useful results:
Lemma 6 When s0 → 0, ∆0 > 0.
If n ≤ 2, E (∆1) |s0→0 ≥ 0
∀n ≥ 1, E (∆1 −∆0) |s0→0 =
2anσ2 [(n+ 2) (1 + φa)− 1]
(n+ 1)2 d
(
1
ra
− 2
(n+ 1) rb
)
s¯1
Proof. The first result follows taking the limit of ∆0 given in Proposition 3, when s0 → 0.
For the second result, let’s start from equation (1.20):
E (∆1) =
2aσ2
n+ 1
[
−n
d
s0 +
(
1− n
(n+ 1)2 d
(
n+ 1
ra
− 2
rb
))
s¯1
]
We can prove that 1 − n
(n+1)2d
(
n+1
ra
− 2
rb
)
∈ [0, 1] when n ≤ 2. Let’s show first that 1 is an
upper bound. Skipping some lines of algebra, I get:
1− n
(n+ 1) dra
+
2n
(n+ 1)2 drb
< 1 ⇔ −4abσ
2z21
n+ 1
− 2 (2n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
< n− 1
The second inequality is always verified. Second, 1− n
(n+1)dra
+ 2n
(n+1)2drb
> 0 is equivalent to
(n+1)2
n
d > n+1
ra
− 2
rb
. Given that d = φn+(n+ 2)φa+2nφb = φn+(n+ 2)
a2σ2z21
(n+1)2ra
+2n
4abσ2z21
(n+1)2rb
,
the inequality is equivalent to
(n+ 1)2 φn
n
+
(n+ 2) a2σ2z21 − n (n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2 ra
+
2 (1 + 4abσ2z21)
(n+ 1)2 rb
> 0
The third term is clearly positive. Thus it is sufficient that the sum of the first two terms is
positive. Using the definition of φn, the sum of the first two terms is equal to:
(n+ 1)2 φnra + (n+ 2) a
2σ2z21 − n (n+ 1)
nra
=
(n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)
(
1− 2n+1
(n+1)2
a2σ2z21
)
+ (n+ 2) a2σ2z21 − n (n+ 1)
nra
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The numerator is n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 2 + a2σ2z21
(
n+ 2− (2n+ 1) (n
3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)
(n+ 1)2
)
> 0
⇔ a2σ2z21 <
(n+ 1)2 (n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 2)
2n (n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 1)
Note that
(n+1)2(n3+3n2+2n+2)
2n(n3+4n2+3n+1)
− (n+1)2
2n+1
=
(n+1)2(−n3+n2+3n+2)
2n(2n+1)(n3+4n2+3n+1)
. This expression is strictly
positive for n = 1, and n = 2, and negative for n > 2. Hence for n ≤ 2, Assumption 1
implies that 1− n
(n+1)dra
+ 2n
(n+1)2drb
> 0, which implies that E (∆1) |s0→0 ≥ 0.
Finally, I calculate the expected change of the spread E (∆1 −∆0) using equations (1.19)
and (1.20):
E (∆1 −∆0) = 2aσ2
[
1
n+ 1
(
1− n
(n+ 1) dra
+
2n
(n+ 1)2 drb
)
−
(
Φa
(n+ 1) ra
+
2 (1− Φa)
(n+ 1)2 rb
)]
s¯1
− 2aσ2
(
n
(n+ 1) d
+ Φa
)
s0
Recall that Φa = 1− n(n+2)(1+φa)(n+1)d , we have:
E (∆1 −∆0) |s0→0 =
2anσ2 [(n+ 2) (1 + φa)− 1]
(n+ 1)2 d
(
1
ra
− 2
(n+ 1) rb
)
s¯1
Corollary 6
Proof. From the expression of the equilibrium spread (1.19), ∂∆0
∂s¯1
= 2aσ2
[
Φa
(n+1)ra
+ 2(1−Φa)
(n+1)2rb
]
>
0 since Φa ∈ ]0, 1[. Similarly, from equation (1.17),
∂xi0
∂s¯1
=
1
d
(
1
(n+ 1) ra
− 2
(n+ 1)2 rb
)
,with d = φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb
Replacing ra and rb by their expressions, and rearranging terms, this simplifies into:
∂xi0
∂s¯1
=
n− 1 + 4abσ2z21
n+1
+ 2aσ2z21
2n+1
(n+1)2
d
> 0, for any n ≥ 1
Corollary 7
Proof. Since both the denominator and the numerator of xi0 depend on z
2
1 , I first
calculate the derivative of each part. Starting from the expression of the equilibrium trade
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xi0 given by (1.17), and the definition of ra, φa, rb and φb given by equations (1.15) and
(1.16), we get:
∂ra
∂z21
= −a2σ2 2n+ 1
(n+ 1)2
< 0;
∂φa
∂z21
=
a2σ2 (n+ 1)2 r1 + a
2σ2 2n+1
(n+1)2
a2σ2z21
(n+ 1)2 r2a
=
a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
> 0
∂rb
∂z21
=
4abσ2
(n+ 1)2
> 0,
∂φb
∂z21
=
4abσ2 (n+ 1)2 rb − 4abσ2(n+1)2 4abσ2z21
(n+ 1)4 r2b
=
4abσ2
(n+ 1)2 r2b
> 0
This implies that the derivative of the numerator of xi0 is:
∂
s¯1
(n+1)ra
− 2s¯1
(n+1)2rb
∂z21
=
s¯1
n+ 1
[
∂r−1a
∂z21
− 2
n+ 1
∂r−1b
∂z21
]
=
s¯1
n+ 1
[
(2n+ 1) a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
+
8abσ2
(n+ 1)3 r2b
]
Similarly, the derivative of the denominator of xi0 is:
∂ (φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb)
∂z21
=
(n+ 2) a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
+ 2n
4abσ2
(n+ 1)2 r2b
Thus combining both derivatives and using the notation d = φn + (n+ 2)φa + 2nφb, I get:
∂xi0
∂z21
=
ds¯1
n+1
[
(2n+1)a2σ2
(n+1)2r2a
+ 8abσ
2
(n+1)3r2b
]
−
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
− 2s¯1
(n+1)2rb
)(
(n+2)a2σ2
(n+1)2r2a
+ 2n 4abσ
2
(n+1)2r2b
)
d2
Thus
∂xi0
∂z21
≥ 0 iff
ds¯1
n+ 1
[
(2n+ 1) a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
+
8abσ2
(n+ 1)3 r2b
]
≥
(
s0 +
s¯1 ((n+ 1) rb − 2ra)
(n+ 1)2 rarb
)(
(n+ 2) a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
+ 2n
4abσ2
(n+ 1)2 r2b
)
Now let’s consider the limit case where arbitrageurs become risk-neutral, b → 0. The
previous condition becomes:
∂xi0
∂z21
≥ 0 ⇔ d
b→0s¯1
n+ 1
(2n+ 1) a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
≥
(
s0 +
s¯1 (n+ 1− 2ra)
(n+ 1)2 ra
)
(n+ 2) a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
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Since db→0 = φn + (n+ 2)φa, we can rearrange terms and get:
If b→ 0, ∂x
i
0
∂z21
≥ 0 ⇔
(
(2n+ 1) (φn + (n+ 2)φa)
(n+ 1) (n+ 2)
− n+ 1− 2ra
(n+ 1)2 ra
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
s¯1 ≥ s0
After a simple calculation, I get Θ > 0 iff a2σ2z21 < cn ≡ (n+1)
2
2n+1
(n+1)(2n+1)φn+n+3−(n+1)2
(n+1)(2n+1)φn+n+3
.
Clearly, (n+1)(2n+1)φn+n+3−(n+1)
2
(n+1)(2n+1)φn+n+3
< 1, thus cn <
(n+1)2
2n+1
. Hence there are two cases:
• If cn ≤ a2σ2z21 < (n+1)
2
2n+1
, then Θ < 0 and
∂xi0
∂z21
< 0
• If 0 < a2σ2z21 < cn, then Θ > 0 and ∂x
i
0
∂z21
≥ 0 iff s1 > Θ−1s0
In the result, I use the notation θn,a = Θ
−1.
To derive the comparative statics of the spread, I start from the expression of the spread
schedule (1.14), and get:
∂∆0
∂z21
= 2aσ2
∂
(
s0 +
s¯1
(n+1)ra
)
∂z21
− n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
∂ (
∑n
i=1 x
i
0)
∂z21
− n+ 2
n+ 1
n∑
i=1
xi0
∂φa
∂z21

When b→ 0, this gives:
∂∆0
∂z21
=
2n+ 1
(n+ 1)3 r2a
a2σ2s¯1 − n+ 2
n+ 1
(1 + φa)
ds¯1
n+1
a2σ2 2n+1
(n+1)2r2a
−
(
s0 +
s¯1(n+1−2ra)
(n+1)2ra
)
(n+2)a2σ2
(n+1)2r2a
d2
−n+ 2
n+ 1
a2σ2
(n+ 1)2 r2a
n
(
s0 +
s¯1(n+1−2ra)
(n+1)2ra
)
d
After rearranging terms, I get:
∂∆0
∂z21
= αa2σ2s¯1 + βa
2σ2
(
s0 +
s¯1 (n+ 1− 2ra)
(n+ 1)2 ra
)
,with
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α =
2n+ 1
(n+ 1)3 r2a
− (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
(n+ 1)4 r2ad
(1 + φa) =
2n+ 1
(n+ 1)4 r2ad
[
n3 + 2n2 + n
n+ 1
+ (n+ 2) (n− 1)φa
]
> 0
β =
(n+ 2)2 (1 + φa)
(n+ 1)3 r2a
− n (n+ 2)
(n+ 1)3 r2ad
=
n+ 2
(n+ 1)3 r3ad
(n+ 2)φn − n︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+φa (n+ 2) (φn + (n+ 2)φa + n+ 2)

Hence with α and β strictly positive, the derivative is positive.
Corollary 8
Proof. Follows from Proposition 3.
1.6.4 Entry
Simultaneous (free) entry
Risk-free arbitrage Proposition 4
Proof. From Proposition 1, I calculate the arbitrageurs’ certainty equivalent in equilib-
rium. Skipping a few lines of algebra, this gives, assuming w.l.o.g. that Bi0 = 0:
CEi0 = 2aσ
2
[
ω0s
2
0 + ω1s
2
1 + ω0,1s0s1
]
with ω0 =
n4 + 3n3 + 6n2 + 5n+ 2
(n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
ω1 =
4n6 + 14n5 + 21n4 + 22n3 + 21n2 + 14n+ 4
(n+ 1)2 (n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
ω0,1 =
2n4 + 5n3 + 8n2 + 3n+ 2
(n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
Note that ω0+ω1+ω0,1 =
7n6+28n5+54n4+66n3+55n2+30n+8
(n+1)2(n3+4n2+3n+2)2
≡ pin. Thus assuming that s0 = s1 = s
and s ∼ N (s¯, z2), we have by Lemma 3 (with “B”= 0):
−E (exp−2abσ2pins2) = −exp
[
− 2abσ2s¯2pin
1+4abσ2z2pin
]
(1 + 4abσ2z2pin)
1
2
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Let us denote θ = −2abσ2pin.
J˜ i0 = −
exp
(
θs¯2
1−2θz2 + bI
)
√
1− 2θz2 (1.42)
J˜ must be compared to the payoff from the alternative, which consists in doing nothing and
brings the agent a utility of − exp (0) = −1. To see that J˜ is decreasing in n, note that J˜ is
decreasing in θ. Since θ decreases with pin and pin decreases with n, θ increases with n, i.e.
J˜ decreases with n.
Corollary 9
Proof. J˜ decreases with I, hence J˜0 decreases with I. Since θ = −2abσ2pin increases
with n, n∗ decreases with I. Since J˜ increases with s¯, the same logic applies and n∗ increases
with s¯. Further, θ decreases with a and σ2. Since J˜ increases in both a and σ2, J˜−1 also
does and therefore n∗ increases in a and σ2.
The comparative static with respect to z requires to calculate the derivative. Using
equation (1.42), and noting that
∂ θs¯
2
1−2θz2
∂z2
=
2θ2s¯2
(1− 2θz2)2
∂J˜ i0
∂z2
= −
2θ2s¯2
√
1−2θz2
(1−2θz2)2 exp
(
θs¯2
1−2θz2
)
+ θ√
1−2θz2 exp
(
θs¯2
1−2θz2
)
1− 2θz2
= −
exp
(
θs¯2
1−2θz2
)
(1− 2θz2) 32
[
2θ2s¯2
1− 2θz2 + θ
]
Hence
∂J˜i0
∂z2
≤ 0 ⇔ 2θ2s¯2
1−2θz2 + θ ≥ 0 ⇔ 2θs¯
2
1−2θz2 + 1 ≤ 0, because θ < 0. This is equivalent to
s¯2 − z2 ≥ −1
2θ
=
1
4abσ2pin
The condition is satisfied if a or b or σ2 are large, or if pin is large, i.e. if n is small. Since J˜
decreases with n, n∗ decreases with z if θ is large enough. θ is large when a or b or σ2 are
large or n is small.
Corollary 10
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Proof. φn and ψ¯n are given in Proposition 1. It is easy to see that they are decreasing
in n. Since n∗ is increasing in a, ψn∗ and ψ¯n∗ are decreasing in a.
Risky arbitrage
Proposition 5
Proof. To calculate arbitrageurs’ certainty equivalent in equilibrium, recall from the
proof of Proposition 3 that
xi0 =
s0
d
+
(n+ 1) rb − 2ra
(n+ 1)2 rarbd
s¯1∑
i
xi0 =
n
d
s0 +
n (n+ 1) rb − 2nra
(n+ 1)2 rarbd
s¯1
∆ˆ0 = Φas0 +
(n+ 1) rbΦa + (1− Φa) 2ra
(n+ 1)2 rarb
s¯1
with Φa = 1− n (n+ 2)
n+ 1
1 + φa
d
Thus, skipping some tedious algebra, arbitrageurs’ certainty equivalent is given by
CEi0 = x
i
0∆ˆ0 + (1− φb)
(
∑
i x
i
0)
2
(n+ 1)2
− s¯1
(n+ 1)2 rb
(
2
∑
i
xi0 − s¯1
)
= pi0s
2
0 + pi1s
2
1 + pi0,1s0s¯1
with pi0 =
Φa
d
+
1− φb
(n+ 1)2
n2
d2
(1.43)
=
(n+ 1)2 φn − n (n2 + 2n+ 2) + (n+ 1) (n+ 2)φa + n (2n2 + 2n+ 2)φb
(n+ 1)2 d2
pi1 =
[(n+ 1) rb − 2ra]2
(n+ 1)4 r2ar
2
bd
2
[
Φad+
n2 (1− φb)
(n+ 1)2
]
− 2 (n− 1) (n+ 1) rb − 2ra
(n+ 1)4 rar2bd
+
1
(n+ 1)2 rb
(1.44)
pi0,1 =
2 [(n+ 1) rb − 2ra]
(n+ 1)2 rarbd
[
Φa +
n
(n+ 1)2 d
]
− 2 (n− 1)
(n+ 1)2 rbd
(1.45)
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Therefore at time 0 arbtrageurs’ equilibrium utility is
J i0 = −r−
1
2
b exp
(−2abσ2 (pi0s20 + pi1s21 + pi0,1s0s¯1))
= −r−
1
2
b exp
(−2abσ2pi1s¯1) exp (−2abσ2pi0s20 − 2abσ2pi0,1s0s¯1)
Hence assuming that s0 ∼ N (s¯0, z20), and using Lemma 3:
E−1
[
exp
(−2abσ2pi0s20 − 2abσ2pi0,1s0s¯1)] = exp
(
2a2b2σ4pi20,1s¯
2
1z
2
0+s¯0(−2abσ2pi0,1s¯1−2abσ2pi0s¯0)
1+4abσ2pi0z20
)
√
1 + 4abσ2pi0z20
=
exp
(
−2abσ2 s¯0(pi0,1s¯1+pi0s¯0)−abσ2pi20,1s¯21z20
1+4abσ2pi0z20
)
√
1 + 4abσ2pi0z20
This implies that arbitrageurs’ expected utility at time -1 (net of entry cost) is:
Jˆ i0 = −
exp
[
−η
(
pi0,1(s¯0s¯1− η2pi0,1s¯21z20)+pi0s¯20
1+2ηpi0z20
+ pi1s¯
2
1
)]
exp (bI)√
rb (1 + 2ηpi0z20)
, with η = 2abσ2 (1.46)
1.6.5 Gradual entry
Proposition 6
Proof.
I start with the oligopoly case ( n ≥ 2). The proposition is based on the following three
results.
Proposition 7 Arbitrageurs accommodate entry iff ρ < ρ¯. There is no accommodate equi-
librium if ρ > ρacc > ρ¯. The equilibrium trades are:
∀i = 1, . . . , n, xi0 =
(n+ 1) (n+ 4)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s
∀i = 1, . . . , n+ 1, xi1 =
s−∑i xi0
n+ 2
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Proof. At time 1, following arguments given in the proof of Proposition 1, the payoff
(certainty equivalent) of the subgame is given by 2aσ2
(s−
∑
j x
j
0)
2
(n+2)2
. Hence, the new arbitrageur
enters iff(
s−∑j xj0)2
(n+ 2)2
≥ I
2aσ2
= ρ2 (1.47)
In the benchmark case with no gradual entry, the equilibrium trades are (from Proposition
1):
xi0 =
n2 + 3n
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
s
This implies that s −∑j xj0 = (n+1)(n+2)n3+4n2+3n+2s. Plugging this expression into condition 1.47
shows that at time 1, if ρ > ρbmk ≡ n+1
n3+4n2+3n+2
s, it is not profitable for the new arbitrageur
to enter. Thus incumbent arbitrageurs can deter the entrant without altering their trading
strategy, i.e. at no cost.
Let’s now assume that local investors believe at time 0 that entry will occur at time 1
and that incumbents trade accordingly, i.e. assume that n+ 1 traders will be active at time
1. Following the same steps as in the benchmark case of Proposition 1, the spread at time
0 is:
∆0 = 2aσ
2
[
s0 +
s1
n+ 2
− n+ 3
n+ 2
∑
j
xj0
]
= 2aσ2
n+ 3
n+ 2
[
s−
∑
j
xj0
]
, with s0 = s1 = s
Hence incumbents solve the following problem:
CEi,acc0
2aσ2
= max
xi0
n+ 3
n+ 2
xi0
(
s−
∑
j
xj0
)
+
(s−∑i xi0)2
(n+ 2)2
Solving for the first-order condition:
∀i = 1, . . . , n, n+ 3
n+ 2
(
s−
∑
j
xj0 − xi0
)
− 2
(n+ 2)2
(
s−
∑
j
xj0
)
= 0
Collecting the n equations and stacking them together in vectors, and applying Lemma 3
68 CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC STRATEGIC ARBITRAGE
gives the equilibrium trade:
xi0 =
(n+ 1) (n+ 4)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s
As a result, s−∑j xj0 = (n+2)(n+3)n3+6n2+9n+6s, and the anticipation that the new arbitrageur enters
is verified iff
(s−
∑n
j=1 x
j
0)
2
(n+2)2
≥ ρ2 ⇔ ρ ≤ ρacc ≡ n+3
n3+6n2+9n+6
s. Of course, the above strategy is
a Nash equilibrium only if the entrant can commit ex-ante to enter no matter what. Since
it is not possible here, we must take into account the possibility for arbitrageurs to deter
entry by deviating at time 0. When ρ ≤ ρacc, the incumbents’ certainty equivalent is
CEi,acc0 =
(n+ 3)2 (n2 + 5n+ 5)
(n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6)2
s2 ≡Ms2 (1.48)
Since each incumbent is pivotal, a deviation by one incumbent arbitrageur can deter the
new arbitrageur from entering by reducing the available rent at time 1. In this case, the
time 1 payoff changes to 2aσ2
(s−
∑
j x
j
0)
2
(n+1)2
. To analyze the deviaton, let’s assume that n − 1
incumbents (indexed by −i) trade x−i0 = (n+1)(n+4)n3+6n2+9n+6s (“accommodate”). This implies that
s −∑−i x−i0 = 2(n2+5n+5)n3+6n2+9n+6s. A deviating incumbent thus solves (holding local investors’
beliefs fixed):32
CEi,dev,acc0
2aσ2
= max
xi0
n+ 3
n+ 2
xi0
(
s−
∑
−i
x−i0 − xi0
)
+
(
s−∑−i x−i0 − xi0)2
(n+ 1)2
s.t.
(s−∑i xi0)2
(n+ 2)2
< ρ2 (1.49)
Ignoring the constraint first, and solving the maximisation problem gives:
xi,dev0 =
n3 + 5n2 + 5n− 1
2 (n3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1)
(
s−
∑
−i
x−i0
)
=
(n3 + 5n2 + 5n− 1) (n2 + 5n+ 5)
(n3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1) (n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6)
s
One can check whether by deviating to this quantity, an incumbent deters entry: in this
case, s−∑−i x−i0 − xi0 = (n3+5n2+7n+3)(n2+5n+5)(n3+5n2+6n+1)(n3+6n2+9n+6)s and therefore the no-entry constraint is
satisfied iff ρ >
(n3+5n2+7n+3)(n2+5n+5)
(n+2)(n3+5n2+6n+1)(n3+6n2+9n+6)
s ≡ ρˆ. However, we are considering the interval
[0, ρacc[, and ρacc− ρˆ = − n2+9n+9
(n+2)(n3+5n2+6n+1)(n3+6n2+9n+6)
< 0. This means that to deter entry,
32Since I assumed that ρ ≤ ρacc, the only potentially optimal deviation is to prevent entry. Without the
constraint in the maximisation problem, the solution would simply be xi0 =
2(n2+5n+5)
n3+6n2+9n+6s, by definition.
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the deviating incumbent must trade xi,dev0 to meet the no-entry constraint (1.49), i.e. such
that: (
s−∑−i x−i0 − xi,dev0 )2
(n+ 2)2
< ρ2
Assuming that s−∑−i x−i0 − xi,dev0 ≥ 0 (which will be true in equilibrium), this amounts to
xi,dev0
n+2
>
s−∑−i x−i0
n+2
− ρ. Since it is suboptimal to increase his position too much, the deviating
arbitrageur chooses xi,dev0 = s−
∑
−i x
−i
0 − (n+ 2) (ρ− ), with  > 0 and small, i.e.
xi,dev0 =
2 (n2 + 5n+ 5)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
− (n+ 2) (ρ− )
We can thus compute the payoff from deviating. Skipping a few lines of algebra, I get:
CEi,dev,acc0
2aσ2
= − (n+ 2) (n
3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
ρ2
+
(
2 (n+ 3) (n2 + 5n+ 5)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s+
2 (n+ 2) (n3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2

)
ρ
− (n+ 2) (n
3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
2 − 2 (n+ 3) (n
2 + 5n+ 5)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s
We can derive the condition under which accommodate is a Nash equilibrium in rational
expectations by comparing payoffs:
1
2aσ2
(
CEacc0 − CEdev,acc0
)
|→0 ≥ 0⇔ a1ρ2 + a2ρ+ a3 ≥ 0
with a1 =
(n+ 2) (n3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
a2 = −2 (n+ 3) (n
2 + 5n+ 5)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s
a3 =
(n+ 3)2 (n2 + 5n+ 5)
(n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6)2
s2
The discriminant of a1ρ
2 + a2ρ+ a3 is ∆ =
(n+3)2(n2+5n+5)
(n3+6n2+9n+6)2
∆˜s2, with
∆˜ =
(
n2 + 5n+ 5
)− (n+ 2) (n3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
=
2n+ 3
(n+ 1)2
(1.50)
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There are two positive roots ρ1 and ρ2, with ρ1 < ρ2, given by ρ1 = −a2+
√
∆
2a1
≡ ρ¯ and
ρ2 =
−a2+
√
∆
2a1
. After some simplifications, I get:
ρ¯ =
n+ 3
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
(n+ 1)2
(
un −
√
∆˜un
)
(n+ 2) vn
s = ρacc
(n+ 1)2
(
un −
√
∆˜un
)
(n+ 2) vn
(1.51)
ρ2 =
n+ 3
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
(n+ 1)2
(
un +
√
∆˜un
)
(n+ 2) vn
s = ρacc
(n+ 1)2
(
un +
√
∆˜un
)
(n+ 2) vn
(1.52)
with un = n
2 + 5n+ 5
vn = n
3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1
It is clear that ρ2 > ρ2 = ρ
acc (n+1)
2un
(n+2)vn
. Further, the fact that for all n ≥ 2, (n+1)2un
(n+2)vn
> 1,
implies that ρ2 > ρ
acc.
Regarding the position of ρ¯ relative to ρacc, note that ∀ (a, b) ∈ (R+)2, with a > b,
a − b −√a (a− b) = √a− b [√a− b−√a] < 0, as the square root is increasing. Rewrite
∆˜ = un − n+2(n+1)2vn, and apply the previous result to the thresholds:
ρ¯ < ρacc ⇔
(n+ 1)2
(
un −
√
∆˜un
)
(n+ 2) vn
< 1
⇔ un − n+ 2
(n+ 1)2
vn <
√
un
(
un − n+ 2
(n+ 1)2
vn
)
The previous inequality holds. Thus incuments accommodate iff ρ < ρ¯ < ρacc. Note that for
ρ > ρacc, the payoff from deviating will always dominate the payoff from accommodating,
as can be seen from Figure 1.11. The constrained part of CEi,dev,acc0 is above CE
i,acc
0 when
ρ > ρacc because the function is still increasing after ρ¯ for some time: the peak of CEi,dev,acc0
is ρm > ρacc > ρ¯. This can be verified by direct calculation.
Proposition 8 If ρ > ρbmk, arbitrageurs deter without altering their optimal strategy. Equi-
librium trades are as in Proposition 1, with s0 = s1 = s.
If ρ ≤ ρbmk, arbitrageurs deter iff ρ > ρ, with ρbmk > ρ. Arbitrageurs must alter their
trading strategy as follows:
∀i = 1, . . . , n, xi0 =
1
n
[s− (n+ 2) ρ+ ] ,  > 0 and  ≈ 0
∀i = 1, . . . , n, xi1 =
s−∑i xi0
n+ 1
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Proof. The case ρ > ρbmk was treated above. I focus instead on ρ ≤ ρbmk. I assume that
local investors believe at time 0 that the new arbitrageur will not enter the market in the next
period, meaning that the incumbent arbitrageurs face the following schedule for the spread:
∆0 = 2aσ
2 n+2
n+1
(
s−∑j xj0). When ρ ≤ ρbmk, incumbents must alter their benchmark trading
strategies to decrease the time 1 payoff and prevent entry. x0 satisfies:
(s−
∑
j x
j
0)
2
(n+2)2
< ρ2, i.e.
assuming that s −∑j xj0 ≥ 0 (which will be true in equilibrium ), ∑j xj0 > s − (n+ 2) ρ.
Since incumbents have an interest in minimizing the deviation from their optimal strategy,
they choose the smallest quantity such that the previous inequality is satisfied. Imposing
symmetry across incumbents, this gives the following candidate equilibrium strategy:
∀i = 1, . . . , n, xi0 =
1
n
[s− (n+ 2) ρ+ ] , with  positive and small (1.53)
The objective function of arbitrageurs is
CEi,det0
2aσ2
= maxxi0
n+2
n+1
xi0
(
s−∑j xj0) + (s−∑j xj0)2(n+1)2 .
Plugging the strategy (1.53) into the objective function, and skipping a few lines of calcula-
tion, I get:
CEi,det0
2aσ2
= − (n
2 + 2n+ 2) (n+ 2)2
n (n+ 1)2
ρ2 +
[
(n+ 2)2
n (n+ 1)
s+
2 (n22n+ 2) (n+ 2)
n (n+ 1)2

]
ρ
+
n+ 2
n (n+ 1)
s+
n2 + 4n+ 2
n (n+ 1)2
2 (1.54)
This is the payoff from deterring entrance, when local investors believe that there will be no
entry in equilibrium. Since deterring requires to alter the time-0 trading strategy, it may be
too costly for incumbent arbitrageurs. I now analyze under which conditions (1.53) forms a
Nash equilibrium in rational expectations.
Suppose n − 1 incumbents, indexed by −i, follow the deterrence strategy and trade
x−i0 =
1
n
[s− (n+ 2) ρ+ ]. This leads to s −∑−i x−i0 = sn + (n−1)(n+2)n ρ − n−1n . Then for
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incumbent arbitrageur i, A deviating incumbent solves the following problem:
CEi,dev,det0
2aσ2
= max
xi0
n+ 2
n+ 1
xi0
(
s−
∑
−i
x−i0 − xi0
)
+
(
s−∑−i x−i0 − xi0)2
(n+ 2)2
s.t. x−i0 =
1
n
[s− (n+ 2) ρ+ ]
2aσ2
(s−∑ni=1 xi0)2
(n+ 2)2
≥ I (1.55)
Solving the first-order condition (assuming the entry constraint is satisfied) gives
xi0 =
n3 + 6n2 + 10n+ 6
2 (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
[
s+
(n− 1) (n+ 2)
n
ρ− n− 1
n

]
(1.56)
Note xi0 > 0. Further, x
−i
0 ≥ 0 ⇔ s > (n+ 2) ρ− , which is verified for any ρ < ρbmk.
We can check under which condition the deviation leads to the new arbitrageur’s entry
at time 1. Given the construction of the deterrence strategy x−i0 , it is sufficient to compare
xi0 and x
−i
0 . In particular if x
i
0 < x
−i
0 , then the deviation leads to entry. Skipping a few lines
of algebra,
x−i0 − xi0 =
n3 + 6n2 + 12n+ 8
2 (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
s
n
− n
4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8
2 (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
[
n+ 2
n
ρ− 
n
]
Hence, x−i0 > x
i
0 ⇔ ρ−

n+ 2
< ρdev ≡ (n+ 2)
2 s
n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8
(1.57)
Comparing ρdev with ρbmk shows that ∀n ≥ 1, ρdev < ρbmk. Hence if ρ ∈ [ρdev, ρbmk[, the
deviation does not lead to entry. Since on this interval xi0 ≥ x−i0 , the deviating arbitrageur
would have to buy x−i0 −η, with eta > 0 and small. This strategy must be dominated, since it
implies a strictly lower time-1 continuation payoff (for the entrant steals some business), but
only a very small gain at time 0, relative to the deterrence strategy. Thus if ρ ∈ [ρdev, ρbmk[,
then deterring is optimal.
If ρ < ρdev, there is a trade-off between deviating and letting the new arbitrageur enter
and deterring for arbitrageur i. I plug (1.56) into the objective function and, after rearranging
terms, I obtain the payoff from deviating for arbitrageur i:
CEi,dev,det0
2aσ2
=
(n+ 2)4
4 (n+ 1) (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
[
s+
(n− 1) (n+ 2)
n
ρ
n− 1
n

]2
(1.58)
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I now derive under which condition the strategy is a Nash equilibrium in rational ex-
pectations by comparing payoffs. Recalling equation (1.54), and rearranging terms, I take
→ 0, and get:
CEi,det0 − CEi,dev,det0
2aσ2
≥ 0⇔ b1ρ2 + b2ρ+ b3 ≥ 0
with b1 = −(n+ 2)
2
n
[
n2 + 2n+ 2
(n+ 1)2
+
(n− 1)2 vn
n
< 0
]
b2 =
[
(n+ 2)2
n (n+ 1)
− 2 (n− 1) (n+ 2) vn
n2
]
s
b3 = −vn
n2
s2 < 0
and vn ≡ (n+ 2)
4
4 (n+ 1) (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
After some algebra, I get the following expressions for b1, b2 and the discriminant:
b1 = − (n+ 2)
2wn
4n2 (n+ 1)2 (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
b2 =
(n+ 2)2 (n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8)
2n2 (n+ 1) (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)
s
∆ =
(n+ 2)4 ∆¯
4n4 (n+ 1)2 (n3 + 6n2 + 11n+ 7)2
with wn = n
7 + 11n6 + 47n5 + 101n4 + 132n3 + 120n2 + 72n+ 16
∆¯ =
(
n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8
)2 − (n+ 2)2
n+ 1
wn
=
n2 (7n4 + 60n3 + 160n2 + 188n+ 84)
n+ 1
The discriminant being positive, there are two roots ρ3 =
−b2+
√
∆
2b1
≡ ρ and ρ4 = −b2−
√
∆
2b1
with
ρ4 > ρ > 0. It is possible to calculate these roots explicitly. Skipping a few lines of algebra,
I get:
ρ3+k =
(n+ 1)
(
n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8− (−1)k
√
∆¯
)
wn
s, k = 0, 1
Finally, I compare the roots to the threshold ρbmk. Note that ρ4 >
(n+1)(n4+7n3+16n2+18n+8)
wn
≡
ρ
4
. Further, ρ
4
− ρbmk > 0 ⇔ n(n+1)(4n
3+10n2−2n−12)
(n3+4n2+3n+2)wn
> 0, which is true ∀n ≥ 2. Hence
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ρ4 > ρbmk.
Further, note that
ρ− ρdev
s
=
(n+ 1)
(
n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8−
√
∆¯
)
wn
− (n+ 2)
2
n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8
=
(n+ 1)
[
∆¯− (n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8)
√
∆¯
]
wn (n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8)
Then write ∆¯ = a − b, with a = − (n4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8)2 and b = (n+2)2
n+1
wn. ∆¯ > 0
⇒ a > b, hence a − b −√a (a− b) = √a− b [√a− b−√a] < 0 (since a − b < a and √ is
increasing). Thus, ρ < ρdev. Since ρdev < ρbmk, ρ < ρbmk. Summing up, deterring is a Nash
equilibrium in rational expectations on
[
ρ, ρbmk
]
.
Proposition 9 ∀n ≥ 2, ρ < ρ¯.
Proof. By direct calculation. Recall from the proofs of Propositions 7 and 8 that
ρ¯ = ρacc
(n+ 1)2
[
un −
√
∆˜un
]
(n+ 2) vn
with vn = n
3 + 5n2 + 6n+ 1, ∆˜ =
2n+ 3
(n+ 1)2
, ρacc =
n+ 3
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
and ρ =
(n+ 1)
[
zn −
√
∆¯
]
wn
with wn = n
7 + 11n6 + 47n5 + 101n4 + 132n3 + 120n2 + 72n+ 16
zn = n
4 + 7n3 + 16n2 + 18n+ 8
∆¯ =
n2 (7n4 + 60n3 + 160n2 + 188n+ 84)
n+ 1
Hence ρ¯ > ρ ⇔ (n+ 1) ρaccwn
[
un −
√
∆˜un
]
−vnzn+vn
√
∆¯ > 0 ⇔ (n+ 1) ρaccwn−vnzn >
(n+ 1) ρaccwn
√
∆˜un− vn
√
∆¯. Skipping several lines of algebra, I find that the numerator of
the LHS is qn = n
11 +19n10 +156n9 +729n8 +2160n7 +4134n6 +6107n5 +6454n4 +5254n3 +
3142n2 + 1172n + 192. Since un < (n+ 3)
2,
√
∆˜un <
(n+3)
√
2n+3
n+1
< (n+3)(2n+3)
n+1
. Hence, it is
sufficient to prove that qn > (n+ 3)
2 (2n+ 3)wn. After some algebra, I find that the LHS
is equal to 2n10 + 37n9 + 295n8 + 1330n7 + 3768n6 + 7215n5 + 9423n4 + 8996n3 + 6072n2 +
2520n+ 432 < qn for all n ≥ 2. Hence ρ¯ > ρ.
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Monopoly case.
Last, I consider the case n = 1. If there is a monopolistic arbitrageur at time 0, the
equilibrium at time 0 is not a Nash equilibrium in rational expectations, but simply a rational
expectations equilibrium.
The thresholds ρbmk and ρacc remain the same, with n = 1. From the results of Proposi-
tion 7, I get: ρbmk = 0.2 and ρacc = 2
11
. For ρ > ρbmk, the monopolist has no interest to let
the new arbitrageur enter. For ρ < ρbmk, the monopolist compares the payoff from accom-
modating and deterring. If the monopolist accommodates, his payoff is CEacc0 = 2aσ
2 4
11
s2
(from equation (1.48). If he deters, since ρ ≤ ρbmk, he must set x10 such that the time 1
payoff is smaller than the entry cost for the new arbitrageur, i.e. x10 = s − 3ρ − , with 
small and strictly positive. The payoff, for  very small, is CEdet0 = 2aσ
2
(−9
2
ρ2 + 9
2
sρ
)
.
Given that there is no coordination problem, I compare directly the payoffs CEacc0 and
CEdet0 , while in the n ≥ 2 case, I was holding the local investors’ beliefs fixed and checking
each arbitrageur’s incentives to deter or accommodate. After a straightforward calculation,
I find that CEacc0 ≥ CEdet0 ⇔ ρ ≤ ρˆ or ρ ≥ ρˆ′, with ρˆ = 1 − 29
√
δ and ρˆ′ = 1 + 2
9
√
δ,
where δ =
√
747
2
√
11
. Clearly, ρˆ′ > 1 > ρbmk > ρacc > ρˆ. Thus, in equilibrium, the monopolist
accommodates if ρ ≤ ρˆ and the new arbitrageur enters, and the monopolist deters if ρ > ρˆ,
with no entry. The deterrence is not “costly” if ρ > ρbmk.
Corollary 12
Proof. Using the results of Propositions 7 and 8, I get, after straightforward calculations:
If ρ > ρbmk, ∆bmk0 = 2aσ
2 (n+ 2)
2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
s (1.59)
∆bmk1 = 2aσ
2 n+ 2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
s =
∆bmk0
n+ 2
If ρ ≤ ρ, ∆acc0 = 2aσ2
(n+ 3) (n+ 2)
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s (1.60)
∆acc1 = 2aσ
2 n+ 2
n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6
s =
∆acc0
n+ 3
If ρ ∈ [ρ¯, ρbmk], and  small ∆det0 = 2aσ2 (n+ 2)2n+ 1 ρ (1.61)
∆det1 = 2aσ
2n+ 2
n+ 1
ρ =
∆det0
n+ 2
Comparison of spreads across the three regimes
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First, a simple calculation shows that ∀n ≥ 2, ∆bmk0 > ∆acc0 , which implies that ∆bmk1 >
∆acc1 .
Second, ∆det0 (ρ¯) > ∆
acc
0 iff
(n+2)2
n+1
ρ¯ > (n+1)(n+3)
n3+6n2+9n+6
s = n+1
n+2
ρacc. Recall from equation
(1.51) in the proof of Proposition 7 that ρ¯ = ρacc
(n+1)2
(
un−
√
∆˜un
)
(n+2)vn
. Hence ∆det0 (ρ¯) > ∆
acc
0
iff vn − (n+ 1)un + (n+ 1)
√
∆˜un < 0, which is equivalent to
√
∆˜un <
(n+2)2
n+1
. Using
the definition of ∆˜, this simplifies to (2n+ 3)un = (2n+ 3) (n
2 + 5n+ 5) < (n+ 2)4, i.e.
2n3 + 13n2 + 25n + 15 < (n+ 2)4, which holds for any n. Hence ∆det0 (ρ¯) > ∆
acc
0 . This
implies that ∆det1 (ρ¯) > ∆
acc
1 .
Third, consider ∆det0
(
ρ
) − ∆acc0 = 2aσ2 (n+ 2) s( (n+2)(zn−√∆¯)wn − (n+3)n3+6n2+9n+6). Hence
∆det0
(
ρ
)
> ∆acc0 iff (n+ 2) (n
3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6) zn−(n+ 3)wn−(n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6)
√
∆¯ > 0.
By the definition of ∆¯, and given that (n+ 2) (n3 + 6n2 + 9n+ 6) zn − (n+ 3)wn = n7 +
13n6+75n5+233n4+394n3+360n2+176n+48, this is equivalent to
√
7n4+60n3+160n2+188n+84
n+1
<
n7+13n6+75n5+233n4+394n3+360n2+176n+48
n(n+2)(n3+6n2+9n+6)
. Taking the square on each side and developing, one can
check that this inequality is always satisfied after some tedious algebra. Hence ∆det0
(
ρ
)−∆acc0 ,
and thus ∆det1
(
ρ
)−∆acc1
Fourth, it is immediate that ∆det0
(
ρbmk
)−∆bmk0 = 0. This implies that the inequality is
also verified at time 1.
Note that ∆dett (ρ) is increasing in ρ on its interval, so that it was sufficient to compare
the spread at the thresholds ρ and ρ¯, ρbmk. Figure 1.11 represents ∆0 as a function of ρ, and
summarizes all the previous results.
Speed of convergence
Clearly,
∆bmk1
∆bmk0
− 1 = ∆det1
∆det0
− 1 = −n+1
n+2
>
∆acc1
∆acc0
− 1 = −n+2
n+3
.
The price impact coefficient is n+2
n+1
when ρ > ρ¯ and n+3
n+2
when ρ ≤ ρ. Thus arbitrageurs
have a lower price impact when ρ ≤ ρ.
Corollary 13
Proof. The first part of the corollary follows from the definition of (1.61). The second
part follows from the facts that ∆acc0 < ∆
det
0
(
ρ
)
< ∆det0 (ρ¯) and the multiplicity of equilibria
on
[
ρ, ρ¯
]
.
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Figure 1.3: Trades and race effect in the risk-free case. The parameters are: s0 =
s1 = 1.
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(a) Local investors more risk-averse than arbitrageurs (a =
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Figure 1.4: Trades (panel a) and decay rate (panel b and c) of arbitrageurs’
position at time 0 as a function of the number of arbitrageurs. In all cases, the
parameters are: s0 = 1, s1 = s¯1 = 1, z
2
1 = 1, σ
2 = 0.1.
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Figure 1.5: Comparative statics of the equilibrium number of arbitrageurs n∗ in
the risky case. The baseline parameters are: a = 2, b = 2, s¯0 = s¯1 = 2, z
2
0 = z
2
1 = 0.5,
σ2 = 0.1, I = 0.1.
80 CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC STRATEGIC ARBITRAGE
n
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37
J  
-
h a
t
s0-bar=3 s0-bar=2
(a) Increase in s¯0
n
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37
J  
-
h a
t
s1-bar=3 s1-bar=2
(b) Increase in s¯1
Figure 1.6: Comparative statics of the equilibrium number of arbitrageurs n∗ in
the risky arbitrage case. The baseline parameters are: a = 2, b = 2, s¯0 = s¯1 = 2,
z20 = z
2
1 = 0.5, σ
2 = 0.1, I = 0.1.
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Figure 1.7: Comparative statics of the equilibrium number of arbitrageurs n∗ in the
risky arbitrage case. The baseline parameters are: a = b = 3, s¯0 = s¯1 = 4, z
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0 = z
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1 = 0.2,
σ2 = 0.1, I = 1.
82 CHAPTER 1. DYNAMIC STRATEGIC ARBITRAGE
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
rf, sigma^2=0.1 rf, sigma^2=0.2
risky,  sigma^2=0.1 risky, sigma^2=0.2
(a) Increase in a
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
rf, sigma^2=0.1 rf, sigma^2=0.2
risky,  sigma^2=0.1 risky, sigma^2=0.2
(b) Increase in σ2
Figure 1.8: Comparing entry in the riskfree and risky arbitrage cases. Effect of a
change in investors’ risk-aversion and volatility of the fundamental. The baseline
parameters are: a = 2, b = 2, s¯0 = s¯1 = s¯ = 2, z
2
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1 = .5, z
2 = 1, σ2 = 0.1, I = 1.
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Figure 1.9: Comparing entry in the riskfree and risky arbitrage cases. Effect of
a change in the volatility of the arbitrage risk at time 0 or time 1. The baseline
parameters for panel b are: a = b = 3, s¯0 = s¯1 = s¯ = 4, σ
2 = 0.1, I = 1. In panel a and c,
the parameters are a = 2, b = 2, s¯0 = s¯1 = s¯ = 2, z
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1 = .5, z
2 = 1, σ2 = 0.1, I = 1
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Figure 1.10: Expected return of the arbitrage at time 0. The baseline parameters are
z2 = 1, σ2 = 0.1. a varies from 0.1 to 10.
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Figure 1.11: Gradual Entry
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Chapter 2
Market Structure and the Limits of
Arbitrage
Abstract: How does imperfect competition among financially-constrained arbitrageurs affect liq-
uidity and asset prices? I study a multi-period model in which arbitrageurs (e.g. market-makers,
dealers, hedge funds) provide market liquidity and face capital constraints, and compare monopo-
listic competition to the competitive case studied by Gromb and Vayanos (2002). I show that the
monopoly is both less efficient and less capital-intensive, as rents captured over time allow her to
build up capital. Consequently, when capital is scarce, arbitrageurs may provide more liquidity at
later stages under monopolistic competition than under perfect competition. In some cases, this
increases aggregate welfare but without being Pareto-improving. Further, when a monopolistic ar-
bitrageur has an intermediate level of capital, she may tackle the arbitrage in a way that leaves her
constrained in the future. Surprisingly, this may improve liquidity relative to a situation without
financial constraints. I discuss implications for market-making via a monopolistic specialist.
2.1 Introduction
In line with the theoretical predictions of the limits of arbitrage literature, there is a growing
body of empirical evidence showing that the amount of capital held by financial institutions
affects market liquidity and asset prices.1 The theory is based on the assumption that
arbitrageurs are competitive, and predicts that the aggregate amount of arbitrageurs’ capital
matters. In practice, however, arbitrage is carried out by large, highly specialized financial
institutions (hedge funds, proprietary trading desks, broker-dealers, etc.), who recognize their
1For recent empirical evidence, see for example Hu, Pan and Wang (2011), Mitchell and Pulvino (2011)
and Jylha and Suominen (2009).
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price impact.23 Hence in reality capital is often concentrated in the hands of a few large,
strategic players instead of being distributed across a large number of small competitive
investors. This implies that the market structure and the distribution of capital should be
an important determinant of asset prices and liquidity.
To understand how the size of arbitrageurs and the distribution of capital affect market
efficiency, I extend Gromb and Vayanos’ (2002) model of financially constrained compet-
itive arbitrage to the non-competitive case. In Gromb and Vayanos’ model, competitive
arbitrageurs exploit price differences between two identical risky assets traded in segmented
markets. Market liquidity, defined as the spread between the prices of the risky assets, de-
pends on arbitrageurs’ aggregate capital: with abundant capital, competitive arbitrageurs
eliminate the spread immediately. With a smaller amount of capital, financial constraints
bind and the spread decreases gradually over time, as capital gains captured by arbitrageurs
progressively relax their financial constraint. By contrast, I study a situation in which all
the capital is deployed through a single, monopolistic arbitrageur who recognizes her price
impact. This allows me to compare liquidity and welfare across the two market structures. I
show that switching from perfect to monopolistic competition (or equivalently from a largely
disaggregated capital distribution to an extremely concentrated one) has substantial impli-
cations for liquidity provision, asset prices and welfare that go beyond the simple efficiency
loss associated with market power.
First, I show that when capital is concentrated in the hands of a single arbitrageur, a
trade-off between market efficiency and capital intensity appears. A monopolistic arbitrageur
(“‘the arbitrageur”, or “the monopoly”) internalizes her impact on the spread. Thus, facing
a positive spread between the two identical assets, the arbitrageur trades in a way that keeps
the spread open in equilibrium, even if her financial constraint is not binding. This allows her
to reap profits over time and therefore to increase her capital. Understanding that the price
of each asset will not converge to its fundamental value for this precise reason (even in the
2See Chen, Stanzl and Watanabe (2002) and references therein for empirical evidence of institutional
investors’ price impact. Numerous firms propose algorithms or programmes to help institutional investors
minimize their price impact. In extreme cases, one trader may become the dominant player in one market
or in a specific strategy, such as LTCM with relative-value and convergence trades or Amaranth and Enron
with energy derivatives.
3There is a large theoretical literature on limits of arbitrage. See for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). In effect, the assumption of perfect
competition also means that entry has already occurred in the market, so that an increase in capital cannot
stem from new players. Attari and Mello (2006) do analyze the trading strategy of a monopolistic financially-
constrained arbitrageur but do not draw comparison across market structures. I discuss their paper in more
details when I review the literature below.
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absence of risk), financiers demand less collateral to fund the arbitrageur’s position. Hence
in equilibrium the monopoly prevents the arbitrage to close while competitive arbitrageurs
would eliminate all mispricings. At the same time, the monopoly requires less initial capital
to do so than a competitive market.
The key driver of this result is the modeling of the arbitrageur’s financial constraint which
implies that the arbitrageur’s financiers are sophisticated enough to understand the impact
of the market structure on the equilibrium price. Indeed, in the model, the arbitrageur is re-
quired to post collateral in each leg of the arbitrage only to cover the risk associated with the
position, which depends on the volatility of the fundamental. Predictable discounts/ premia
arising from the monopoly’s rationing lower the collateral requirement, because financiers
realize that they are not facing additional risks. In other words, margins have a counter-
cyclical effect relative to liquidity.4 Although arguably strong, this assumption constitutes
an interesting and unavoidable benchmark: according to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
countercyclical, stabilizing margins are “hard to escape in a theoretical model”. Moreover, if
the market is concentrated, the dominant arbitrageur is likely to be visible to other market
participants and financiers may understand how she affects liquidity. There is anecdotal
evidence that LTCM, which held very large positions in fixed-income markets, had access to
cheaper funding than its competitors.5
An interesting consequence of the efficiency - capital intensity trade-off is that, contrary
to the competitive case, an increase in the volatility of the fundamental does not necessarily
tighten the arbitrageur’s financial constraint. There are two opposite effects at work. On
one hand, an increase in volatility increases the maximum potential loss on the arbitrageur’s
position and makes it more risky for financiers to fund it, which tightens the constraint.
This effect is the same as in the competitive case (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, 2010). On the
other hand, an increase in volatility increases the profitability of the arbitrage opportunity,
which lowers collateral requirement. The reason is that the arbitrage opportunity arises
in the first place because of demand pressure stemming from local investors who trade in
segmented markets. These investors receive liquidity shocks that are correlated with the
payoff of the risky asset. Local investors in each market (say A and B) receive opposite
shocks and would thus benefit from trading with each other to share risk but are prevented
4I keep Gromb and Vayanos (2002)’s modeling of the financial constraint in order to facilitate comparisons.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) consider closely-related constraints but allow for the financiers to be
imperfectly informed about sources of illiquidity in the market, and show that this can generate procyclical
margins.
5See Pe´rold (1999).
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to do so by market segmentation. The arbitrageur instead is the only investor who can
trade across both markets. As volatility increases, local investors are ready to accept larger
price concessions to share their risk, which benefits the arbitrageur. Financiers recognize
this second effect, which loosens the financial constraint.
Second, and quite surprisingly, I show that the arbitrageur may choose to be constrained
at certain dates in equilibrium. Specifically, when the amount of capital is intermediate, and
volatility sufficiently low, the monopoly trades in a way that makes her financial constraint
binding in the future, even though with a different trading strategy, the amount of capital she
holds would allow her to remain unconstrained until the assets pay off. The reason for this
behaviour is that to maximize profits, the arbitrageur seeks not only to keep the arbitrage
spread open while buying, but also to keep it open as long as possible. Since the positions
already established continue to affect the spread over time (permanent price impact), the
arbitrageur split up her order and increases her position progressively over time. Local
investors anticipate that this will gradually reduce the arbitrage spread. This reduces their
willingness to accept large price concessions at present dates, which erodes the arbitrageur’s
current market power.6 In this context, the financial constraint can work as a commitment
device for the arbitrageur to keep the spread open over time: if the constraint binds, future
spreads will be large, which increases the local investors’ willingness to share risk and accept
a large price concession early on.
This equilibrium arises only for an intermediate level of capital. Indeed, if the arbitrageur
had a large amount of capital, her trading strategy would not be dynamically consistent:
she would be able to reoptimize in the future, which would be optimal from her viewpoint.
Since local investors are smart, they can foresee this behaviour and therefore the commitment
power of the financial constraints unravels if the arbitrageur is too well-capitalized. At the
same time, if capital is too scarce, the arbitrageur cannot respond to the increase in local
investors’ demand for liquidity at earlier dates that result from the anticipation that her
constraint will be binding in the future.
Third, I compare liquidity provision and welfare across market structures. When there is
abundant capital, the market is perfectly liquid under perfect competition and imperfectly
6Hence providing liquidity is subject to the same dynamics as a durable good provided by a monopolist.
In the model, trading happens at discrete dates and the spread closes as the asset matures. These features
represent “frictions” that limit the substitutability of one trade with another. With an infinite horizon, or
with a shrinking time between two trading dates, the Coase conjecture would apply, i.e. the spread would
immediately reach zero. See Vayanos (2001), DeMarzo and Urosevic (2007, and Pritsker (2009).
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liquid under monopolistic competition, because the monopolistic arbitrageur limits liquidity
to extract rents. Since the monopoly is less capital intensive than the competitive market, a
more interesting case is where there is not enough capital for the competitive market to be
unconstrained but enough for a monopoly to be unconstrained (or voluntarily constrained).
I show that in this case the monopoly may provide more liquidity, resulting in a tighter
spread, before the asset matures. For some parameter cases, I can show analytically that
the improvement occurs only close to the date at which the asset matures, and is associated
with a reduction in liquidity before. Suppose for instance that the monopoly is voluntarily
constrained. The monopoly is able to decrease the spread in the future precisely because
she limits liquidity further at the beginning. Doing so, she maximizes intermediate capital
gains, which relaxes the financial constraint and results in lower future spreads. I show that
this change can hurt local investors’ welfare, as the deterioration of current liquidity offsets
the benefit of the future improvement. Arbitrageurs, however, benefit from this change in
market structure. In an example, I show that aggregate welfare may increase as a result.
The analysis has implications for the debate about the size of financial intermediaries
and how much capital they should hold. The debate about the size of intermediaries follows
from the failure of large institutions during the 2007-2009 crisis. In the media or among
economists, it often revolves around the lack of competition in the financial industry, and
the implicit government protection on large systemically important institutions. This paper
abstracts from government protection in case of default but shows that market power has
consequences not only for market efficiency and the law of one price but also for margins and
access to funding liquidity. The model predicts that large institutions with market power can
operate with less capital and that this may be beneficial for market liquidity in situations
where capital is scarce. However, the benefits in terms of liquidity seems small (in numerical
examples) and involve some wealth transfers to arbitrageurs.
I show that, when dividend volatility is not too large, voluntarily-constrained monopolis-
tic arbitrageurs provide more liquidity than unconstrained monopolistic arbitrageurs. This
has implications for the level of capital monopolistic market-makers, such as NYSE special-
ists, should hold, depending on the underlying characteristics of the market they make. In
assets with limited dividend volatility, it is preferable, surprisingly, that specialists are not
too much capitalized if one cares about market liquidity. This however leads to transfers rel-
ative a market with many competitive market-makers. Thus opening specialists businesses
to competition would redistribute gains from trade to customers and liquidity consumers
but may reduce aggregate welfare and affect the provision of liquidity through time (better
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liquidity ahead of dividend payoff, lower close to payoff).
This paper departs from the literature of limits of arbitrage by studying the effects of the
concentration of capital into a large arbitrageur. Consistent with the idea that the capital
is concentrated, I relax the assumption of price-taking behaviour that prevails in models of
financially constrained arbitrage.7
Attari and Mello (2006) also study the trading strategy of a monopolistic arbitrageur.
There are two key differences with my analysis. First, in Attari and Mello, the arbitrageur
faces a constraint based only on current prices, which generates an immediate feedback
effect from capital to asset prices. This effect is absent in my model, as I assume that
the financial constraint is forward-looking and is based not only on current but also future
prices.8 Second, all investors are rational in my model. In particular, local investors’ demand
for the asset is endogenous. By contrast, Attari and Mello assume that local investors
have an exogenous downward-sloping demand curve. This assumption has two important
consequences: i) it allows me to carry out a welfare analysis under different market structures;
ii) it plays a central role in the dynamics of market depth and asset prices. It generates
Coasian dynamics: as local investors rationally anticipate the price path, a monopolistic
arbitrageur competes with herself over time. Vayanos (1999, 2001), Kihlstrom (2000) and
DeMarzo and Urosevic (2007) have emphasized the analogy between the durable goods
problem studied by Coase (1972) and asset pricing with non-competitive investors. Basak
(1997) studies a Lucas economy with a monopolistic trader able to make future commitments.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to solve the dynamic problem of a
monopolistic investor under realistic financial constraints when all investors are rational and
the monopolist cannot commit ex-ante. My contribution in this context is to show that
financial constraints may alleviate the arbitrageur’s commitment problem by providing a
credible commitment device without impairing market liquidity.9 Finally, this paper builds
on a companion paper (Fardeau, 2011), where I derive the trading strategies and entry
decisions of an oligopoly of unconstrained arbitrageurs. There I focus on price effects, and
derive new predictions about the dynamics of entry.
7Gromb and Vayanos (2010) survey this extensive theoretical literature. My model is similar to a two-
period version of Gromb and Vayanos (2002) with risk-free arbitrage and mean-variance preferences.
8Both constraints are plausible, but may stem from different contractual frictions. However, financial
constraints of financial firms is a largely unexplored area. As an exception, He and Krishnamurthy (2011)
embed a static contractual problem a` la Holmstrom Tirole (1997), which generates an equity constraint, into
an asset pricing model. The mechanisms generated by this constraint seems consistent with our results.
9There is a loose analogy between this effect and the use of leverage as a strategic bargaining tool by
shareholders against unions (Perotti and Spier, 1993).
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I proceed as follows. I present the model in the next section. In section 2.3, I review the
competitive equilibrium and its properties. In Section 2.4, I study the monopolistic equi-
librium. I compare liquidity across market structures in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
The appendix contains the proofs.
2.2 Model
The model extends Gromb and Vayanos (2010)’s setting to imperfectly competitive arbi-
trageurs. It has three periods, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2. The financial market is open at time
0 and time 1, and consumption takes place at time 2. There are two identical risky assets,
A and B, and a risk-free asset with return rf normalized to 0. Assets A and B are in zero
net supply and pay a dividend D2 at time 2, with D2 = D + 1 + 2, where t is a random
variable with a symmetric bounded support [−e¯, e¯], a mean of 0 and volatility σ. The dis-
tribution need not be further specified, but to facilitate the interpretation of the results, I
will sometimes use a particular distribution described below. The information t is revealed
to all investors at time t before trading. The price of asset k at time t is denoted pkt . Each
asset k is traded on its own, segmented market.
There are two types of investors. First, in each market, there are risk-averse local investors
with mean-variance preferences: for k = A,B, U
(
W k2
)
= E
(
W k2
)− a
2
V
(
W k2
)
. Local investors
experience liquidity shocks st that are correlated with the dividend of the risky asset. That
is, at time t = 0, 1, local investors in market A receive a shock st+1, where the magnitude
of the shock, s > 0, is deterministic. B-investors receive opposite shocks, −st+1.10 Since
k-investors have only access to asset k (market segmentation) and the risk-free security,
they cannot share risk, although they could perfectly insure each other. The shocks and
market segmentation imply potential price differences between assets A and B, although
their cash-flows are identical. In particular, A-investors have a low valuation for the asset,
and B-investors a high valuation.
At time 2, local investors consume their wealth W k2 . Let E
k
t and Y
k
t denote their end-
of-period positions in the risk-free and risky asset k, respectively. Then we can write local
10The results do not depend on the mean-variance framework. I use these preferences because they offer
greater tractability when liquidity shocks are stochastic, an extension that I am planning to consider in
future work.
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investors’ final wealth as follows:
for k = A,B, W k2 = E
k
1 + Y
k
1 D2,
The dynamic budget constraint follows from the dynamics of asset holdings: Y kt = Y
k
t−1 + y
k
t
and Ekt = E
k
t−1 − ykt pkt + st+1, where ykt denotes the time-t trade of investors k.
There is an additional investor, the arbitrageur, who can trade all assets without re-
striction. The arbitrageur is also endowed with mean-variance preferences over wealth:
u (W2) = E (W2) − b2V (W2), albeit with a potentially different risk-aversion b. Given that
she has access to all securities, the arbitrageur’s final wealth is
W2 =
∑
k=A,B
Xk1D2 +B1
with for each asset k, Xkt = X
k
t−1 +x
k
t denotes the end-of-period position at time t in asset k,
xkt the corresponding trade, and Bt = Bt−1 −
∑
k=A,B x
k
t p
k
t , the arbitrageur’s risk-free asset
holdings at the end of period t. I assume that the arbitrageur has no endowment in the risky
assets Xk−1 = 0, k = A,B and starts with an initial wealth W−1 = B−1. Apart from Section
2.3, where I assume that the arbitrageur stands for a continuum of competitive investors, I
assume that the arbitrageur is a price-setter in both A and B markets. Specifically, I assume
that the arbitrageur chooses positions, knowing the local investors’ demand in each market,
and imposing market-clearing.
Whether the arbitrageur is price-taker or price-setter, she needs capital to trade the
risky assets. I model the financial constraint in the same fashion as Gromb and Vayanos
(2002, 2010). Arbitrageurs have a margin account V kt in each market, and their positions
must be fully collateralized. That is, the arbitrageur’s wealth in this account must cover the
maximum possible loss on the position over the next period:
V kt−1 ≥ max
pkt+1
Xkt
(
pkt − pkt+1
)
Hence, in total, the arbitrageur’s wealth must cover the total maximum loss on each ac-
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count:11
Wt−1 ≥
∑
k=A,B
max
pkt+1
Xkt
(
pkt − pkt+1
)
(2.1)
The presence of the financial constraint implies that arbitrageurs may not be able to fully
eliminate the price differences between A and B assets. The modeling of the constraint also
implies that asset A cannot be used as collateral for asset B (and vice-versa). In other words,
cross-collateralization is not allowed, which can be viewed as a consequence of the assumption
of market segmentation. In practice, cross-collateralization is often limited by financiers who
are concerned about imperfect correlation between assets (although this would not be an
issue here). Sometimes traders also voluntarily avoid it in order to avoid revealing their
trading strategies.12 The full-collateralization of each separate account rules out default in
equilibrium.
The constraint corresponds to one-periods VaR constraint at the 100 percent level (as
implied by the assumption of full collateralization). The 100 percent level is for simplicity
only, as it rules out default in equilibrium and thus makes welfare comparisons simpler13,
but the constraint is motivated by real-world margin setting.14 An important feature of the
constraint is that it is forward-looking, in the sense that it is based on both current and
future prices. This is in contrast to Attari and Mello (2006), who also study the trading
strategy of a monopolistic arbitrageur but consider a constraint based only on current prices.
Following Gromb and Vayanos (2002), I will focus on equilibria in which the arbitrageur
holds symmetric positions in both assets, i.e. XAt = −XBt = Xt. Given that the arbitrageur
starts with no endowment in the risky assets, this implies that xAt = −xBt = xt, for t =
0, 1. Using the symmetry assumption, we can rewrite the arbitrageur’s budget constraint as
11I define Wt−1 as the end-of-period wealth, while Gromb and Vayanos (2002) use W˜t as the beginning-of-
period wealth. Given this difference in notation: Wt−1 = W˜t. The same applies to the definition of margin
accounts.
12For instance, Pe´rold (1999) reports: “LTCM inernalized most of the back-office functions associated
with contractual arrangements, due to the complexity and and advanced nature of many of the firm’s trades.
This also helped maintain the confidentiality of its positions. LTCM chose Bear Stearns as a clearing agent
partly because Bear Stearns was committed to customer business rather than being focused on proprietary
trading, and thus there were fewer conflicts of interest.”
13There is no need to compute the welfare of financiers on the other side of the constraint.
14See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Appendix A, for additional institutional details.
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follows:
W2 = W−1 +
∑
t=0,1
xt∆t, with ∆t = p
B
t − pAt
The equation shows that by setting up opposite position in each leg of the arbitrage, the
arbitrageur eliminates all fundamental risk and derives all her profits from exploiting the
price difference ∆ between the two markets. The symmetry assumption also simplifies the
financial constraint, because it implies that the risk premia on asset A and B are opposite.
That is, φAt = Dt − pAt = ∆t2 = −φBt , where Dt is the conditional expected value of the asset
at time t: Dt = Dt−1 + t. This implies that pkt − pkt+1 = φkt+1 − φkt − t+1 = ∆t+1−∆t2 − t+1.
As a result, we can rewrite the financial constraint (2.1) as follows:
Wt−1 ≥
∑
k=A,B
max
pkt
Xkt
(
pkt − pkt+1
)
≥ max
t+1
Xt
(
∆t+1 −∆t
2
− t+1
)
+ max
t+1
−Xt
(
−∆t+1 −∆t
2
− t+1
)
≥ 2Xt
(
∆t+1 −∆t
2
)
+ max
t+1
Xt (−t+1) + max
t+1
−Xt (−t+1)
≥ 2|Xt|e¯−Xt (∆t −∆t+1)
The last step follows from the symmetric support of the distribution. Since the arbitrage
is risk-free, the arbitrageur will hold a long position in equilibrium, Xt ≥ 0. Thus, we can
rewrite the right-hand side as mtXt, where the margin mt is
mt = 2e¯− (∆t −∆t+1)
The properties of the margin are key for the dynamics of the model. Clearly, margins increase
with the dispersion (and consequently, volatility) of the fundamental e¯. A more volatile
asset leads to a larger potential loss on the position, which induces financiers to ask for more
collateral. Margins also depend on the mispricing between asset A and B. More specifically,
they depend on the change in the mispricing, ∆t−∆t+1. If financiers expect market liquidity
to improve, i.e. ∆t+1 ≤ ∆t, they reduce current margins. Hence, the financiers’ behaviour
assumed here leads to countercyclical margins relative to mispricings (illiquidity). Said
differently, margins play a stabilizing role for asset prices. If a drop in liquidity (i.e. large
∆t) is temporary, then financiers do not necessarily ask for more capital. This stands in sharp
contrast to the financial constraint considered in Attari and Mello (2006), which is based
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only on current prices. It also differs from the uninformed financier case in Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), in which uncertainty about whether the mispricing will decrease or not
in the future can lead to procyclical, destabilizing margins.15
Remark: volatility, tail risk, and dispersion of the fundamental. I show in section
2.4 that the ratio e¯
σ2
plays an important role for the equilibrium. Since the dispersion of
the fundamental e¯ and its volatility are related, it is useful to specify a simple distribution
of fundamental shocks. The following coarse four-point symmetric distribution is enough to
gain intuition:
Lemma 7 Let (µ, p) ∈ ]0,∞[× ]0, 1[, and t ∼ E [−e¯, e¯], where the random variable E takes
the following values:
E =

−e¯ with probability 1
2
− p
− e¯
µ
with probability p
e¯
µ
with probability p
e¯ with probability 1
2
− p
Then E (E) = 0 and σ2 = V (E) = e¯2
[
1 + 2p
(
1
µ2
− 1
)]
.
This example shows how the variance of fundamental shocks relates to the support boundary,
e¯. Although this distribution is just meant to fix ideas, the relation between σ2 and e¯2 is
more general. Further, this example can help us clarify how the volatility in a symmetric
distribution can relate to the shape of the tails. The parameter µ measures how far the
median values are from the mean 0, while p measures the weight of the tails: a small p
means that tail events in which t takes the extreme values e¯ or −e¯ are likely. Clearly the
variance decreases with µ and with p (since 1
µ2
− 1 < 0). Hence, when extreme events are
likely (small p), the variance is large. More generally, this example shows that while an
increase in the boundaries of the distribution of fundamentals e¯ always increases volatility,
volatility may also increase because of a change in the shape of the distribution, without
changing the dispersion e¯.
15Brunnermeier and Pedersen show that a margin spiral, in which low liquidity leads to higher margins,
which further limits the ability of arbitrageurs to provide liquidity, can result from the uninformed case.
This margin spiral complements and amplifies the loss spiral created by the financial constraint (“a decrease
in arbitrageurs’ capital impairs their ability to provide liquidity and eliminate the mispricing, which in turn
reduces their capital”). Under our assumptions, there can be a loss spiral, but no margin spiral.
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2.3 Competitive equilibrium benchmark
In this section, I briefly recall the competitive benchmark derived in Gromb and Vayanos
(2002). The model illustrates how liquidity (given by the spread between assets A and B)
depends on arbitrageurs’ capital.
Proposition 10 (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002) There exists a unique symmetric competitive
equilibrium given by:
• If W−1 ≥ ω∗ ≡ 2se¯, the financial constraint never binds, the arbitrageurs absorb the
liquidity shock s, i.e. Xt = s at t = 0, 1, and the spread between assets A and B is
always 0: ∆0 = ∆1 = ∆2 = 0
• If 0 ≤ W−1 < ω∗, the financial constraint binds at t = 0 and t = 1 and the spread
between assets A and B narrows over time and is closed only at t = 2, i.e. ∆0 > ∆1 >
∆2 = 0. The arbitrageur position in asset A is given by:
x0 − x0aσ
2 (s− x0)
e¯
=
W−1
2e¯
(2.2)
X1 −X1aσ
2s−X1
e¯
= x0 (2.3)
The equilibrium links liquidity (via the spread) to arbitrageurs’ initial capital and has a
simple form: if arbitrageurs’ capital is large enough, then the market is perfectly liquid,
as reflected by the absence of spread between assets A and B; if instead arbitrageurs start
with less capital, then the financial constraints are binding, and assets A and B trade at a
positive spread, which decreases over time. An increase in the liquidity shock s affecting local
investors or in the dispersion of the fundamental (increase in e¯) tightens (proportionately)
the financial constraint: the financiers anticipate that the price divergence between assets A
and B is potentially larger and demand more collateral.
To facilitate comparison with the monopolistic case and gain further insight, I derive the
equilibrium positions and spread as a function of arbitrageurs’ capital:
Corollary 14 If 0 ≤ W−1 < ω∗, the arbitrageurs’ positions in asset A are:
x0 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Q
2aσ2
; X1 =
aσ2s− e¯+√U
2aσ2
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with Q = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2W−1 and U = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 4aσ2x0e¯.
In equilibrium, the spreads are:
∆0 = 2
(
aσ2s+ e¯
)−√Q−√U ; ∆1 = aσ2s+ e¯−√U
This result shows how the positions and the spreads depend on arbitrageurs’ capital: clearly
the spread at time 0 and 1 decreases with capital W−1 (i.e. ∂∆t∂W−1 < 0, and even more so if
capital is low, a non-linear effect (i.e. ∂
2∆t
∂W 2−1
< 0).16
2.4 Equilibrium with a monopolistic arbitrageur
In this section I derive the trading strategy of a monopolistic arbitrageur and compare it to
the competitive case. In the monopoly case, market power allows the arbitrageur to limit
liquidity but also to operate with a much lower level of initial capital thanks to rent capture.
However, the arbitrageur also faces a commitment problem as local investors recognize that,
even though the arbitrageur can limit liquidity at the current stage, she always has an interest
to provide further liquidity at a later stage. Liquidity provision by a single arbitrageur
thus resembles the provision of a durable good by a monopolist. In this context, financial
constraints can work as a commitment device to limit liquidity at a later stage. This device
is credible, however, only if capital is not too abundant. If instead the arbitrageur’s capital is
sufficiently large, this device does not work as local investors recognize that the arbitrageur
has an incentive to deviate at a later stage (time inconsistency).
2.4.1 Liquidity provision and time consistency
I start by introducing some useful notation and presenting the solution method. Since the
arbitrageur may be constrained (superscript c) or not (superscript u) at each date, there are
two payoffs associated with the different combinations at time 1: J c11 and J
u1
1 , and four at
time 0: Ju1,u00 , J
u1,c0
0 , J
c1,u0
0 , J
c1,c0
0 .
At time 1, the arbitrageur enters with a position x0 in the asset A (and the opposite in
asset B). The local investors’ first-order conditions and market-clearing imply that ∆1 (X1) =
16See also Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008).
100 CHAPTER 2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE LIMITS OF ARBITRAGE
2aσ2 (s−X1), where X1 = X0 + x1 = x0 + x1. The arbitrageur’s maximization problem is
thus:
J1 = max
x1
B0 + x1∆1 (X1)
s.t. W0 ≥ 2X1 [e¯− (∆1 −∆2)]
Therefore, denoting xu1 =
s−x0
2
the first-best solution, and xc1 the constrained solution (which
saturates the constraint: W0 = 2X
c
1 [e¯− (∆1 −∆2)]), the two possible payoffs at time 1 are
given by:
Ju11 (x0) = B0 + 2aσ
2xu1 (s−Xu1 ) = B0 +
aσ2
2
(s− x0)2
J c11 (x0) = B0 + 2aσ
2xc1 (s−Xc1) , with Xk1 = x0 + xk1, k = u, c
Of course, by construction J c11 (x0) ≤ Ju11 (x0). Similarly, the time-1 equilibrium spread
depends on the state and the arbitrageur’s beginning-of-period position x0: ∆1 = ∆
u1
1 (x0)
if the constraint is slack, and ∆1 = ∆
c1
1 (x0) otherwise.
At time 0, the relation between the four payoffs is more complicated: local investors being
forward-looking, the price schedule ∆0 (x0) depends on their beliefs about the state of the
market in the next period (constrained or unconstrained arbitrageur). In particular, their
first-order conditions and market-clearing always imply the following price schedule (shown
in the appendix):
∆0 (x0) = ∆1 (x0) + 2aσ
2 (s− x0)
That is, we can define ∆u10 (x0), and ∆
c1
0 (x0) the time-0 price schedule implied by the corre-
sponding beliefs about the state at time 1. Depending on the anticipated time-1 state, the
arbitrageur’s maximization problem is:
Ju10 = max
x0
W−1 + x0∆
u1
0 (x0) + 2aσ
2xu1 (s−Xu1 )
s.t. W−1 ≥ 2x0 [e¯− (∆0 −∆1)]
or J c10 = max
x0
W−1 + x0∆
c1
0 (x0) + 2aσ
2xc1 (s−Xc1)
s.t. W−1 ≥ 2x0 [e¯− (∆0 −∆1)]
Local investors have rational expectations and can anticipate the price path, and thus
whether the arbitrageur’s constraint will be binding or not. Hence a necessary condition
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for the maximization problems to make sense is that in equilibrium, the time-0 trade does
satisfy the time-1 constraint if local investors expect the arbitrageur’s constraint to be slack,
and vice-versa if they expect the constraint to be binding. The condition is:
Lemma 8 Suppose that in equilibrium the arbitrageur chooses to trade a quantity x0 at time
0. It is consistent with being unconstrained at time 1 if and only if
W−1 − se¯+ aσ2 s
2
2
+
(
2aσ2s− e¯)x0 − 5
2
aσ2x20 ≥ 0 (2.4)
Depending on whether the constraint binds or not at time 0, the arbitrageur can trade
the first-best quantity xu0 or the constrained quantity x
c
0 which “maxes out” her financial
constraint.17 The corresponding payoffs are Ju1,u00 , J
u1,c0
0 , J
c1,u0
0 , J
c1,c0
0 , which are functions
of the base parameters.
The arbitrageur chooses max (Ju1,u00 , J
u1,c0
0 , J
c1,u0
0 , J
c1,c0
0 ). By definition: J
u1,u0
0 ≥ Ju1,c00
and J c1,u00 ≥ J c1,c00 , i.e. conditional on the state at time 1, it is better to be unconstrained
at time 0. However, because the price schedule is different at time 0 depending on what
local investors believe about time 1, it is not guaranteed that Ju1,u00 or J
u1,c0
0 are greater
than J c1,u00 . In other words, from the point of view of time 0, being unconstrained at time
1 may not be more profitable than being constrained. In particular, when capital is large
enough, the first-best solution is likely to be feasible, and so are other trading strategies. In
the absence of competitive pressure, the arbitrageur can in principle deviate from, say, the
unconstrained strategy to a constrained strategy if this raises her profit. This yields a time
consistency issue. Suppose, for instance, that J c1,u00 ≥ Ju1,u00 for some parameter region.
Then it is in the arbitrageur’s interest to trade in a way that leaves her constrained at time
1. However, if the arbitrageur has abundant capital, she may have enough dry powder left
when time 1 comes to be unconstrained. She may therefore be able to re-optimize and trade
her first-best quantity, a time-inconsistent behaviour. This will be the case if inequality (2.4)
in Lemma 8 is not satisfied. This should not occur in equilibrium, however, because local
investors are rational: their expectations must therefore be correct in equilibrium.18 The
definition of the equilibrium in the monopoly case summarizes this discussion:
17This is optimal, since the arbitrage is riskfree.
18This rules out any exogenous commitment device that the arbitrageur could credibly use to “tie her
hands” in such cases.
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Definition 1 An equilibrium is a collection of arbitrageur’s trades (xt)t=0,1 (or equivalently
positions x0, X1) in asset A and opposite trades (positions) in asset B, such that
• given prices, the local investors maximize their expected utility of final consumption,
• the arbitrageur maximizes her expected payoff subject to financial constraints, local
investors’ demands and market-clearing,
• local investors have rational expectations.
I now describe the strategies, under which conditions they are feasible and / or credible and
the equilibrium.
2.4.2 Equilibrium
Scarce capital
I start with the case where the arbitrageur’s capital is low. Then the arbitrageur has no
financial flexibility and there is only one feasible strategy, so that the equilibrium is easy to
determine:
Proposition 11 If W−1 < ωc ≡ 75se¯ − 910aσ2s2 − e¯
2
10aσ2
, then the financial constraint binds
at t = 0 and t = 1, and the arbitrageur’s trades and the equilibrium spreads are the same as
in Proposition 10 and Corollary 14.
If W−1 ≥ ωc, it is always possible for the arbitrageur to be unconstrained at time 1 and
trade xu1 =
s−x0
2
. Other strategies in which the arbitrageur is constrained in one or two
periods are also feasible.
It is already clear from this result that the condition under which the arbitrageur is fully or
partially constrained is very different from the competitive case. In particular, the threshold
ωc is no longer linear in s and e¯ and also depends on volatility of the fundamental σ. I proceed
with the analysis of the more complicated abundant capital case and relegate comments and
intuitions to the end of this section.
Strategies with more abundant capital
If capital is more abundant (W−1 ≥ ωc), the arbitrageur has more financial flexibility and
can choose from a larger set of strategies. I first describe the strategies available to the
arbitrageur, starting with the case where she chooses to be unconstrained at time 1.
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Lemma 9 Denote ωm0 =
4
5
se¯− 12
25
aσ2s2, ωm1 =
7
5
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2, and note that ωc = ωm1 − e¯
2
10aσ2
<
wm1 .
The following holds:
• If W−1 ≥ max (ωm0 , ωm1 ), the arbitrageur can be unconstrained at time 0 and time 1.
The unconstrained strategy (u1, u0) consists of the following trades
x0 =
2
5
s, x1 =
3
10
s
and yields a payoff Ju1,u00 = W−1 +
9
10
aσ2s2.
• If W−1 ∈ [ωc,max (ωm0 , ωm1 )[, then the arbitrageur must reduce her time-0 position in
order to remain unconstrained at time 1 (if ωm0 ≤ W−1 < ωm1 ) or to satisfy the time-
0 constraint (if ωm1 ≤ W−1 < ωm0 ), or to satisfy both constraints (if ωc ≤ W−1 <
min (ωm0 , ω
m
1 )). The arbitrageur’s constraints are:
at time 0: W−1 − 2
(
e¯− aσ2s)x0 − 2aσ2x20 ≥ 0
at time 1: W−1 − se¯+ aσ2 s
2
2
+
(
2aσ2s− e¯)x0 − 5
2
aσ2x20 ≥ 0
The arbitrageur’s strategy to remain unconstrained at time 1, if feasible, is the maxi-
mum of four quantities, saturating the time-0 and time-1 constraints:
x00 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Q
2aσ2
> 0, x0
′
0 =
aσ2s− e¯−√Q
2aσ2
< 0
x10 =
2aσ2s− e¯−√R
5aσ2
, x1
′
0 =
2aσ2s− e¯+√R
5aσ2
where R = 10aσ2W−1 + e¯2 − 14aσ2se¯ + 9a2σ4s2. The sign of x10 and x1′0 depends on
the ratio e¯
aσ2s
and the position of arbitrageur capital relative to the threshold ωp =
se¯− 1
2
aσ2s2.
The payoff of this strategy, as a function of the time-0 trade, is Ju1,c00 (x0) = W−1 +
aσ2s2
2
+ 2aσ2sx0 − 52aσ2x20.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. With abundant capital, W−1 ≥ max (ωm0 , ωm1 ),
the arbitrageur is unconstrained. With a somewhat lower level of capital, the arbitrageur
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must alter her trading strategy if she wants to remain unconstrained at time 1. Since capital
is relatively abundant (W−1 > ωc), other strategies in which the arbitrageur chooses to be
constrained at time 1 or at both time 0 and time 1 are feasible too, but may not be time
consistent. (I refer to a time consistent strategy as “credible”.)
Lemma 10 Suppose W−1 ≥ ωc. Then strategies (c1, u0) and (c1, c0) in which the arbitrageur
voluntarily chooses to be constrained at time 1, or at time 0 and time 1, are available under
the following conditions.
• The (c1, u0) strategy consists of the following positions:
x0 =
s
2
, X1 =
s
2
− e¯−
√
Um
2aσ2
, with Um = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2W−1 + a2σ4s2
It is feasible and credible (i.e. time consistent) if and only if W−1 ≥ ωp ≡ se¯− 12aσ2s2
and W−1 < ω¯p ≡ 32se¯−78aσ2s2, with ωp > ωc. Its payoff is J c1,u00 = e¯aσ2
[√
Um − (e¯− aσ2s)
]
.
• The (c1, c0) strategy is given in Corollary 14 and its payoff is
J c1,c00 =
e¯
aσ2
[
aσ2s− e¯+
√
a2σ4s2 − e¯2 + 2e¯
√
Q
]
It is credible if and only if h (W−1) < 0, with
h (W−1) = −1
4
W−1 +
1
4
a2σ4s2 − se¯
4
+
e¯2
2aσ2
+
3e¯− aσ2s
4aσ2
√
Q (2.5)
Given the feasibility and credibility conditions, determining the equilibrium requires to com-
pare Ju1,u00 to J
c1,u0
0 or J
c1,c0
0 if the unconstrained strategy is feasible at time 1, and J
u1,c0
0 to
J c1,u00 or J
c1,c0
0 if it is not. This is no easy task given that the order of the thresholds ω
m
0 , ω
m
1 ,
ωc, ωp and ω¯p changes with the ratio e¯
aσ2s
. Further, note that the last credibility condition
is not explicit since Q depends on W−1. In spite of the large number of cases, it is possible
to derive some general results. There are three main regions for the equilibrium. I now state
the main results of this section:
Abundant capital: trading off efficiency and capital intensity
Proposition 12 The following holds:
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• If W−1 ≥ ωm = Λse¯− Γaσ2s2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which the financial
constraint is slack at t = 0 and t = 1, the arbitrageur’s trades in asset A are x0 =
2
5
s
and x1 =
3
10
s and the equilibrium spreads are ∆m0 =
9
5
aσ2s and ∆m1 =
3
5
aσ2s.
• Λ and Γ are such that 0 < Λ < 2 and 0 < Γ < 1, and depend on the ratio e¯
aσ2s
as
follows:
Λ = 4
5
and Γ = 12
25
if e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
0, 21
10(1+
√
5)
[
Λ = 1 + 1√
5
and Γ = 9
10
if e¯
aσ2s
≥ 21
10(1+
√
5)
• Relative to the benchmark competitive case, there is a trade-off between liquidity pro-
vision and capital intensity:
– For all e¯, a, σ, s, ωm < ω∗, i.e. the monopolistic arbitrageur can remain uncon-
strained with a lower initial capital.
– However, the monopoly provides less liquidity: ∆mt > ∆
∗
t , t = 0, 1.
This region is comparable to the first region of the competitive case (W−1 ≥ ω∗). There are
three noticeable differences. First, although the arbitrageur is unconstrained, assets A and
B trade at a spread, i.e. liquidity is imperfect in the economy. This is simply due to the
arbitrageur’s market power. Given the absence of competition, the arbitrageur limits the
amount she buys from local investors with low valuation for the asset and sells to those with
high valuation. This keeps the spread open in equilibrium, which allows the arbitrageur to
make a profit.19 Second, and consequently, the financial constraint is no longer linear in the
dispersion of the fundamental e¯ and the liquidity shock s. In fact, it is now quadratic in s20,
so that the following comparative statics obtains:
Corollary 15 The threshold ω¯m features the following comparative statics:
• If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
0, 21
10(1+
√
5)
[
, i.e. if volatility is high enough, then a small increase in the
liquidity shock s loosens the financial constraint,
• If e¯
aσ2s
> 21
10(1+
√
5)
, i.e. if volatility is low enough, a small increase in s tightens the
financial constraint.
19Indeed in equilibrium the arbitrageur’s position is Xt < s. (note that x0 = X0)
20It is also quadratic in e¯ since σ2 is a function of e¯2.
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The intuition for this result is simple. On one hand, an increase in the dispersion of
the fundamental e¯ increases its volatility σ, which in turn increases the magnitude of the
potential divergence from fundamental in the next period and makes a default by the arbi-
trageur more likely from the viewpoint of financiers. This tightens the financial constraint,
an effect akin to the competitive case. On the other hand, under our modeling assump-
tions, the financiers (implicitly) recognize that an increase in volatility is equivalent to an
increase in the willingness of local investors to share their risk and to accept large price con-
cessions. This increases the profitability of the arbitrage strategy and allows the arbitrageur
to capture larger rents. The arbitrageur reaps larger capital gains, which relaxes the finan-
cial constraint. This second effect relies on the assumption that financiers understand the
sources of illiquidity and the dynamics of liquidity provision, which generates countercyclical
(stabilizing) margins.21
Bearing this simple trade-off in mind, it is easy to interpret ω¯m as the sum of two terms:
the first term, Λse¯, represents the maximum loss on the position caused by a change in the
fundamental and is therefore a multiple of e¯, which measures the largest possible change in
the fundamental. Note that it depends on the arbitrageur’s position , which is less than 2s.
By contrast, in the competitive case, ω∗ = 2se¯, because arbitrageurs fully absorb the liquidity
shock affecting market A and B, which is 2s in total (corresponding to a position of size s
in each leg of the arbitrage). The second term in ω¯m, −Γaσ2s2, is an adjustment measuring
how much past or future profits due to rent extraction lower the capital requirement. It is
thus specific to the monopoly case, as financiers anticipate that perfect competition drives
profits to zero.
The third noticeable difference is that there are two different regions for the threshold
ωm, while there is a unique threshold ω∗ in the competitive benchmark. These regions can be
expressed in terms of low or high volatility since by using the four-point distribution given
in Section 1.2, the ratio e¯
aσ2s
becomes e¯
ae¯2
(
1+2p
(
1
µ2
−1
))
s
= 1
ae¯
(
1+2p
(
1
µ2
−1
))
s
. For simplicity,
I will refer to a situation with large fundamental dispersion e¯ as high volatility and small
fundamental dispersion as low volatility.22 Note that ω¯m = ωm0 in the high volatility region,
i.e. the time-0 feasibility constraint is binding in this case. In the region of low volatility,
ω¯m = v1, where v1 is the threshold such that J
u1,u0
0 ≥ J c1,u00 . The interpretation is in terms
21Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)’s model nests both stabilizing and destabilizing margins. With
destabilizing margins, the second effect would remain but would bite less.
22Equivalently, low volatility can stem from low risk in the tail (large µ or low p), so that we could rephrase
the analysis in terms of large or small tail risk. Note that because the distribution is symmetric, tail risk
equally includes good and bad events.
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of which effects of the maximum position loss and the profit adjustment dominates. When
volatility is high, the profit adjustment is large and therefore v1 < ω
m
0 , because v1 takes into
account all expected profits, while ωm0 reflects only one period expected profits. It is the
opposite in the low volatility region, where the profit adjustment is small, meaning that the
feasibility constraint is not the binding constraint. The uniqueness of the threshold in the
competitive benchmark is due to the absence of profit adjustment, since competition drives
profit to zero.
Intermediate level of capital: voluntarily-constrained trading
When the arbitrageur has less capital, she may credibly choose to be constrained at time 1.
Proposition 13 If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
2
√
5
5
, 1
[
and W−1 ∈ [ωp, v1[ or if e¯aσ2s > 1 and W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[,
then the unconstrained strategy is feasible. However, in the unique equilibrium, the financial
constraint is slack at t = 0 and binding at t = 1, i.e. the arbitrageur’s positions are:
x0 =
s
2
and X1 =
s
2
− e¯−
√
Um
2aσ2
. The equilibrium spreads are ∆c1,u00 = 2aσ
2s + e¯ − √Um and
∆c1,u01 = aσ
2s+ e¯−√Um.
The result shows that the arbitrageur voluntarily chooses to be constrained when volatility
is low enough and her level of capital is intermediate. The reason why being constrained at
time 1 might be optimal is related to the Coasian dynamics of the model. Intuitively, the
arbitrageur chooses her trading strategy to keep the spread open as long as possible. Since
the asset matures only at time 2, local investors have some freedom to chose the date at
which they consume liquidity. They rationally anticipate that after providing liquidity (i.e.
tackling the arbitrage opportunity) at time 0, the arbitrageur will provide further liquidity
at time 1, further decreasing the spread. Hence providing liquidity early, at time 0, reduces
the profitability of later liquidity provision for the arbitrageur, unless she is able to credibly
commit to keep the spread large in the future. To this extent, the financial constraint works
as a commitment device for the arbitrageur, who can then extract larger rents at time 0.
Indeed, in equilibrium, local investors anticipate that the arbitrageur’s constraint binds time
1, which increases their willingness to accept large price concessions at time 0, increasing
the potential price gap and thus the arbitrageur’s capital gain.
When does this occur in equilibrium? The conditions on capital and volatility given
in Proposition 13 have an intuitive interpretation. First, the arbitrageur’s capital must be
below some threshold v1 < ω¯
p, which guarantees that the arbitrageur cannot re-optimize
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(by Lemma 10). Intuitively, if the arbitrageur has a very abundant capital, local investors
anticipate that she will not be actually constrained at time 1, and the equilibrium unravels.
If capital is too low, however, the arbitrageur cannot serve the additional liquidity demand
at time 0 and cannot benefit from committing to be constrained. These conditions on
arbitrageur’s capital are combined with the requirement that the volatility be low enough,
i.e. that e¯
aσ2s
is low enough. Intuitively, if this was not the case, the unconstrained strategy
would be so profitable that the arbitrageur would not be tempted to boost her trading profit
by organizing a liquidity shortage. In particular, I show in the appendix that for a high
enough volatility, the feasibility of the c1, u0 strategy always implies that it is dominated by
the unconstrained strategy.
At a deeper level, one may wonder how it is possible for the constraint to be binding
only at one date in equilibrium, while in the competitive case, either the constraint binds at
all dates or never. This point is related to the trade-off between position funding and profit
adjustment. The position funding effect depends on the size of the arbitrageur’s position.
The profit adjustment depends on expected profits. As time passes, the position increases,
and therefore the constraint should tighten. But at the same time, the profit adjustment also
increases, so that the constraint at time 1 may be less severe than the constraint at time 0.
When arbitrageurs are competitive, they collectively fully absorb the liquidity shock in each
period, so that their total position is always 2s. Further, perfect competition eliminates the
arbitrageurs’ profits, hence there is no profit adjustment, and the constraint either binds all
the time or never.
Similarly, one can wonder why the arbitrageur chooses to make her constraint binding at
time 1 and not at time 0. Intuitively, from the viewpoint of time 0, there are larger rents to
collect since local investors are aware that they will face two liquidity shocks and therefore
have a larger willingness to share risk. At time 1, only one shock remains and it is too late
to hedge the first one. Hence the arbitrageur prefers to be constrained at time 1.
When the arbitrageur chooses to be constrained at time 1, she has just enough wealth
to respond to the increased willingness of local investors to diversify risk at time 0. The
arbitrageur responds to this additional liquidity demand by tackling the arbitrage gap more
aggressively at time 0 than in the unconstrained case: she sets up a trade x0 =
s
2
instead of
2
5
s. Conversely, her time-1 trade is lower than if she were unconstrained.
Corollary 16 In the (c1, u0) equilibrium given in Proposition 13, the arbitrageur trades a
larger quantity at time 0 and a smaller at time 1, than if she were using the (feasible)
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unconstrained strategy, i.e. in the relevant parameter space, xc1,u00 > x
u1,u0
0 and x
c1,u0
1 <
xu1,u01 .
The overall effect is that the arbitrageur builds a larger position in the (c1, u0) equilibrium
than if she chose to remain unconstrained if W−1 ∈ [ω, v1[, with ω ≡ 75se¯− 2325aσ2s2.
It is interesting to see that the arbitrageur’s increased trading aggressiveness at time 0
may be so strong that she may be able to build a larger position than if she was unconstrained,
even though she is financially constrained at time 1. The condition that the arbitrageur must
hold enough capital to build a large position is intuitive, since in this equilibrium trade size
is increasing in the arbitrageur’s capital.
Implications for market liquidity and empirical predictions. The arbitrageur trades
more aggressively in this equilibrium than when she is unconstrained. But her behaviour is
motivated by the fact that local investors shift liquidity demand towards the first period,
pushing the prices of assets A and B further apart. Given these conflicting effects, it is
natural to analyze the overall impact on the equilibrium spread. The following result shows
that the increased trading aggressiveness always dominates:
Corollary 17 The spread is lower at all dates when the arbitrageur chooses to be constrained
in equilibrium, i.e. ∆c1,u0t < ∆
m
t , t = 0, 1.
This improvement in liquidity means either that the arbitrageur more than compensates the
additional liquidity demand at time 0, or that her trades have a larger price impact than
in the unconstrained case. Even more surprising is the result that the liquidity improves
at all dates: this is related to the fact that trades have a permanent impact on the price.
Moreover, the arbitrageur may acquire a larger position than if she was unconstrained.
More generally, this result implies that a drop in arbitrageur’s capital may not have a
monotonically decreasing effect on market liquidity. If volatility is low enough, a reduction
in the arbitrageur’s capital may first leave market liquidity unchanged (if W−1 ≥ ωm), then
improve it and decrease it again later. This is in contrast to the competitive case.
NYSE specialists can be seen as real-world counterparts to our monopolistic arbitrageur,
and one can use effective spreads as proxy for market liquidity as in Comerton-Forde, Jones,
Hendershott, Moulton, Seasholes (2010).23 The model prediction is that for firms with
23To strengthen the analogy with market-making, consider that market A and B at time t may represent
two subperiods tA and tB of date t. Thus A-investors may come to the market at time tA to share the risk of
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low enough dividend volatility, effective spreads should increase in the amount of capital
available to the specialists running the stock, for capital large enough. For capital low
enough, effective spreads should be decreasing in the amount of specialists’ capital, and even
more so if specialist capital is low, for any level of dividend volatility. Comerton-Forde et al.
find evidence for the latter, but base their tests on the assumption that there are two regions
for market-maker capital (as in the competitive case), and not three as in the monopolistic
case. Instead of the cross-section, the test may be run in the time-series, i.e. by comparing
spreads in times where specialists appear to be more constrained than others.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 13 is that when the arbitrageur is con-
strained at time 1, the amount of capital she owns affects her price impact at time 0.24
Further, an increase in capital has an ambiguous effect on the arbitrageur’s price impact
(Kyle’s lambda):
Corollary 18 Under the conditions of Proposition 13 or if W−1 < ωc, then the arbitrageur’s
price impact at t=0 (Kyle’s lambda) depends on her initial capital and following an increase
in capital,
• the arbitrageur’s price impact increases for small trades (x0 < s2)
• the arbitrageur’s price impact decreases for large trades (x0 ≥ s2)
This result is based on a substitution effect between the arbitrageur’s initial capital and her
intermediate capital gain. If the arbitrageur’s capital increases, it must be that her capital
gain between time 0 and time 1 decreases for her to remain constrained. The difference
between the effect of small and large trades on the price comes from whether the trade will
increase or decrease the capital gain between t = 0 and t = 1. If x0 ≤ s2 , a small increase
in the trade following from an injection of capital would raise the intermediate capital gain,
which is equal to x02aσ
2 (s− x0). Therefore, for the arbitrageur to remain constrained at
time 1, it must be that her capital gain is small, i.e. that her price impact increases. This
result has an interesting implication. Suppose capital is injected into the arbitrageur with the
view to improve market liquidity. If capital injections are too limited to push the arbitrageur
their liquidity shocks, while B-investors with whom there would be gains from trade arrive only later at time
tB . Arbitrageurs fill the gap between the two subperiods, providing immediacy as market-makers smoothing
out order imbalances. See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for further details on this alternative interpretation
of the model.
24This point holds for the c1, u0 equilibrium, as well as the c1, c0 equilibrium. It also holds more generally
in the competitive case, if one think of the arbitrageurs’ collective price impact.
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out of the constrained region, using the spread and the arbitrageur’s price impact to assess
the effect of the policy on liquidity may produce conflicting results. The model predicts that
the spread will decrease, but the price impact may either increase or decrease.
Low capital: semi-constrained trading
When the arbitrageur’s capital is below max (ωp, ωm1 ) or if volatility is high enough, it is in
general not possible to determine the equilibrium analytically, because equilibrium conditions
are implicit. The following result summarizes the equilibrium conditions:
Proposition 14 Suppose that W−1 ∈ [ωc,min (ωm0 , ωm1 )[ ∪ [min (ωm0 , ωm1 ) ,max (ωm0 , ωm1 )[,
then at least one constraint is binding in equilibrium.
• If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [0, 7
10
[
, then remaining unconstrained at time 1 involves saturating the t = 0
constraint, which is the most tightly binding, i.e. the u1, c0 strategy involves trading x
0
0
at time 0. Further, the c1, u0 strategy is never feasible / credible.
– If W−1 ≥ ωp, an equilibrium always exists. If h (W−1) ≥ 0, or if h (W−1) > 0 and
g˜c (W−1) ≥ 0 the equilibrium is u1, c0. If h (W−1) > 0 and g˜c (W−1) < 0, then the
equilibrium is c1, c0.
– If W−1 < ωp, then if h (W−1) ≥ 0, it is not possible to satisfy the financial
constraints and there is no equilibrium. Otherwise, the equilibrium is the same as
for W−1 ≥ ωp.
• If e¯
aσ2s
> 7
10
, then remaining unconstrained at time 1 involves saturating the t = 1
constraint, which is the most tightly binding, i.e. the u1, c0 strategy involves trading x
1
0
at time 0. There are two cases:
– If ωm1 ≥ ωp the equilibrium is as in Proposition 13,
– If ωm1 < ω
p, the equilibrium is u1, c0 with x0 = x
1
0 if h (W−1) ≥ 0. If h (W−1) < 0,
the equilibrium is u1, c0 if g (W−1) ≥ 0, and c1, c0 otherwise.
The functions g and g˜c are defined in Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 in the appendix.
Contrary to the previous case, the unconstrained strategy is not feasible anymore, so that it
is the lack of capital and not strategic considerations that dictates the arbitrageur’s trading
strategy in equilibrium. Even in this case, however, the arbitrageur may keep some financial
flexibility by reducing her time-0 trade in order to remain unconstrained at time 1.25 Note
25Consistent with the previous section, I have not been able to find numerical examples where this strategy
is an equilibrium.
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that the equilibrium may not exist if capital is low and volatility large enough. The reason
is that for such parameters, the thresholds, ωc, ωm0 , etc. may be negative. As a consequence,
the arbitrageur’s capital is in some cases negative as well, and this explains why trading may
not be feasible.
2.5 Market structure, liquidity provision and welfare
When the competitive economy is unconstrained, because capital is abundant, it is clear
that the market is more liquid than in the monopolistic economy. However, given that the
monopoly is less capital-intensive than a competitive market, it is natural to ask whether the
monopoly can provide more liquidity than a constrained competitive market when capital is
relatively scarce. In this section, I show that a monopoly - whether it is unconstrained or
voluntarily constrained - may provide more liquidity than a constrained competitive market
but only at time 1, just before the asset matures.
2.5.1 Constrained perfect competition vs unconstrained monopoly
Given that the thresholds ωm and ωm1 associated with the monopoly are lower than the
threshold ω∗ of the competitive market, there is a parameter region in which the competitive
market is constrained but the monopoly is unconstrained in equilibrium. I denote ∆∗t and
∆mt the spreads at time t in the competitive and monopoly cases, respectively.
Proposition 15 At time 0: Suppose that W−1 ∈ [ωm, ω∗[. The constrained competitive
market features more liquidity than an unconstrained monopoly at time 0 if e¯
aσ2s
< 21
10(1+
√
5)
or if e¯
aσ2s
≥ 21
10(1+
√
5)
and W−1 ∈ [ω˜, ω∗[ with ω˜ > ωm.
At time 1: Suppose that W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , ω∗[ and h (W−1) ≥ 0 or h (W−1) < 0 and f (W−1) ≥
0, then
• If e¯
aσ2s
≥ 7+q, then if W−1 [ωm1 , ωˆ[, the unconstrained monopoly provides more liquidity
than the constrained competitive market, and less if W−1 ∈ [ωˆ, ω∗[,
• If e¯
aσ2s
< 7 + q, then constrained competitive market always provide more liquidity than
the unconstrained monopoly.
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Since the ratio e¯
aσ2s
can be rewritten as a function of e¯, a and s only, we can discuss
the result in terms of high and low volatility regions (or dispersion of fundamental e¯). To
understand the result, note that volatility has different effects in the constrained competitive
case and the unconstrained monopoly. For the unconstrained monopoly, volatility has an
unequivocal positive effect. It increases local investors’ demand for liquidity, making the
arbitrage opportunity more profitable. Thus the spread increases with volatility σ2 (and
thus with e¯). For the constrained competitive market, volatility has two opposite effects:
first, it increases local investors’ demand for liquidity, as in the monopoly case, thus pushing
asset prices apart. Second, by making the arbitrage more profitable, it can increase the
intermediate capital gain and relax the financial constraint.
As a consequence, in the high volatility region (low e¯
aσ2s
), the unconstrained monopoly is
less liquid than the constrained competitive economy. This is because the constrained com-
petitive economy benefits from the softening effect of volatility on the financial constraint.
In the low volatility region, this effect is reduced, and thus there is less liquidity in the
monopoly case only if arbitrageurs’ capital is large enough at time 0, and there can be more
liquidity in the monopoly case at time 1. Intuitively, the intermediate capital gain is small in
this case, thus the constrained competitive economy remains severely constrained at time 1.
The condition on capital is intuitive, since when competitive arbitrageurs are constrained,
the spread decreases in the amount of capital they hold. Note that this result obtains only
when considering ωm1 instead of v1 as a lower threshold for an unconstrained monopoly. This
requires that the conditions h (W−1) ≥ 0 or h (W−1) < 0 and f (W−1) ≥ 0 be satisfied. In
numerical examples, these conditions seem easy to meet.
My results do not rule out the possibility of having more liquidity in the monopoly case
also at time 0. However, even if I do not have an analytical proof, I have not been able
to generate this case numerically, suggesting that liquidity improvement may occur only at
time 1.
2.5.2 Constrained perfect competition vs voluntarily constrained
monopoly
When capital is relatively abundant but close to the constrained region, the monopolistic
arbitrageur may find it optimal to be constrained at time 1. I showed that this decreases
the spread relative to the unconstrained case in Section 2.4. Hence from Proposition 15, one
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would expect that the monopoly provides more liquidity than the constrained competitive
market at least at time 1. The following result confirms this conjecture.
Proposition 16 If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
2
√
5
5
, 1
[
and W−1 ∈ [ωp, v1[ or e¯aσ2s > 1 and W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[ then
the voluntarily-constrained monopoly provides more liquidity at time 1 than the constrained
competitive market.
Given Corollary 17, it is not surprising to see that the condition for ∆∗1 ≥ ∆c1,u01 is easier
to satisfy than in the unconstrained monopoly case. In particular, there is no condition on
arbitrageurs’ capital, although we are looking at the same region with W−1 ≥ ωm1 . The
result, however, holds only at time 1. At time 0, I show in the proof that for the monopoly
to provide more liquidity at time 0, a non-trivial condition on parameters must be satisfied.
In numerical examples, I have always found a larger spread in the monopoly case than in
the constrained competitive case. This is confirmed by the following result:
Corollary 19 Under the conditions of Proposition 16, the voluntarily constrained monopoly
captures the largest possible intermediate capital gain, x0 (∆0 −∆1), by rationing liquidity
more than the constrained competitive market: xc1,u00 ≤ xc1,c00 .
This implies that under these conditions, ∆0−∆1 is larger in the voluntarily constrained
case than in the constrained competitive case, and thus ∆c1,u00 ≥ ∆c1,c00 .
It may be surprising that the competitive market yields a tighter spread at time 0 and a
larger one at time 1, all the more than the model features permanent price impact, implying
that a large spread at time 0 should translate into a large spread at time 1. However,
the intuition is simple. The monopoly improves liquidity at time 1 relative to competitive
arbitrageurs because she captures a larger intermediate capital gain. The larger capital
gain, x0 (∆0 −∆1) = 2aσ2x0 (s− x0), follows precisely from the fact that the monopoly
limits liquidity more at time 0 by buying a smaller amount, which causes the spread to
be larger at time 0 than in the competitive case. In particular, I show in the proof of the
Corollary that the intermediate capital gain in the monopoly case, Um, is greater than that
of the competitive case, U , and that this implies ∆∗1 ≥ ∆c1,u01 .
2.5.3 Welfare
Given that liquidity may improve at time 1 when the market is monopolistic, it is natural
to study whether investors’ welfare improves. As a first step, I calculate the expression of
local investors’ welfare as a function of the spreads.
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Lemma 11 Let χA0 denote A-local investors’ welfare, and let autarky (χ
A,a
0 ) define a sit-
uation without arbitrageur (n = 0), i.e. where there is no trade across markets, and full
insurance (χA∗0 ) the situation where a continuum of unconstrained competitive arbitrageurs
trade across markets.
Then we have:
χA0 =
(∆0 −∆1)2 + ∆21
8aσ2
− s
2
∆0,
χA,a0 = −aσ2s2 < χA,m0 ≤ χA,∗0 = 0
The arbitrageur’s profit is larger in the monopoly case than in autarky or full insurance cases.
As expected, for local investors, autarky and full insurance form two polar cases, and the
monopolistic case is somewhere in the middle. In autarky, local investors have no options to
hedge, and their certainty equivalent is minimal. When there is a continuum of unconstrained
competitive arbitrageurs, local investors can trade the asset at its fair value, and can access
a perfect hedge thanks to arbitrageurs’ intermediation to market B, resulting in perfect
insurance. When there is a monopolistic arbitrageur (whether she is constrained or not),
local investors receive some imperfect insurance as the market is imperfectly liquid. To
understand how the investors’ welfare with an unconstrained monopolist (χA,m0 ) compares
to a constrained competitive market (χA,c0 ) when we place ourselves under the conditions of
Propositions 15 and 16, we could directly compare welfare. However, it is difficult to derive
analytical results. Thus I use an indirect approach based on comparative statics.
Corollary 20 The following holds:
• Local investors’ welfare decreases with ∆0, ∂χ
A
0
∂∆0
< 0
• If ∆1 < 12∆0, then local investors’ welfare decreases with the time-1 spread and with a
decrease in liquidity:
∂χA0
∂∆1
< 0,
∂χA0
∂(∆0−∆1) < 0, and
∂χA0
∂(∆1−∆2) < 0
An immediate implication of this result is that, if ∆1 is small enough relative to ∆0, the
improvement in liquidity at time 1 - because it is due to a larger difference ∆0−∆1 as numer-
ical results and analysis suggest - may not be Pareto improving. Put differently, switching
from a constrained competitive market to a monopolistic market unambiguously increases
arbitrageurs’ welfare but may decrease local investors’ if the improvement in liquidity at
time 1 does not offset the worsening at time 0:
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Corollary 21 If ∆1 <
1
2
∆0, and the conditions of Proposition 16 are satisfied, switching
from a competitive market to a monopolistic market increases the arbitrageur’s welfare but
can decrease local investors’ welfare. Aggregate welfare may rise.
Intuitively, the improvement in liquidity at time 1 is associated with a decrease in the
improvement of liquidity between time 0 and time 1, measured by ∆0 −∆1, and a quicker
improvement between time 1 and time 2, ∆1 −∆2.26 Under the conditions of Corollary 21,
the first effect can outweigh the second. There are two reasons why it can be the case. i)
Since local investors experience two shocks, they face higher risks at time 0 (conditionally),
thus receiving liquidity at time 0 matters more than receiving liquidity at time 1. ii) The
improvement in liquidity at time 1 may require a large worsening at time 0, implying that
dχA0
d∆
=
∂χA0
∂∆0
d∆0 +
∂χA0
∂∆1
d∆1 ≤ 0 (see numerical example below). The condition for the result of
Corollary 20 is that ∆1 <
1
2
∆0. In practice it seems verified. In many numerical examples,
including the one reported below, the spread at time 1 is somewhere between a third and a
half of the spread at time 0. I prove the result on aggregate welfare on a numerical example:
Aggregate welfare. It is interesting to study the aggregate effects of the change in mar-
ket structure. Although some redistribution effects may be negative, aggregate welfare may
increase with a change in market structure (This, of course, takes into account both A
and B local investors). For instance, assume that t follows the example distribution de-
scribed in Section 1.2 and consider the following parameter values: a = 9, s = 0.1, e¯ = 1,
p = 0.48, µ = 150, and set the arbitrageur’s capital W−1 to ωm1 ≈ 0.1368. We are then under
the conditions of Proposition 16, and if the market is competitive, the arbitrageurs would
be constrained, since ω∗ = 0.2. The equilibrium spreads in the monopolistic (voluntarily-
constrained) structure are ∆c1,u00 ≈ 0.058, and ∆c1,u01 ≈ 0.0216. The spreads in the con-
strained competitive case are ∆c1,c00 ≈ 0.044 and ∆c1,c01 ≈ 0.0217, implying that the spread
at time 1 is less than a half of that of time 0. Comparing the market structure shows that
the improvement in liquidity at time 1 is moderate relative to the deterioration at time 0.
(observe that we assumed a value of the arbitrageur’s capital at the low end of the possible
range) This implies that local investors’ welfare decreases from -0.0019 to -0.0023. Instead
arbitrageur’s profit increases 0.1398 to 0.1401. The total effect (taking into account both
markets A and B) is positive: 0.013.
26Recall that ∆2 = 0 and that ∆0 > ∆1.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I studied a model of financially constrained arbitrage and relaxed the as-
sumption that arbitrageurs are price-takers. I show that a monopolistic arbitrageur reduces
market efficiency but is less capital-intensive. I also emphasized the role of financial con-
straints as a commitment device for the monopolistic arbitrageur. Since the arbitrageurs’
trading counterparties understand that she will push prices further to their fundamental
value in the future, the arbitrageur loses market power today. Thus, in some cases, the arbi-
trageur may choose to be constrained in order to solve this commitment problem. Relative
to the competitive case, a monopolistic arbitrageur does necessarily provide less liquidity. If
capital is scarce in the economy, liquidity may improve relative to a constrained competitive
market when the asset is close to maturity, since the single arbitrageur’s superior financial
flexibility loosens her financial constraint.
I have studied a textbook situation in which the arbitrage is risk-free. In practice, ar-
bitrage strategies such as relative-value and convergence trading entail risk. Gromb and
Vayanos (2002) show that in this case competitive arbitrageurs may not take the efficient
level of risk, as they fail to internalize the effects of their strategies on others’ financial
constraints. With imperfect competition, one can expect that arbitrageurs would to some
extent internalize the impact of their decisions, even though this would also decrease effi-
ciency. Hence, extending the model to risky arbitrage is an interesting research avenue.
Similarly, considering the effects of entry is a promising topic and would help disentangle
the effects of an increase in capital for existing arbitrageurs from an increase in capital
resulting from the entry of new arbitrageurs.
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2.7 Proofs
2.7.1 Competitive equilibrium
Proposition 10
Proof. The result is a special case of Proposition 1 in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) with
T = 2, and f ′ (x) = aσ2x.
Corollary 14
Proof. I solve the system of equations (2.2)-(2.3). Rearranging terms in equation (2.2)
gives:
2aσ2x20 + 2
(
e¯− aσ2s)x0 −W−1 = 0
Since 2aσ2s > 0 and −W−1 ≤ 0, the unique positive root is
x0 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Q
2aσ2
, with Q = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2W−1. (2.6)
Similarly, reshuﬄing terms in equation (2.3) gives:
aσ2X1 + e¯− aσ2s− x0e¯ = 0 (2.7)
aσ2 and −x0e¯ have opposite signs and e¯− aσ2s > 0, hence the unique positive root is
X1 =
aσ2s− e¯+√U
2aσ2
, with U = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 4aσ2x0e¯.
To derive equilibrium spreads, I use the first-order condition of local investors’ maximiza-
tion problems. At time 0, aσ2
(
xA0 + s
)
= E0
(
pA1
) − pA0 = ∆0−∆12 . Similarly at time 1,
aσ2
(
XA1 + s
)
= E1
(
pA2
)−pA1 = ∆1−∆22 = ∆12 . Market-clearing for asset A requires xa0+x0 = 0,
and XA1 +X1 = 0, hence
∆1 = 2aσ
2 (s−X1)
∆0
2
= aσ2 (s− x0) + aσ2 (s−X1)
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I get the equilibrium spreads by plugging equations (2.6) and (2.7) into the above equations.
2.7.2 Monopoly equilibrium
Lemma 8
Proof. At time 1, local investors in market A solve the following problem:
χA1 = max
yA1
U1 = E1
(
WA2
)− a
2
V1
(
WA2
)
= max
yA1
EA0 + Y
A
1 D1 − yA1 pA1 −
aσ2
2
(
Y A1 + s1
)2
From the first-order condition, aσ2
(
Y A1 + s1
)
= D1−pA1 , and market-clearing, Y At +Xt = 0,
I obtain the price schedule faced by the arbitrageur in market A:
pA1 (X1) = D1 − aσ2s1 + aσ2X1
By symmetry, in market B: pB1 (X1) = D1 + aσ
2s1− aσ2X1. With ∆1 = pB1 − pA1 , this gives:
∆1 (X1) = 2aσ
2 (s−X1) (2.8)
The arbitrageur takes the price schedule as given and solve the following maximization
problem:
J i1 = max
x1
E1
(
W i2
)− b
2
V
(
W i2
)
s.t. W0 ≥ 2X1
[
e¯− aσ2 (s−X1)
]
W2 = W1 = B0 − x1pA1 + x1pB1 = B0 + x1∆1∆1 (X1) = 2aσ2 (s−X1)
where x1 is the arbitrageur’s trade in asset A. Given that opposite positions in assets A and
B eliminate all fundamental risk, the problem can be rewritten as:
J i1 = max
x1
B0 + 2aσ
2x1 (s−X1)
s.t. W0 ≥ 2X1
[
e¯− aσ2 (s−X1)
]
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From the first-order condition, and using X1 = x0 + x1, the unconstrained solution is
x1 =
s− x0
2
(2.9)
This trade satisfies the t = 1 financial constraint if
W0 = B−1 + x0 (∆0 −∆1) ≥ 2X1
[
e¯− aσ2 (s−X1)
]
(2.10)
To express this inequality as a function of the time-0 trade x0, it is necessary to derive the
price schedule ∆0, which is a function of x0. Coming back to the local investors’ problem,
plugging their demand into the value function χA1 , we get:
χA1 = E
A
0 + Y
A
0 p
A
1 +
(
D1 − pA1
)2
2aσ2
− s1
(
D1 − pA1
)
At time 0, the local investors choose their holdings (trades) in the risky asset yA0 . We can
rewrite their final wealth as
EA−1 − yA0 pA0 + s01 + Y a0 pA1 +XA1 (D2 − p1) + s12
In equilibrium, the price pA1 is the sum of the expected conditional value of the asset, D1 and
the liquidity discount, -φA1 . Hence D1 − p1 is independent of 1, which implies that D2 − p1
depends only on 2. This means that at time 0,
E0
(
WA2
)
= EA−1 − yA0 pA0 + Y A0 E0
(
pA1
)
+XA1 (D1 − p1)
V0
(
WA2
)
= σ2
(
Y A0 + s0
)2
+ σ2
(
Y A1 + s1
)2
Therefore the local investors’ time-0 problem is:27
χA0 = max
yA0
E0
(
WA2
)− a
2
V0
(
WA2
)
= max
yA0
EA−1 − yA0 pA0 + Y A0 E0
(
pA1
)
+ Y A1 (D1 − p1)−
a
2
σ2
(
Y A0 + s0
)2 − a
2
σ2
(
Y A1 + s1
)2
(2. 1)
The first-order condition is:
E0 (pa1)− pA0 = aσ2
(
Y A0 + s0
)
27Note that following Basak and Chabakauri (2009) we could write a recursive representation for the local
investors’ problem, using the law of the conditional variance. This would yield of course the same solution.
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Using the symmetry of the B-market, and market-clearing in both markets, gives:
∆0 −∆1 = 2aσ2 (s− x0)
Using this result, equation (2.9), the fact that X1 = x0 + x1, the notation B−1 = W−1 and
the financial constraint (2.10), I can rewrite the condition under which the constraint is slack
as
W−1 ≥ e¯ (s+ x0)− aσ2 (s− x0) s+ 5x0
2
,
which gives W−1 − se¯+ aσ2 s
2
2
+
(
2aσ2 − e¯)x0 − 5
2
aσ2x20 ≥ 0
Proposition 11
Proof. Building on Lemma 8, we know that the unconstrained trade x1 =
s−x0
2
is feasible
as long as the left-hand side of inequality (2.4) has a solution, i.e. as long as the discriminant
is positive:
R =
(
2aσ2s− e¯)2 + 10aσ2(W−1 − se¯+ aσ2 s2
2
)
Hence, rearranging terms, I get that R ≥ 0 if and only if
W−1 ≥ 7
5
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2 − e
2
aσ2
≡ ωc (2.12)
Let us assume that W−1 < ωc so that the arbitrageur is necessarily constrained at t = 1,
i.e. there is no position x0 such that x1 =
s−x0
2
is feasible. The arbitrageur’s position must
therefore saturate the financial constraint, i.e.:
W0 = W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0) = 2X1
(
e¯− aσ2s)+ 2aσ2X21
i.e. − 2aσ2X21 − 2
(
e¯− aσ2s)X1 +W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0) = 0
At time 1, the arbitrageur’s position, x0, is given, and we can view this equation as a
second-order equation in X1 . The constant term, W−1 +2aσ2x0 (s− x0), is positive, since it
represents the wealth accumulated so far, which will be positive in equilibrium. Hence there
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is a unique solution:
Xc11 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Um
2aσ2
, with Um = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2 (W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0)) (2.13)
The time-1 payoff in this constrained case is 2aσ2X1 (s−X1). Plugging the quantity
(2.13) into this expression gives after some algebra:
2aσ2Xc11 (s−Xc11 ) =
e¯
aσ2
[
aσ2s− e¯+
√
Um
]
− (W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0)) (2.14)
At time 0, as we proved in the previous result, the local investors’ first-order condition
and market-clearing imply that
E0
(
pA1 − pA0
)
= aσ2 (s− x0)
Similarly, in market B, E0
(
pB1 − pB0
)
= aσ2 (−s+ x0)
⇒ ∆0 −∆1 = 2aσ2 (s− x0) (2.15)
As a consequence, ∆0 = ∆1+2aσ
2 (s− x0). Plugging equation (2.13) into ∆c11 = 2aσ2 (s−Xc11 )
gives ∆c11 = aσ
2s+ e¯−√Um. Using (2.15), this implies that
∆c10 (x0) = aσ
2s+ e¯−
√
Um + 2aσ2 (s− x0) (2.16)
I can now solve the arbitrageur’s problem at time 0:
J c10 = max
x0
W−1 + x0∆
c1
0 (x0) + 2aσ
2Xc11 (s−Xc11 )
s.t. W−1 ≥ 2x0
(
e¯− aσ2 (s− x0)
)
∆c10 (x0) = aσ
2s+ e¯−
√
Um + 2aσ2 (s− x0)
Using equation (2.14) and plugging the spread schedule into the maximand, the problem
boils down:
J c10 = max
x0
e¯
aσ2
[√
Um − e¯+ aσ2s
]
s.t. W−1 ≥ 2x0
(
e¯− aσ2 (s− x0)
)
Since Um = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2 (W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0)) is concave in x0, the maximiza-
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tion problem admits an interior solution (ignoring the constraint for now):
FOC:
e¯
aσ2
∂
√
Um
∂x0
= 0
Since ∂
√
Um
∂x0
=
∂Um
∂x0√
Um
= 4a
2σ4(s−2x0)√
Um
, the unconstrained optimum is
x0 =
s
2
Let us now check under which condition this strategy satisfies the time-0 financial constraint.
The constraint is satisfied if
W−1 ≥ 2x0
(
e¯− aσ2 (s− x0)
)
= se¯− 1
2
aσ2s2 ≡ ωp
To determine whether this condition is compatible with the initial assumption that W−1 <
ωc, I compare the two thresholds:
ωc ≥ ωp ⇔ 2
5
se¯− 2
5
aσ2s2 − e¯
2
10aσ2
⇔ −(e¯− 2aσ
2s)
2
10aσ2
≥ 0
Since the last inequality is never satisfied, ωc ≤ ωp, implying that for any arbitrageur capital
W−1 strictly below ωc, the arbitrageur is constrained at both t = 0 and t = 1. The time-0
position and the equilibrium are thus the same as in Proposition 10.
Conversely, for W−1 ≥ ωc, not only the fully constrained strategy is financially feasible,
but for W−1 ≥ ωp, but also the c1, u0 strategy.
Lemma 9
Proof. Let’s assume that W−1 ≥ ωc, so that there is always a time-0 trade such that
x1 =
s−x0
2
satisfies the financial constraint at t = 1.
The u1, u0 strategy. I first derive the conditions under which the unconstrained strategy
is feasible. Plugging x1 =
s−x0
2
into the arbitrageur’s objective function yields her value
function in the unconstrained state of the world:
Ju11 = B0 +
aσ2
2
(s− x0)2 (2.17)
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From local investors’ first-order conditions and market-clearing, and the symmetry assump-
tion xA0 = −xB0 = x0, I get that
E0
(
pA1 − pA0
)
= aσ2 (s− x0)
E0
(
pB1 − pB0
)
= aσ2 (x0 − s)
Subtracting the first line from the second gives:
∆1 −∆0 = 2aσ2 (x0 − s)⇒ ∆u10 (x0) = 3aσ2 (s− x0) (2.18)
where the second equation follows from equations (2.8) and (2.9). Hence, using equation
(2.17), the arbitrageur’s problem at time 0 (if he is unconstrained at time 1) is:
Ju10 = max
x0
W−1 + x0∆
u1
0 (x0) +
aσ2
2
(s− x0)2
s.t. ∆u10 (x0) = 3aσ
2 (s− x0)
W−1 ≥ 2x0
[
e¯− aσ2 (s− x0)
]
Taking the first-order condition and solving for its zero (ignoring the financial constraint),
the unconstrained optimal strategy is
xu1,u00 =
2
5
s (2.19)
This implies: xu1,u01 =
3
10
s (2.20)
Plugging this quantities into (2.8) and (2.18), this trades translates into the following equi-
librium spreads:
∆0 =
9
5
aσ2s; ∆1 =
3
5
aσ2s (2.21)
Further, from equations (2.19) and (2.20), I get the payoff
Ju1,u00 = W−1 +
9
10
aσ2s2 (2.22)
I now derive the conditions under which these trades are feasible. Plugging equations
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(2.19)-(2.20) into the financial constraints, I get:
At t = 0, W−1 ≥ 2x0
[
e¯− aσ2 (s− x0)
]⇔ W−1 ≥ ωm0 ≡ 45se¯− 1225aσ2s2 (2.23)
At t = 1, W0 ≥ 2X1
[
e¯− aσ2 (s−X1)
]⇔ W−1 ≥ ωm1 ≡ 75se¯− 910aσ2s2 (2.24)
From the expressions of ωm0 and ω
m
1 , one can see that a slack constraint at t = 0 does
not necessarily imply the same at t = 1, in particular, ωm1 ≥ ωm0 ⇔ e¯ ≥ 710aσ2s. Moreover,
by comparing ωm1 and ω
c, one can see that ωc = ωm1 − e¯10aσ2 < ωm1 .
I show in Lemma 16 below that ωc ≥ ωm0 ⇔
[
3− 2
√
6
5
, 3 + 2
√
6
5
]
.
The u1, c0 strategy. Since there are two thresholds ω
m
0 , ω
m
1 , and given that their relative
order changes, one constraint may be saturated at a time. To remain unconstrained at time
1, the arbitrageur must trade a quantity that jointly satisfies the following inequalities:
t = 0: W−1 ≥ 2x0
[
e¯− aσ2 (s− x0)
]
t = 1: W−1 ≥ e¯ (s+ x0)− aσ2 (s− x0) s+ 5x0
2
I showed in the proof of Proposition 10 that the time-0 constraint has two roots, one positive
(denoted x00) and one negative (denoted x
0′
0 ). The time-1 constraint has at least one root if
its discriminant R ≥ 0 (defined in the proof of Lemma 8). Let x10 and x1′0 denote the roots
if R > 0. Since the arbitrageur’s problem and the constraints are second-order equations in
x0 and have an inverted U shape, if one constraint is binding, it means that its roots are
smaller than the peak of the arbitrageur’s the value function at xu1,u00 =
2
5
s, and at least
one root of the non-binding constraint is greater than 2
5
s. If both constraints are binding,
then all four roots are smaller than 2
5
s. Then to remain unconstrained, the arbitrageur must
trade the largest quantity such that both inequalities are weakly satisfied. This may not
always be feasible, for instance if x10 < x
1′
0 < 0 and x
0′
0 > x
1′
0 . The time-1 constraint has two
negative roots if W−1 ≤ ωp = se¯− 12aσ2s2, and e¯aσ2s > 2. Similarly, if W−1 < ωm1 < ωm0 , and
x10 > x
1′
0 > x
0
0 > 0.
Lemma 10
Proof.
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The c1, u0 strategy was derived, in part, in the proof of Proposition 11. I recall the main
equations here for convenience. The positions are:
xc1,u00 =
s
2
Xc1,u01 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Um
2aσ2
where Um =
(
e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2 [W−1 + 2aσ2xc1,u00 (s− xc1,u00 )]
= 2aσ2W−1 +
(
e¯− aσ2s)2 + a2σ4s2 (2.25)
The payoff is:
J c1,u00 =
e¯
aσ2
[√
Um − e¯+ aσ2s
]
(2.26)
From Proposition 11, the time-0 trade is feasible if and only if W−1 ≥ ωp. I now check under
which condition the arbitrageur is indeed constrained at time 1 after trading x0 =
s
2
. It must
be that if the arbitrageur re-optimizes at time 1 with a starting position s
2
, her financial
constraint binds. The unconstrained trade at time 1 is s−x0
2
= s
4
, resulting X1 =
s
2
+ s
4
= 3
4
s.
Plugging this quantity into the time-1 financial constraint gives:
W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0) ≥ 2X1
[
e¯− aσ2 (s−X1)
]⇔ W−1 ≥ 3
2
se¯− 7
8
aσ2s2 ≡ ω¯p
To sum up: the c1, u0 strategy is
• feasible if and only if W−1 ≥ ωp,
• credible if and only if W−1 ≥ ω¯p.
The c1, c0 strategy is described in Corollary 14. Plugging the positions into the arbi-
trageur’s profit function, W−1 + 2aσ2x0 (s− x0) + 2aσ2X1 (s−X1) gives the payoff:
J c1,c00 =
e¯
aσ2
[
aσ2s− e¯+
√
(e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2e¯
(
aσ2s− e¯+
√
Q
)]
As shown above, a necessary and sufficient condition for the arbitrageur to be constrained
at time 0 is W−1 < ωp, with ωp ≥ ωc. When W−1 ∈ [ωc, ωp[, one must therefore check under
which condition the strategy is credible. The arbitrage cannot re-optimize at time 1 if the
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time-1 constraint is binding when it is evaluated based on x1 =
s−x0
2
and x0 =
aσ2s−e¯−√Q
2aσ2
.
From Lemma 8, the time-1 financial constraint based on x1 =
s−x0
2
is W−1 − se¯ + aσ2 s22 +
(2aσ2s− e¯)x0 − 52aσ2x20 ≥ 0. Plugging x0 = aσ
2s−e¯+√Q
2aσ2
into this equation and rearranging
terms gives inequality (2.5).
The following result will be useful to determine the equilibrium:
Corollary 22 suppose that W−1 < ωp, then if W−1 ≥ ω¯p, the c1, u0 strategy is not credible
and it implies that the c1, c0 is not credible either.
Proof. This follows from the relative position of time-0 trades:
xc1,c00 ≤ xc1,u00 =
s
2
⇔ e¯−
√
Q ≥ 0
⇒ e2 ≥ Q ⇔ W−1 ≤ se¯− aσ2 s
2
2
= ωp
Then, note that the time-1 constraint, based on x1 =
s−x0
2
is an inverted-U shaped parabola
in x0: g (x0) = W−1 − se¯ + aσ2 s22 + (2aσ2s− e¯)x0 − 52aσ2x20. By Lemma 10, W−1 ≥ ω¯p
implies that g (xc1,u00 ) ≥ 0. Note that g is decreasing for all x0 < x10, where x10 is the largest
root of g (x0) = 0. Further, if W−1 ≥ ωp, xc1,c00 ≤ xc1,u00 ≤ x10. Thus on this interval,
g (xc1,u00 ) ≥ 0 ⇒ g (xc1,c00 ) ≥ 0, i.e. the fact that c1, u0 is not credible implies that c1, c0 is
not credible.
Equilibrium
Propositions 12 and 13 are based on a number of intermediate results that I present here.
I first compare the payoffs of the different strategies, then derive parameter conditions to
order the capital thresholds, and finally determine the equilibrium in each region.
Lemma 12 The u1, u0 strategy (weakly) dominates the c1, u0 strategy if and only if W−1 ≤ v2
or W−1 ≥ v1, with v2 =
(
1− 1√
5
)
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2 and v1 =
(
1 + 1√
5
)
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2.
Proof. I recall the expressions of the respective payoffs for convenience: Ju1,u00 = W−1 +
9
10
aσ2s2, and J c1,u00 =
e¯
aσ2
[√
Um − (e¯− aσ2s)
]
. This gives:
Ju1,u00 ≥ J c1,u00 ⇔ aσ2W−1 + e¯2 +
9
10
a2σ4s2 − aσ2se¯ ≥ e¯
√
Um
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From Proposition 11, a necessary condition for consider the u1, u0 strategy is W−1 ≥ ωc,
which implies that aσ2W−1 + e¯2 + 910a
2σ4s2− aσ2se¯ ≥ 0. Hence elevating to the square each
side will not change the order of the previous inequality. I get:
[
aσ2W−1 − aσ2ωl
]2 ≥ e¯2Um, with ωl = se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2 − e¯2
aσ2
Using Um = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2W−1 + a2σ4s2 and developing and regrouping terms gives :
a2σ4W−1 − 2aσ2
(
aσ2ωl + e¯2
)
W−1 + a2σ4
(
ωl
)2 − e¯2 (e¯2 − 2aσ2se¯+ 2a2σ4s2) ≥ 0
The left-hand side is a second-order equation in W−1. Its discriminant is:
δ = 4a2σ4
[
aσ2ωl + e¯2
]2 − 4a2σ4 [a2σ4 (ωl)2 − e¯2 (e¯2 − 2aσ2se¯+ 2a2σ4s2)]
Using the definition of ωl and regrouping terms yields:
δ =
4
5
a4σ8s2e¯2 > 0
This proves that there are always two roots v1 =
2aσ2(aσ2ωl+e¯2)+
√
δ
2a2σ4
and v2 =
2aσ2(aσ2ωl−e¯2)+
√
δ
2a2σ4
,
with v2 ≤ v1, so that the inequality is satisfied for W−1 ≤ v2 or W−1 ≥ v1. v1 and v2 can be
simplified to the expressions given in the lemma by replacing δ and ωl by their expressions.
It is easy to check that the conditions are both necessary and sufficient.
Lemma 13 The u1, u0 strategy weakly dominates the c1, c0 strategy if
f (W−1) = −a2σ4W 2−1 + 2a2σ4ω¯lW−1 − a2σ4
(
ω¯l
)2
+ 2e¯3
√
Q+ e¯4 − a2σ4s2e¯2 ≤ 0 (2.27)
Proof. From the expressions of Ju1,u00 and J
c1,c0
0 , I get:
Ju1,u00 ≥ J c1,c00 ⇔ aσ2W−1 − aσ2se¯+
9
10
a2σ4s2 ≤ e¯
√
a2σ4s2 − e¯2 + 2e¯
√
Q
The assumption that W−1 ≥ ωm1 implies that the left-hand side is positive. I take the square
on each side, which gives:
a2σ4
[
W−1 − ω¯l
]2 ≥ a2σ4s2e¯2 − e¯4 + 2e¯3√Q, with ω¯l = se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2
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Developing and rearranging terms yields condition (2.27).
Lemma 14 If ωm0 ≤ W−1 < ωm1 , or W−1 < ωm1 ≤ ωm0 , the u1, c0 strategy involves trading a
quantity x10, given in Lemma 9, at time 0. In this case,
• the u1, c0 strategy is always dominated by c1, u0,
• the u1, c0 strategy dominates c1, c0 if
g (W−1) =
2
5
aσ2W−1−12
25
a2σ4s2+
42
25
e2+
2
25
aσ2se¯+
4
25
(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)√
R ≥ 2e¯
√
Q (2.28)
Proof. First, I plug the expression of x10 into J
u1,c0
0 (x0) to the payoff of the strategy
using the results of Lemma 9. This gives:
Ju1,c00
(
x10
)
= W−1 +
9a2σ4s2 −
(
e¯−√R
)2
10aσ2
=
e¯
aσ2
[
7
5
aσ2s+
√
R− e¯
5
]
Then using the expression for J c1,u00 given in Lemma 10, I find that
Ju1,c00
(
x10
) ≥ J c1,u00 ⇔ 25 (aσ2s+ 2e¯)+
√
R
5
≥
√
Um > 0
Taking the square on each side yields, after developing and rearranging the terms,
(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)√
R ≥ 10aσ2 (W−1 − ωc) , with ωc = 1310se¯− 2320aσ2s2 − e
2
5aσ2
Given that W−1 ≥ ωc by assumption, and that ωc > ωc, the right-hand side is positive
and taking the square on each side does not change the sign. This yields the following
second-order equation in W−1:
−100a2σ4W 2−1+10aσ2
[
20aσ2ωc +
(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)2]
W−1−10aσ2
[(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)2
ωc + 10aσ2 (ωc)2
]
≥ 0
The discriminant of the equation is:
d = 100a2σ4
[
20aσ2ωc +
(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)2]2−400a2σ4 [10aσ2 [(aσ2s+ 2e¯)2 ωc + 10aσ2 (ωc)2]]
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Developing and regrouping the terms gives
d = 100a2σ4
(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)2 [(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)2 − 40aσ2 (ωc − ωc)]
Since ωc − ωc = 1
10
se¯+ 1
4
aσ2s2 + e¯
2
10aσ2
, the discriminant boils down to
d = −900a4σ8s2 (aσ2s+ 2e¯)2 < 0
Therefore, given that the coefficient of the second-order term is negative, the inequality is
never satisfied.
I now turn to the second point:
Ju1,c00 ≥ J c1,c00 ⇔
2
5
(
aσ2s+ 2e¯
)
+
√
R
5
≥
√
a2σ4s2 − e¯2 + 2e¯
√
Q
This yields condition (2.28), after elevating both sides to the square and rearranging terms.
Lemma 15 If ωm0 ≤ W−1 < ωm1 , or W−1 < ωm1 ≤ ωm0 , the u1, c0 strategy to trade x00, given
in Lemma 9. Then
• the u1, c0 strategy dominates c1, u0 if
g˜u (W−1) = −1
4
aσ2W−1 +
(5e¯− aσ2s)√Q+ 2aσ2se¯− e¯2 + a2σ4s2
4
≥ e¯
√
Um
• the u1, c0 strategy dominates c1, c0 if
g˜c (W−1) = −1
4
aσ2W−1+
(5e¯− aσ2s)√Q+ 2aσ2se¯− e¯2 + a2σ4s2
4
≥ e¯
√
a2σ4s2 − e¯2 + 2e¯
√
Q
Proof. By plugging x00 into J
u1,c0
0 (x0), both given in Lemma 9, I get the payoff of the
strategy
Ju1,c00
(
x00
)
= −1
4
W−1 +
a2σ4s2 + 6aσ2se¯− 5e¯2 + (5e¯− aσ2s)√Q
4aσ2
Comparing this payoff to J c1,u00 and J
c1,c0
0 and rearranging terms gives the conditions given
in the result.
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Lemma 16 The thresholds are ranked in the following order:
1. If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [0, 1
10
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp ≤ ωm0 ,
2. If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [ 1
10
, 79
140
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωp,
3. If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
79
140
, 21
10(1+
√
5)
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ωm0 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp,
4. If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
21
10(1+
√
5)
, 7
10
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ ωm0 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp,
5. If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [ 7
10
, 3
4
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp,
6. If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
3
4
, 3− 2
√
6
5
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ωp ≤ ω¯p,
7. If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
3− 2
√
6
5
, 2
√
5
5
[
, then ωm0 ≤ ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ωp ≤ ω¯p,
8. If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
2
√
5
5
, 1
[
, then ωm0 ≤ ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ ωp ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p,
9. If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
1, 3 + 2
√
6
5
[
, then ωm0 ≤ ωc ≤ ωp ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p,
10. If e¯
aσ2s
> 3 + 2
√
6
5
, then ωc ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωp ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p.
Proof. I start by recalling the expressions of the different thresholds:
ωc =
7
5
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2 − e¯
2
10aσ2
ωm0 =
4
5
se¯− 12
25
aσ2s2
ωm1 =
7
5
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2
ωp = se¯− 1
2
aσ2s2
ω¯p =
3
2
se¯− 7
8
aσ2s2
v1 =
(
1 +
√
5
5
)
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2
v2 =
(
1−
√
5
5
)
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2
I now determine relative positions.
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ωm1 vs ω
c: ωc = ωm1 − e¯10aσ2 < ωm1 .
ωm0 vs ω
c:
ωc ≥ ωm0 ⇔
7
5
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2 − e¯
2
10aσ2
≥ 4
5
se¯− 12
25
aσ2s2
⇔ 6aσ2se¯ > 42
10
a2σ4s2 + e¯2
⇔ − e¯2 + 6aσ2se¯− 42
10
a2σ4s2 > 0 (2.29)
One can view the left-hand side as a second-order equation in e¯. The discriminant of the
left-hand side is D = 96
5
a2σ4s2, and given that the coefficient of the second-order term and
the constant have the same sign, and that the coefficient of the first-order term is positive,
there are two positive roots, given by
(
3− 2
√
6
5
)
aσ2s ≈ 0.81aσ2s and
(
3 + 2
√
6
5
)
aσ2s ≈
5.2aσ2s. Hence ωc ≥ ωm0 if and only if e¯aσ2s ∈
[
3− 2
√
6
5
, 3 + 2
√
6
5
]
.
ωp vs ωm1 and ω
m
0 :
ωp ≥ ωm0 ⇔ e¯ ≥
1
10
aσ2s
ωp ≥ ωm1 ⇔ e¯ ≤ aσ2s
ωp vs ωc:
ωp ≤ ωc ⇔ 2
5
se¯− 2
5
aσ2s2 − e¯
2
10aσ2
≥ 0
⇔ −(e¯− 2aσ
2s)
2
10aσ2
≥ 0
⇒ impossible, hence ωp > ωc
ωp vs ω¯p: ωp ≤ ω¯p ⇔ e¯ ≥ 3
4
aσ2s.
ω¯p vs ωm0 and ω
m
1 :
ω¯p ≥ ωm0 ⇔ e¯ ≥
79
140
aσ2s
ω¯p ≥ ωm1 ⇔ e¯ ≥ −4aσ2s which always holds
ωm0 vs ω
m
1 : ω
m
0 ≤ ωm1 ⇔ e¯ ≥ 710aσ2s.
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v1 vs ω
m
0 , ω
m
1 , ω
p and ω¯p:
v1 > ω
m
1 since 1 +
√
5
5
> 7
5
v1 ≥ ωm0 ⇔ e¯ ≥
21
10
(
1 +
√
5
)aσ2s
v1 ≥ ωp ⇔ e¯ ≥ 2
√
5
5
aσ2s
v1 < ω¯
psince 3
2
> 1 +
√
5
5
and 9
10
> 7
8
Note that v2 < ω
m
1 hence the condition W−1 < v2 is not going to bind, and therefore it is
not useful to study the relative position of v2.
Overall, without condition on the parameters, we have: ω¯p ≥ ωm1 , ωc < ωm1 , ωc < ωp,
v1 > ω
m
1 , ω¯
p > v1 and v2 < ω
m
1 . For the other relationships, there are 9 thresholds, in
ascending order: 1
10
, 79
140
, 21
10(1+
√
5)
, 7
10
, 3
4
, 3− 2
√
6
5
, 2
√
5
5
, 1, 3 + 2
√
6
5
.
Proposition 12 Proof. For u1, u0 to be an equilibrium, it must be i) feasible, ii) weakly
dominating c1, u0 and c1, c0. Note that if a strategy dominates c1, u0, it also dominates c1, c0
(whether c1, u0 and c1, c0 are credible or not), but the converse is not necessarily true. A
necessary and sufficient condition for i) to hold is that W−1 ≥ max (ωm0 , ωm1 ) by Lemma 9.
A necessary and sufficient condition for ii) to hold is that W−1 ≥ v1 or W−1 ≤ v2. Given
that v2 ≤ ωm1 and v1 > ωm1 for all parameter values, one can eliminate W−1 ≤ v2 from the
equilibrium conditions. Hence a necessary condition is W−1 ≥ max (v1, ωm0 ). Lemma 16
shows that v1 ≥ ωm0 if and only if e¯aσ2s ≥ 2110(1+√5) , hence the result.
Note that u1, u0 may be an equilibrium for a larger parameter interval, because the
previous points are based on the weak dominance versus c1, u0, which implies weak dominance
of c1, c0, and do not take into account credibility and feasibility conditions. There are cases
(see Lemmata 22-25 below) where c1, u0 dominates u1, u0 but is either not credible or not
feasible. This is the case in particular if v1 ≤ ωp and / or v1 ≥ ω¯p. If at the same time,
u1, u0 dominates c1, c0, and / or c1, c0 is not credible, then u1, u0 is an equilibrium, but these
cases are not accounted for by the proposition.
Corollary 15 Proof. Building on Proposition 12, if e¯
aσ2s
≤ 9
10(1+
√
5)
≈ 0.65, the equilib-
rium condition is W−1 ≥ ωm0 = 45se¯− 1225aσ2s2. Since ωm0 is highest for e¯ ≥ 65aσ2s > 2110(1+√5) ,
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an increase in s decreases ωm0 if
e¯
aσ2s
≤ 21
10(1+
√
5)
. Conversely, if e¯
aσ2s
> 21
10(1+
√
5)
, the threshold
is v1 =
(
1 + 1√
5
)
se¯ − 9
10
aσ2s2. Taking the first-order condition shows that v1 is increasing
in s if e¯ ≥ 9
10
(
1+ 1√
5
) ≈ 0.62. Given that 9
10
(
1+ 1√
5
) < 21
10(1+
√
5)
, an increase in s tightens the
constraint if e¯
aσ2s
≥ 21
10(1+
√
5)
.
Proposition 13 Proof. The result requires that the u1, u0 and c1, u0 are both feasible
and that c1, u0 is the dominant strategy. The first point requires W−1 ≥ max (ωm0 , ωm1 ) and
W−1 ∈ [ωp, ω¯p[ (by Lemmata 9 and 10). The second point requires W−1 < v1 (Lemma 12).
Hence we must have W−1 ≥ max (ωm0 , ωm1 , ωp) and W−1 < min (v1, ω¯p). From Lemma 16,
this interval is non-empty only in the two instances stated in the result.
Corollary 17 Proof. Recall the expressions of xc1,u00 , x
c1,u0
1 and X
c1,u0
1 from Lemma 10:
xc1,u00 =
s
2
; xc1,u01 =
√
Um − e¯
2aσ2
; Xc1,u01 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Um
2aσ2
Using the results of Lemma 9, it is immediate that xc1,u00 > x
u1,u0
0 .
xc1,u01 − xu1,u01 =
√
Um − e¯
2aσ2
− 3
10
s ≥ ⇔
√
Um ≥ e¯+ 3
5
aσ2s
Taking squares on both sides and rearranging terms yields:
W−1 ≥ 8
5
se¯− 41
5
aσ2s > ωm1
Further v1 ≥ 85se¯ − 415 aσ2s ⇔
√
5−3
5
e¯ ≥ 2
25
aσ2s, which never holds since
√
5 − 3 < 0.
Thus the equilibrium condition W−1 < v1 can be satisfied at the same time as W−1 ≥ 85se¯−
41
5
aσ2s, which implies that for all parameter values satisfying the conditions of Proposition
13, xc1,u01 < x
u1,u0
1 .
Turning to the total position:
Xc1,u01 −Xu1,u01 =
aσ2s− e¯+√Um
2aσ2
− 7
10
s ⇒ W−1 ≥ 7
5
se¯− 23
25
aσ2s2
Since v1 =
(
1 + 1√
5
)
se¯− 9
10
aσ2s2, 7
5
se¯− 23
25
aσ2s2 < v1.
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Proposition 14 Proof. The result can be derived from Lemmata 18-27 below or directly
by using Lemmata 9, 10, 16, 14 and 15.
For the sake of exhaustiveness, I now derive the equilibrium for each of the parameter
regions of Lemma 16. Since the algorithm for the equilibrium determination is always the
same, I write the proof only in the first case. Note that:
Lemma 17 If e¯
aσ2s
< 7− 2√10 or e¯
aσ2s
> 7 + 2
√
10, ωc < 0. Thus some parameter regions
may imply a negative capital (i.e. debt) W−1 < 0.
Proof. Rewriting ωc as 14aσ
2se¯−9a2σ4s2−e¯2
10aσ2
, one can view the numerator as a second-
order equation in e¯ and calculate its discriminant, δ = 160a2σ4s2. There are two roots,(
7− 2√10) aσ2s ≈ 0.67aσ2s and (7− 2√10) aσ2s ≈ 13.3aσ2s
This result matters as it can explain why in some regions the equilibrium with may not
exist. Capital may be so negative that no trade may be feasible. I recall some notation.
Notation 17 The following notation is used as a shorthand:
• Weakly dominant strategy:
– u1, u0 dominates c1, c0 if f (W−1) ≥ 0 where f is defined in Lemma 13,
– u1, c0, with the time-0 constraint most severely binding, dominates c1, c0 if g (W−1) ≥
0, with g defined in Lemma 14,
– u1, c0, with the time-1 constraint most severely binding, dominates c1, u0 if g˜u (W−1) ≥
0, with g˜u defined in Lemma 15,
– u1, c0, with the time-1 constraint most severely binding, dominates c1, c0 if g˜u (W−1) ≥
0, with g˜c defined in Lemma 15.
• Credibility and feasibility conditions:
– c1, c0 is credible if and only if h (W−1) < 0, where h is defined in Lemma 10.
I now present the equilibrium for each parameter region:
Lemma 18 Case A: If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [0, 1
10
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp ≤ ωm0 ,
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1. If W−1 ≥ ωm0 , the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωp, ωm0 [, then if W−1 is such that h (W−1) ≥ 0, the equilibrium is u1, c0 with
x0 = x
0
0, otherwise, a necessary condition for this equilibrium to hold is g˜c (W−1) ≥ 0.
If g˜c (W−1) < 0, the equilibrium is c1, c0.
3. If W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωp[ then the equilibrium is c1, u0 with x0 = x00 if x00 > x1′0 and may not
exist otherwise.
4. If W−1 ∈ [v1, ω¯p[ or [ωm1 , v1[, or W−1 ∈ [ωc, ωm1 [, then the equilibrium is c1, u0 with
x0 = x
0
0 if x
0
0 > x
1′
0 and h (W−1) ≥ 0. If h (W−1) < 0, the equilibrium is u1, c0 if
g˜c (W−1) ≥ 0 and x00 > x1′0 . g˜c (W−1) < 0, then the equilibrium is c1, c0. If x0 < x1′0 , it
is not possible to satisfy the financial constraints.
Proof. If W−1 ≥ ωm0 , u1, u0 is feasible, and u1, c0 is feasible but not credible since
W−1 ≥ ω¯p. Given that W−1 ≥ v1, u1, u0 would dominate c1, u0, hence dominates c1, c0.
Hence the equilibrium is u1, u0.
If W−1 ∈ [ωp, ωm0 [, then u1, u0 is not feasible, with the time-0 constraint binding, hence
one must compare u1, c0 with x0 = x
0
0 to c1, u0 or c1, c0. c1, u0 is still not credible, hence
u1, c0 must be compared to c1, c0 if the latter is credible, i.e. if h (W−1) < 0 according to
Lemma 10. By Lemma 15, if c1, c0 is credible, it is dominated if g˜c (W−1) ≥ 0.
If W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωp[, then the time-0 constraint is still the most severely binding. However,
since W−1 < ωp, there are two positive roots to equation (2.4). One (x10) is greater than
2
5
s
since the time-1 constraint is not binding, and one is smaller (x1
′
0 ). From Corollary 14, the
time-0 constraint has always a positive and a negative root: x00 > 0 and x
0′
0 < 0. If x
0
0 < x)
1′
then the two constraints do not cross in the upper-quadrant, meaning that no trade ensures
that the time-0 constraint is feasible and x1 =
s−x0
2
is feasible. Given that W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωp[,
the fact that c1, u0 is not credible implies that c1, c0 is not credible by Corollary 22. Hence
if x00 < x
1′
0 , there may be no equilibrium. If x
0
0 ≥ x1′0 , there is always an equilibrium, and the
equilibrium is u1, c0 with x0 = x
0
0.
If W−1 ∈ [v1, ω¯p[ or [ωm1 , v1[, then the analysis is similar, with the exception that Corollary
22 cannot be used anymore. Hence if h (W−1) < 0, c1, c0 is a credible strategy and it is played
in equilibrium if g (W−1) < 0.
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If W−1 ∈ [ωc, ωm1 [, the analysis is similar: given that W−1 < ωm1 , the time-1 constraint is
also binding but since ωm0 > ω
m
1 , x
0
0 < x
1
0, the time-0 constraint remains the most severely
binding constraint.
Lemma 19 Case B: If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [ 1
10
, 79
140
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωp,
1. If W−1 ≥ ωp or W−1 ∈ [ωm0 , ωp[, the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωm0 [, the equilibrium is u1, c0 with x0 = x00 if x00 > x1′0 . Otherwise, it is
not possible to satisfy the financial constraints (A.3.).
3. If W−1 ∈ [v1, ω¯p[ or [ωm1 , v1[, the equilibrium is the same as A.4.
Lemma 20 Case C: If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
79
140
, 21
10(1+
√
5)
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ωm0 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp,
1. If W−1 ≥ ωp or W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωp[, or [ωm0 , ω¯p[, the equilibrium is u1, u0.
2. If W−1 ∈ [v1, ωm0 [ ∪ [ωm1 , v1[ ∪ [ωc, ωm1 [, the equilibrium is the same as A.4.
Lemma 21 Case D: e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
21
10(1+
√
5)
, 7
10
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ ωm0 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp,
1. If W−1 ≥ ωp, or W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωp[ or [v1, ω¯p[, the equilibrium is u1, u0.
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωm0 , v1[, then the equilibrium is u1, u0 if h (W−1 ≥ 0). If h (W−1) < 0, then
the equilibrium is u1, u0 if f (W−1) ≥ 0 and c1, c0 otherwise.
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , ωm0 [ or [ωc, ωm1 [, then the equilibrium is as in A.4.
Proof. The first case is immediate: one must compare the strategies u1, u0 and c1, u0,
and the latter is either not feasible / credible, or dominated in these three intervals, since
W−1 ≥ v1. (this implies that c1, c0 is also dominated)
The second case is new and follows from Lemma 10 and Lemma 13. It differs from A.4.
because one mus compare u1, u0 to c1, c0, while in A.4. one compares u1, c0 to c1, c0. This
case arises because for e¯
aσ2s
≥ 21
10(1+
√
5)
, wm0 < v1. The third case has already been analyzed.
Lemma 22 Case E: If e¯
aσ2s
∈ [ 7
10
, 3
4
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p ≤ ωp,
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1. If W−1 ≥ ωp, or W−1 ∈ [ω¯p, ωp[ or [v1, ω¯p[, the equilibrium is u1, u0.
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[, the equilibrium is as D.2.
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωm0 , ωm1 [ or [ωc, ωm0 [, then the equilibrium is u1, c0 with x0 = x10 if h (W−1) ≥
0. If h (W−1) < 0, the equilibrium is u1, c0 if g (W−1) ≥ 0, and c1, c0 otherwise.
Lemma 23 Case F: If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
3
4
, 3− 2
√
6
5
[
, then ωc ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ωp ≤ ω¯p,
1. If W−1 ≥ ω¯p or W−1 ∈ [ωp, ω¯p[ or [v1, ωp[, then the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[, then the equilibrium is as D.2.
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωm0 , ωm1 [ or [ωc, ωm0 [, the equilibrium is as E.3.
Lemma 24 Case G: If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
3− 2
√
6
5
, 2
√
5
5
[
, then ωm0 ≤ ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ωp ≤ ω¯p,
1. If W−1 ≥ ω¯p or W−1 ∈ [ωp, ω¯p[ or [v1, ωp[, then the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[, then the equilibrium is as D.2.
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωc, ωm1 [, the equilibrium is as E.3.
Lemma 25 Case H: If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
2
√
5
5
, 1
[
, then ωm0 ≤ ωc ≤ ωm1 ≤ ωp ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p,
1. If W−1 ≥ ω¯p or W−1 ∈ [v1, ω¯p[, then the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωp, v1[, then the equilibrium is c1, u0,
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , ωp[, then the equilibrium is as D.2.
4. If W−1 ∈ [ωc, ωm1 [, the equilibrium is as E.3.
Lemma 26 Case I: If e¯
aσ2s
∈
[
1, 3 + 2
√
6
5
[
, then ωm0 ≤ ωc ≤ ωp ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p,
1. If W−1 ≥ ω¯p or W−1 ∈ [v1, ω¯p[, then the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[ or [ωp, ωm1 [, then the equilibrium is c1, u0,
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωc, ωm1 [, then the equilibrium is as E.3.
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Lemma 27 Case J: If e¯
aσ2s
> 3 + 2
√
6
5
, then ωc ≤ ωm0 ≤ ωp ≤ ωm1 ≤ v1 ≤ ω¯p,
1. If W−1 ≥ ω¯p or W−1 ∈ [v1, ω¯p[, then the equilibrium is u1, u0,
2. If W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , v1[ or [ωp, ωm1 [, then the equilibrium is c1, u0,
3. If W−1 ∈ [ωm0 , ωp[ or [ωc, ωm0 [, then the equilibrium is as E.3.
2.7.3 Liquidity and welfare comparisons
Proposition 15
Proof. First I recall the expressions of the spread at time 0 in both cases:
∆m0 =
9
5
aσ2s; ∆∗0 = 2
(
aσ2s+ e¯
)−√Q−√U
with Q = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2aσ2W−1 and U = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 4aσ2x0e¯. It is convenient to rewrite
U by plugging the expression for the time-0 constrained trade given in Corollary 14:
U =
(
e¯− aσ2s)2 + 2e¯ (aσ2s− e¯)+ 2e¯√Q
= a2σ4s2 − e¯2 + 2e¯
√
Q
∆∗0 ≥ ∆m0 ⇔
1
5
aσ2s+ 2e¯ ≥
√
Q+
√
U
This implies that
1
5
aσ2s+ 2e¯ ≥ Q+ U + 2
√
QU
Since Q+U = 2a2σ4s2−2aσ2se¯+2e¯√Q+2aσ2W−1, the condition becomes, after regrouping
terms:
−2aσ2W−1 + 14
5
aσ2se¯− 49
25
a2σ4s2 + 4e¯2 ≥ 2
√
Q
(
e¯+
√
U
)
A necessary condition for this inequality to be satisfied is that the LHS is positive, i.e.
W−1 ≤ ω˜ = 7
5
se¯− 49
50
aσ2s2 +
2e¯2
aσ2
(2.30)
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The interval of interest to compare ω˜ to is [ωm0 , ω
∗[ if e¯
aσ2s
< 21
10(1+
√
5)
, [v1, ω
∗[ if e¯
aσ2s
≥
21
10(1+
√
5)
and [v1, ω
∗[ if e¯
aσ2s
≥ 7
10
and h (W−1) ≥ 0 or h (W−1) < 0 and f (W−1) ≥ 0. Note
that the latter case is not given in Proposition 12, which gives only a necessary condition
and not a sufficient one. I compare ω˜ to the different thresholds:
v1 ≥ ω˜ ⇔
5
(√
5− 2) aσ2se¯− 2a2σ4s2 − 50e¯2
25aσ2
≥ 0
We can consider the numerator of the LHS as a second-order equation in e¯. Calculating the
discriminant d =
(
25
(√
5− 2)2 − 400) a2σ4s2 < 0 shows that the LHS is always negative
(since the second-order term has a negative coefficient), i.e. v1 < ω˜.
Next, I compare ω˜ and ωm0 :
ωm0 ≤ ω˜ ⇔
−6aσ2se¯+ 5a2σ4s2 − 20e¯2
10aσ2
The LHS in the numerator can be seen as a second-order equation in e¯, I calculate its
discriminant: d = 436a2σ4s2 > 0. Since the constant and the second-order term have
opposite signs, there is a positive and a negative root. The positive root is equal to
3+
√
109
20
aσ2s ≈ 0.68aσ2s > 21
10(1+
√
5)
aσ2s ≈ 0.65aσ2s. Hence if e¯
aσ2s
< 21
10(1+
√
5)
, (2.30) does
not hold. If
To complete the time-0 case, I assume that h (W−1) > 0 or h (W−1) ≤ 0 and f (W−1) ≥ 0.
The relevant threshold for the monopoly is then ωm1 :
ωm1 ≤ ω˜ ⇔
a2σ4s2
25
≤ e¯2 ⇔ e¯ ≥ aσ
2s
5
(e¯ > 0)
Next, I compare the time-1 spreads, ∆∗1 = aσ
2s+ e¯−√U and ∆m1 = 35aσ2s:
∆∗1 ≥ ∆m1 ⇔
4
5
aσ2se¯+ 2e¯2 − 21
25
a2σ2s4 ≥ 2e¯
√
Q (2.31)
I study the sign of the LHS, taking it as a second-order equation in e¯. The discriminant is
d = 184
25
a2σ4s2 and given that the constant and the second-order term have opposite signs,
there is a positive and a negative root. The positive root is
√
46−2
10
aσ2s ≈ 0.48aσ2s. Hence
for e¯
aσ2s
≤
√
46−2
10
, ∆∗1 ≤ ∆m1 . Otherwise, one can take the square in each side of inequality
2.7. PROOFS 141
(2.31), which gives, after a few lines of algebra:
∆∗1 ≥ ∆m1 ⇒ W−1 ≤ ωˆ ≡
7
5
se¯− 21
25
aσ2s2 +
441
5000
a3σ6s4
e¯2
− 21
125
a2σ4s3
e¯
To assess the existence of this case, I compare ωˆ to the thresholds v1, ω
m
0 and ω
m
1 .
ωˆ ≥ v1 ⇔ 2−
√
5
5
se¯+
3
50
aσ2s2 +
21
125
a2σ4s2
e¯
[
21
40
aσ2s
e¯
− 1
]
≥ 0
It is not possible to derive the roots of this equation analytically. However, one can look at
sufficient conditions. There are two options and both are not satisfied. i) It is enough that:
{
21
40
aσ2s
e¯
− 1 ≥ 0
2−√5
5
se¯+ 3
50
aσ2s2 ≥ 0 ⇔

e¯
aσ2s
≤ 0.525
e¯
aσ2s
≤ 3
10(
√
5−2) ≈ 1.27
⇔ e¯
aσ2s
≤ 0.525
This is not compatible with the initial assumption that e¯
aσ2s
≥ 21
10(1+
√
5)
≈ 0.65. ii) Another
sufficient condition is:{
3
50
aσ2s2 ≥ 21
125
a2σ4s3
e¯
441
5000e¯2
a3σ6s4 ≥
√
5−2
5
se¯
⇔

e¯
aσ2s
≥ 14
5
e¯
aσ2s
≤ (441)
1
3
10(
√
5−2)
1
3
≈ 1.23
These two conditions are contradictory.
Now compare ωˆ and ωm0 :
ωˆ ≥ ωm0 ⇔
3
5
se¯− 9
25
aσ2s2 +
441
5000
a3σ6s3
e¯2
− 21
125
a2σ4s3
e¯
≥ 0
Again, there are two types of sufficient conditions and both are not satisfied. i) It is enough
that: {
3
5
se¯ ≥ 9
25
aσ2s2
441
5000
a3σ6s3
e¯2
≥ 21
125
a2σ4s3
e¯
⇔
{
e¯
aσ2s
≥ 3
5
e¯
aσ2s
≤ 21
40
These two conditions contradict each other. ii) Another sufficient set of sufficient conditions
is: {
3
5
se¯ ≥ 21
125
a2σ4s3
e¯
441
5000
a3σ6s3
e¯2
≥ 9
25
aσ2s2
⇔
{
e¯
aσ2s
≥
√
7
5
≈ 0.53
e¯
aσ2s
≤ 21
15
√
8≈0.49
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Again these two conditions contradict each other. Last I compare ωm1 and ωˆ:
ωˆ ≥ ωm1 ⇔
3
50
aσ2s2 +
441
5000
a3σ6s3
e¯2
− 21
125
a2σ4s3
e¯
≥ 0
We can rewrite the LHS as
aσ2s(300e¯2+441a2σ4s2−4200aσ2se¯)
5000e¯2
, which can be seen as a second-
order equation in e¯. The discriminant of the numerator is d = (42002 − 1200.441) a2σ4s2 ≡
q¯2a2σ4s2 > 0. The constant and the second-order term has the same sign, and the first-
order term is negative, thus there are two positive roots. The smallest root is equal to
(7− q) aσ2s ≈ 0.1aσ2s, with q = q¯
600
, which is lower than the threshold 21
10(1+
√
5)
aσ2s, and
the largest root is (7 + q) aσ2s ≈ 14aσ2s. Hence if e¯
aσ2s
≥ 7 + q, ∆∗1 ≥ ∆m1 if W−1 ∈ [ωm1 , ωˆ].
Proposition 16
Proof. The equilibrium spreads in the constrained competitive and voluntarily con-
strained cases are given in Corollary 14 and Proposition 13. A time 0:
∆∗0 ≥ ∆c1,u00 ⇔
√
Um + e¯ ≤
√
Q+
√
U ≥ 0⇒ Um − (Q+ U) + e¯2 ≥
√
QU − 2e¯
√
Um
Since Um − (Q+ U) = 2e¯2 − 2e¯√Q, the previous condition rewrites as:
2e¯2 ≥
√
QU − 2e¯
[√
Um −
√
Q
]
I now show that the inequality is not trivially satisfied because the RHS is always positive.
To see this, note that Um = Q + a2σ2s2 > Q, hence
√
Um ≤ √Q + aσ2s by Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality. Hence 0 ≤ 2e¯
[√
Um −√Q
]
≤ 2aσ2se¯. Further, we can write U
as U = (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 4aσ2x0e¯. Since the financial constraint is binding at time 0 in the
competitive case, W−1 = 2x0e¯ − 2aσ2x0 (s− x0). Hence U = Q + 4a2σ4x0 (s− x0) > Q,
because the second term represents the time-0 trading profit which is positive in equilibrium
given that the spread does not close. Since Q > 0, U > Q⇒ UQ > Q2. Taking the square
root on each side gives:
√
UQ ≥ Q. Then using the expression U = Q+4a2σ4x0 (s− x0), we
have QU = Q2 + Q4a2σ4x0 (s− x0). Then, applying Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to
√
QU ,
we obtain: Q ≤ √UQ ≤ Q + 2aσ2√Qx0 (s− x0). This, combined with the inequalities
about Um, implies that√
UQ− e¯
(√
Um −
√
Q
)
≥ Q− 2aσ2se¯ = e¯2 + a2σ4s22aσ2W−1 ≥ 0
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Next, I consider the time-1 spreads:
∆∗1 ≥ ∆c1,u01 ⇔ Um ≥ U ⇔ 2e¯2 + a2σ4s2 − 2aσ2se¯+ 2aσ2W−1 ≥ 2e¯
√
Q
I first check the sign of the LHS. It is positive if and only ifW−1 ≥ se¯− 12aσ2s2− e¯
2
aσ2
= ωp− e¯2
aσ2
.
This inequality is always satisfied since by definition W−1 ≥ ωp in the c1, u0 equilibrium. I
rewrite the LHS as 2aσ2
(
W−1 −
(
ωp − e¯2
aσ2
))
. The above inequality gives:
4a2σ4
(
W−1 −
(
ωp − e¯
2
aσ2
))2
≥ 4e¯2Q = 4e¯2 (e¯− aσ2s)2 + 8aσ2e¯2W−1
Developing each side and skipping some lines of algebra, I find that the previous inequality
is equivalent to:
W 2−1 − 2ωpW−1 + s2
(
e¯− 1
2
aσ2s
)2
≥ 0
Since s2
(
e¯− 1
2
aσ2s
)2
=
(
se¯− 1
2
aσ2s2
)2
= (ωp)2, the LHS is equal to (W−1 − ωp)2 which is
always positive. This proves the result about time-1 spreads.
Finally, the result about the time-0 spread follows from the facts that under the assump-
tions of Proposition 16, i) xc1,c00 ≥ xc1,u00 and ii) ∆∗1 ≥ ∆c1,u01 .
Corollary 19
Proof. I showed in the proof of Proposition 16 that the capital gain is larger in the
monopoly case by showing that Um ≥ U . Further, recalling that xc1,c00 = s2 − e¯−
√
Q
2aσ2
and
xc1,u00 =
s
2
, I get:
xc1,u00 ≤ xc1,c00 ⇔
√
Q ≥ e¯⇒ W−1 ≥ se¯− 1
2
aσ2s2 = ωp
This is always true for the c1, u0 equilibrium under consideration.
Lemma 11
Proof. Starting from equation (2.11), and using the expression of local investors’ de-
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mand, E0 (pa1)− pA0 = aσ2
(
Y A0 + s0
)
, we can rewrite local investors’ equilibrium utility as
χA0 =
(
E0
(
pA1
)− pA0 )2 + (D1 − p1)2
aσ2
− s (E0 (pA1 )− pA0 +D1 − p1)− aσ22 [(Y A0 + s)2 + (Y A1 + s1)2]
=
(
E0
(
pA1
)− pA0 )2 + (D1 − p1)2
2aσ2
− s (E0 (pA1 )− pA0 +D1 − p1) (2.32)
Given that risk premia are symmetric, we have: φA0 = D − pA0 = ∆02 and E0
(−φA1 ) =
E0
(
pA1 −D1
)
= −∆1
2
. Further, E0 (∆1) = ∆1 since the spread, unlike the individual price,
does not depend on 1. Hence local investors’ welfare is
χA0 =
(∆0 −∆1)2 + ∆21
8aσ2
− s
2
∆0 (2.33)
When unconstrained competitive arbitrageurs are present, all spreads are 0, as shown in
Proposition 10, hence χA,∗0 = 0. In the autarky situation, local investors are constrained
to hold their local asset in equilibrium. Hence using market-clearing and investors’ demand
functions, we have Y A1 = 0, hence Y
A
1 + s = s, which implies from investors’ demand that
pA1 = D1−aσ2s. At time 0, by market-clearing, Y A0 = 0, hence Y A0 +s =
E0(pA1 )−pA0
aσ2
= s. Hence
pA0 = E0
(
pA1
) − aσ2s = D − 2aσ2s. The prices in market B are opposite, by construction.
Plugging this prices into the local investors’s welfare function gives χA,a0 = −aσ2s.
To rank χA,m0 relative to χ
A,∗
0 and χ
A,a
0 , note that{
0 ≤ E0
(
pA1
)− pA0 ≤ 2aσ2s
0 ≤ D1 − pA1 ≤ 2aσ2s
Using these four inequalities and equation (2.32) yields the result.
Finally, it is clear that in the full insurance and autarky cases, arbitrageurs do not make
any profit, while they do in any of the monopolistic cases.
Corollaries 20 and 21 Proof. The comparative statics in Corollary 20 obtain by
differentiation from equation (2.33). The first part of Corollary 21 follows immediately. The
second part about aggregate welfare is proved on an example in the text.
Chapter 3
Runs, Asymmetric Price Impact and
Predatory Trading
Abstract: Predatory trading is a strategy whereby some traders (predators) amplify or induce
adverse price movements of an asset to trigger a margin call on a rival trader’s (the prey) position
and gain from her subsequent firesales. Given that predation involves a temporary and artificial
mis-valuation of the asset, shouldn’t smart investors step in and take advantage of predators’ price
pressure? I show that when they anticipate the prey’s firesales, smart investors may actually run on
the asset, strengthening, and to some extent substituting to, the predators’ price pressure. Further,
their reaction leads to a reduction in the prey’s price impact, which decreases her already limited
ability to support the price and avoid a margin call. This negative feedback loop reduces the
cost of predatory trading for predators. The key driver of these results is smart investors’ limited
risk-bearing capacity. Consequently, I find that predatory trading is likely to occur when smart
investors are sufficiently risk-averse or the asset sufficiently risky.
3.1 Introduction
Asset prices can at times exhibit sharp fluctuations. During these episodes, traders marking-
to-market or relying on short-term funding (e.g. hedge funds, broker-dealers, investment
banks) may become distressed and forced to sell assets at firesale prices. In some cases,
it seems that the price movements causing these firesales can be exacerbated by deliberate
strategies from traders seeking to profit from a rival’s financial difficulties. There is evidence
that such predatory trading occurred against LTCM in 1998 (Cai, 2009), and against several
hedge funds during the recent financial crisis, in particular in the aftermath of Bear Stearns’
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and Lehmann Brothers’ collapses1.
Predatory trading strategies consist of two stages. First, some traders (predators) seek
to cause or exacerbate price movements decreasing the marked-to-market value of a rival’s
portfolio. This tightens the prey’s financial constraint, eventually leading to firesales. In
a second stage, the predators gain by exploiting the firesale prices. Hence, on one hand,
predatory trading relies critically on the market being imperfectly liquid: the predators
must be able to move asset prices against the prey, and the prey’s firesales must also affect
prices. On the other hand, market liquidity should also depend on the possibility of predatory
trading. Indeed, smart investors should anticipate that liquidity may temporarily dry up if
a large trader liquidates her positions.2 While predators manipulate the price to push their
rival into distress, do smart investors absorb the predators’ trades, thereby countering the
predators’ impact, or instead run for the exits, thus magnifying the liquidity dry-up?
Existing theories of predatory trading (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, Attari,
Mello and Ruckes, 2005) are largely silent on this issue, because they assume that the
predators and the prey trade with a competitive fringe of long-term value investors, whose
demand is fixed.3 This implies that these investors are less-than-fully rational in that they
disregard future price movements. Without this assumption, it is not clear to which extent
the results of these papers would remain or be qualified. In this paper, I show that predatory
trading may occur even in the presence of smart investors who understand that the asset can
be artificially and temporarily undervalued due to predatory trading-induced price pressure.
Since holding the asset is risky, smart investors’ willingness to “lean against the wind” and
absorb predators’ price pressure is limited by their risk-bearing capacity. Hence even if the
1For instance, in March 2008, Focus Capital, a New York-based hedge fund specialized in mid-caps, was
forced to close in the aftermath of Bear Stearns’ collapse. The Financial Times wrote: “In a letter to
investors, the founders of Focus, Tim OBrien and Philippe Bubb, said it had been hit by ’violent short-
selling by other market participants’, which accelerated when rumours that it was in trouble circulated.” (J.
Mackintosh, FT, 4 March 2008). Similarly, in October 2008, the Financial Times wrote: “Hedge funds prey
on rivals (...) the increasingly cannibalistic activity stems from a wave of redemptions hitting hedge funds ”
(H. Sender, FT, Oct 2008). See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) for additional anecdotal evidence. Cai’s
(2009) paper documents dealers’ predatory behaviour against LTCM in 1998, using a unique dataset of audit
trail transactions.
2The financial constraints of a large trader may be known to other market participants. For instance,
broker-dealers or lenders have information about the positions and balance sheet of large traders. Regulatory
constraints sometimes impose to reveal positions, and although traders’ identities may be concealed, market
participants can often infer the positions of others from this information. For instance, Amaranth’s positions
in the natural gas market became known to other traders, who observed from the exchanges data that a
single market participant had accumulated very large positions in the futures market (Levin and Coleman,
2007).
3That is, long-term value investors in these papers have exogenous downward-sloping demand curves.
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mis-valuation is expected to disappear in the future, smart investors are unwilling to take
unbounded positions ex-ante because it would expose them to too much risk. In fact, I
show that smart investors’ reactions to predatory trading may actually reduce the cost of
predation for predators.4
When the competitive fringe of the market is made of smart, rational investors, the
predators’ and the prey’s price impacts, and more generally market liquidity, not only affect,
but also are affected by the possibility of predatory trading. This two-way relationship can
generate self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups and make predatory trading cheaper. I show that
when smart investors expect the prey to fail in the future, current prices adjust to reflect the
fact that the prey’s firesales will lower the willingness of other market participants to hold
the asset. Further, if investors believe that the prey will fail, she loses price impact and her
trades move prices less than opposite trades by predators. That is, price impact becomes
trader-specific and becomes an increasing function of a large trader’s financial strength -
or at least the smart investors’ perception of it. This reduces the prey’s ability to resist
predatory trading by supporting prices to avoid reporting a low marked-to-market wealth.
Hence the mere anticipation of the prey’s firesale can generate a vicious circle in which
predatory trading causes smart investors to “rush for the exits”, which in turn facilitates
predatory trading.
This negative feedback loop materializes in equilibrium when smart investors are suffi-
ciently risk-averse (or equivalently, if the asset is sufficiently risky). A novel prediction of the
model is thus that the link between market liquidity and a trader ’s funding liquidity depends
on risk-aversion in the market: in times of high risk-aversion, a trader’s price impact becomes
an increasing function of her (perceived) funding liquidity, while with low risk-aversion, a
trader’s price impact is independent of her funding liquidity. This trader-specific prediction
complements the results of the limits of arbitrage literature, which predicts a positive link
between market liquidity (defined as the spread between two identical assets) and aggregate
funding liquidity (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Another
key driver of the equilibrium is the distribution of initial asset ownership. When smart in-
vestors start with a small position in the risky asset, an increase in their position increases
the probability of predation, and decreases it otherwise.
4Note that there are theories of front-running with rational market participants (e.g. Pritsker, 2009),
whereby strategic traders exploit their advanced knowledge of a rival trader’s future liquidation. In this
paper, strategic traders engage in predatory trading, i.e. they induce the need for another trader to liquidate
his positions.
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The model has three periods, with a risky asset and a risk-free asset. There are three
types of market participants: a finite number of predators (e.g. hedge funds, dealers) and
one prey (e.g. another hedge fund), the rest of the market being made of a continuum of
smart competitive investors. The prey faces a financial constraint: She must liquidate her
entire portfolio if her marked-to-market wealth falls below some threshold, e.g. because this
triggers margin calls or redemptions. The prey is initially long the asset, so that her financial
constraint is likely to bind if the asset price falls below a certain threshold. Finally, I assume
that the prey cannot hold more than a certain quantity of the risky asset, i.e. her ability to
lever up is limited.5
Smart investors are risk-averse and seek to oﬄoad a long position in the risky asset in the
market, i.e. they demand liquidity. For brevity, I will therefore refer to them as hedgers.6
The predators and the prey are risk-neutral. Hence, in the absence of financial constraints,
they would provide hedgers with liquidity by buying the asset. However, being finite in
number, they have market power and thus ration liquidity by buying only limited quantities
over time. As a result, the asset trades at a discount relative to its fundamental value, i.e.
it is imperfectly liquid.
Now consider the effect of the prey’s financial constraint. The predators may be tempted
to buy less or even short the risky asset in order to ensure that its price is low enough and
force the prey to liquidate. Such a strategy involves an opportunity cost: since the asset
trades at a discount, the predators would prefer to buy the risky asset by spreading trades
over time. However, there is also a benefit from predatory trading. Indeed, eliminating
the prey reduces the competition in the provision of liquidity, allowing predators to capture
larger rents. Further, the prey’s liquidation itself increases the demand for liquidity, which
benefits the remaining liquidity providers.
I first study the prey’s ability to resist predatory trading by buying the asset in a bid to
support its price. This ability may be limited, first, by her leverage constraint, and second
- and more interestingly - by the hedgers’ anticipations about predatory trading. There are
two effects. First, when hedgers expect the prey to liquidate, price impact becomes trader-
specific (even though all information is symmetric). If the prey buys the asset to support
its price, her trades move the price less than opposite orders by predators. Indeed, hedgers
5Both the limited borrowing capacity and the marked-to-market wealth constraint may stem from agency
frictions arising in the process of delegation of funds by outside investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
6Hedgers may stand for market-makers trying to reduce their inventory, or insurance companies seeking
to sell assets following or in anticipation of downgrades or other regulatory constraints.
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anticipate that for each share they sell to the prey, with some probability, that share will
have to be liquidated in a firesale, reducing future liquidity. Hence selling a share to the
prey provides them with only partial, temporary insurance. This reduces the gains from
trading with the prey. In this sense, the reactions of rational hedgers to the possibility of
predatory trading can be “destabilizing”: the mere anticipation of the prey’s distress reduces
her ability to resist predatory trading.
The second effect is akin to a financial market run: the hedgers are more reluctant to
holding the risky asset when they believe that the prey will be distressed. As a result, they
are ready to sell their endowment at a lower price. This selling pressure can thus turn into
a financial market run, as the hedgers attempt to reduce their asset holdings ahead of the
prey’s firesale.7 If the hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse, their run may even be such that
predators need not sell the asset: it may be enough for them to reduce the quantity of the
asset they buy, i.e. “hoard” liquidity, and let the hedgers’ trading push the prey into distress.
This implies that short-selling bans may be ineffective to prevent predatory trading, and that
there is no direct link between selling an asset and predatory trading.
The hedgers’ risk appetite plays a key role in both effects. Their risk appetite depends
on the size of their initial position, and the slope of their demand curve (i.e. the product of
their risk-aversion and the asset volatility). The change in price impact and the run effect
depend primarily on hedgers’ risk-aversion. If the hedgers hold no initial positions in the
asset, the effects are still present, and is stronger with long positions.
The size of the hedgers’ initial position has a non-monotonic effect on the likelihood of
predatory trading: the likelihood first increases and then decreases with hedgers’ initial
position. This results from two conflicting effects. On the one hand, the hedgers’ behaviour
can decrease the cost (to the predators) of predatory trading, because the hedgers’ run
is stronger. This is especially true if they start with a long position in the risky asset.
On the other hand, the hedgers’ initial position also affects predators’ outside option, which
consists in providing rather than withdrawing liquidity: if hedgers generate significant selling
pressure (if they have a large enough initial position), liquidity provision is very profitable.
As a result, an increase in hedgers’ selling pressure (via an increase in their initial position
in the risky asset) does not necessarily generate more predatory trading.
7The difference between the traditional models of market run (e.g. Bernardo and Welch (2004)) and this
one is that the probability of the liquidity shock is endogenous. The liquidity shock (the prey’s firesale)
depends on the first-period price, which is determined in equilibrium.
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The analysis has implications for regulation and risk-management. The model predicts
that a destabilizing feedback loop can occur when hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse. This
prediction is in line with anecdotal evidence that predatory trading occurs during flights-
to-liquidity episodes (e.g. LTCM in 1998, predatory activity among hedge funds in 2008).
The analysis shows, more precisely, that flight-to-liquidity and predatory trading phenomena
feed each others when hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse. If hedgers’ risk-aversion in utility
proxies for risk-aversion stemming from various constraints limiting the market’s risk-bearing
capacity, the model suggests that to avoid predatory trading, one should attempt to relax
these constraints or provide additional risk-bearing capacity. Since hedgers’ risk-aversion
translates into high permanent price impact, and assuming that it is possible to classify
assets by their coefficient of permanent price impact, another interpretation of the results
is that financially-constrained strategic traders are more exposed to predatory trading risk
when they hold assets with high permanent price impact.
Finally, the model has also implications for the relation between turnover, liquidity and
welfare. The analysis shows that proxying for liquidity by turnover or price impact can
be misleading. In a special case of the model where it is socially optimal not to trade
because initial endowments are Pareto-efficient, I show that the mere presence of the prey’s
financial constraint can induce (predatory) trading and thus a positive turnover. Further,
although liquidity worsens - the asset trades at a larger discount -, the prey’s price impact
decreases. Hence in the presence of large investors, traditional measures of market depth
can be misleading to assess liquidity and welfare.
This paper departs from the recent literature on predatory trading (Brunnemeier and
Pedersen (2005), Attari, Mello and Ruckes (2005), Parida and Venter (2009), Lao´ (2010))
and front-running (Pritsker (2009), Carlin et al. (2007)) by combining the assumption that
all market participants are rational and that the prey’s liquidation depends on her marked-
to-market wealth.8 My analysis shows that rational hedgers’ optimal behaviour can make
predatory trading more likely. My model is close to Pritsker’s, who also considers rational
market participants, but in a setting with exogenous distress, i.e. in which the prey is forced
to liquidate at a given time, independently of her marked-to-market wealth. Considering
endogenous distress allows me to link the hedgers’ optimal behaviour to the probability of
predatory trading. It also generates the novel state-dependent link between market liquidity
and a trader ’s funding liquidity.
8Note that some of these papers include front-running under the umbrella of predatory trading.
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Endogenous distress is also the main difference between this paper and Carlin et al.
(2007) and explains why our findings differ. I find that predatory trading is likely to occur
when the slope of hedgers’ demand curve is steep, while Carlin et al.’s model predicts the
opposite. In my setting, high price impact allows predators to move prices to induce the
prey’s distress. In Carlin et al. (2007), a high price impact allows the prey to retaliate
against predators in a repeated interaction.
Modeling all market participants as rational also allows me to connect the literature
on predatory trading to that on runs in financial markets and more generally destablizing
speculation. The economic force triggering what I call run here is not a sequentiality issue
as in Bernardo and Welch (2004), but the prospect of the prey’s firesale (i.e. a supply
shock) and of the predators’ increased market power. A feature common to our models is
the market’s limited risk-bearing capacity. While Bernardo and Welch assume that hedgers
are myopic, in my setting all market participants are rational and forward-looking. DeLong
et al. (1990)’s model relies on the presence of positive feedback traders. In my model, the
positive feedback stems from the fact that low marked-to-market wealth is followed by the
prey’s liquidation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Section 3.3 studies the
special case where the hedgers have no endowment in the risky asset. Section 3.4 studies the
case with positive endowments. Section 3.5 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs.
3.2 Model
The model has three periods: t = 0, 1, 2, and a risky asset, in finite supply S ≥ 0. It pays off
a dividend D˜2 at t = 2, with D˜2 = D + ˜1 + ˜2, D > 0. The innovations 1 and 2, revealed
at t = 1 and t = 2 respectively, are independent and identically distributed normal variables
with mean 0 and variance σ2. I denote pt the price of the risky asset. There is a risk-free
asset in perfectly elastic supply with return rf normalised to 0.
There are n+1 market participants, divided in two classes: hedgers and strategic traders.
The hedgers are treated as a representative competitive trader (with subscript 0) with ex-
ponential utility over final consumption. Their coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is α. The
hedgers start with an endowment X0−1 ≥ 0 in the risky asset.9. Since they have CARA
9Hedgers may stand for a competitive market-making sector. Their endowment, in this case, represent
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preferences, their initial wealth is irrelevant for the problem, hence I assume without loss of
generality that they start with cash B0−1 = 0.
The hedgers trade with n ≥ 2 risk-neutral strategic traders, who start with endowments
X i−1, i = 1, ..., n, in the risky asset and B
i
−1 in cash. For trader i = 0, 1, ..., n, x
i
t denotes the
time t risky asset trade and X it the end-of-time t position. Strategic traders and the hedgers
face the same dynamic budget constraint:
∀i = 0, 1, ..., n, W i2 = Ci2 = Bi−1 − xi0p0 − xi1p1 +X i1D2 (3.1)
Strategic traders account for the impact of their trades on the price. At time 0 and 1,
the hedgers set their demand for the risky asset as a function of its price, and strategic
traders compete in quantities (a` la Cournot) for the risky asset, taking this demand as
given. Strategic traders can be seen as sophisticated investors such as prop trading desks,
dealers or hedge funds, who have a superior understanding of the trading environment and
the “order-flow”, and therefore internalize the impact of their own trades on the price.10 For
simplicity, strategic traders’ identities are observable, i.e. trading is not anonymous.11
The group of the strategic traders consists of one prey (trader 1, “she”) and n − 1
predators. The prey faces financial constraints, while predators do not. In particular, the
prey is distressed and must liquidate her position in the risky asset when her marked-to-
market wealth is lower than a threshold V:
Assumption 1 If B10 +X
1
0p0 ≤ V , then X11 = 0.
The prey’s liquidation consecutive to a low wealth may follow from large capital outflows as
a response to a poor performance. A number of financial constraints are based on prices,
e.g. VaR constraints, stop-loss thresholds or high-water marks. The relation between past
market-makers’ aggregate inventory, which can result from a temporary order imbalance, in the spirt of
Grossman and Miller (1988). Hedgers may also stand for the demand of two groups of local traders subject
to endowment shocks in segmented markets, as in Gromb and Vayanos (2002).
10For instance, investment banks often have a good understanding of the order-flow. Similarly, Perold
reports that LTCM “believed that most of its trading opportunities arose as a result of dislocations in the
financial markets caused by institutional demands”. The hedge fund “would build models to find mispricings
created by such demands, but would also identify the reason for the mispricing before initiating a trade”
(Perod (1999)).
11See Foucault et al. (2003) and references therein for a description of non-anonymous trading environ-
ments . I discuss further the role of this assumption in the model in Section 3.3.3.
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performance and fund flows has been documented for both equity and debt financing.12
Agency concerns resulting from the delegation of funds from investors to strategic traders
can rationalize this behaviour: Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show that a termination threat
can arise as a disciplining device in an optimal contract, even if it exposes the agent to
predation risk.
In addition to the marked-to-market wealth constraint, the prey faces a leverage con-
straint. She cannot take a position X10 larger than X¯.
13
Assumption 2 X10 ≤ X¯
For simplicity, I assume that predators are cash-rich or able to secure better funding condi-
tions and do not face any financial constraints.14
Given that all market participants are informed about the prey’s constraints, they take
into account the possibility of her being distressed in their maximization problems. The
hedgers choose trades x00 and x
0
1 to maximize their utility subject to their dynamic budget
constraint, while taking prices and the prey’s constraints as given. Their problem is given
by:
max
x00,x
0
1
−E0 exp
[−αC02]
s.t. C02 = B
0
−1 − x00p0 − x01p1 +X01D2
B10 +X
1
0p0 ≤ V ⇒ X11 = 0
X10 ≤ X¯
Strategic traders maximize their expected wealth by choosing trades xit (t = 0, 1 and
i = 1, ..., n), subject to their dynamic budget constraint, the price schedule which results
from the hedgers’ demand and market-clearing, and the prey’s financial constraints. The
12For instance, open-end mutual funds experiencing large outflows after a string of poor returns exert
significant price pressure in equity markets (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Coval and Stafford (2007)). The
repo market is also prone to runs (see, e.g. Gorton and Metrick (2010)).
13X¯ may depend on the prey’s initial cash, the first period price, and be correlated with the severity of
the wealth constraint.
14Strategic traders such as hedge funds may have some leeway in chosing their capital structure. For
instance, some hedge funds are able to impose better lock-up periods or gates to their investors than their
rivalsand is optimal differentiation in strategic traders’ capital structure can arise in equilibrium in an optimal
contract setting (Hombert and Thesmar (2009)).
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optimization problem of a strategic trader is given by
∀i = 1, ..., n, max
xi0,x
i
1
E0
[
W i2
]
s.t. Ci2 = B
i
−1 − xi0p0 − xi1p1 +X i1D2
hedgers demand at t = 0, 1
market− clearing at t = 0, 1
B10 +X
1
0p0 ≤ V ⇒ X11 = 0
X10 ≤ X¯
Since each strategic trader has price impact and is informed about the prey’s financial
constraints, these constraints enter not only the prey’s optimisation problem, but also that
of her rival strategic traders.
Strategic traders have a higher apetite for risk than hedgers. Hence, absent financial
constraints, trading is motivated by the hedgers being (strictly) long the risky asset. In
that case, the hedgers would oﬄoad some of the risk of this position onto the risk-neutral
strategic traders. To isolate the effect of the financial constraint in the model, and show
how it leads to predatory trading, I start with a special case, in which the hedgers do not
initially hold the risky asset.
3.3 Predatory trading vs no trading
In this section, I solve the model in the case where the hedgers have no initial position in the
risky asset (i.e. X0−1 = 0), which implies that the strategic traders initially hold all the asset
supply. With no risks to hedge, there should be no trading. However, the presence of the
financial constraint may generate predatory trading, in particular if the hedgers have a low
risk-bearing capacity. In the predatory trading equilibrium, the traders’ financial strength
(or at least the hedgers’ perception of it) affects their price impact. In particular, I show
that the prey’s price impact decreases, while the predators’ increases, which reduces the
probability of survival of the prey.
3.3.1 Liquidity rationing during firesales
Since she is initially long the asset, the prey becomes distressed when the price of the asset
at time 0 is low. In particular, by rearranging the terms in the marked-to-market wealth
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constraint, one can see that the prey is in distress when the price falls below p¯0, where p¯0,
the prey’s distress threshold, is given by
p¯0 ≡ V −B
1
−1
X1−1
(3.2)
Note that the higher the distress threshold is, the more exposed the prey is to a forced
liquidation. The threshold is increasing in V, which measures the severity of the constraint,
and decreasing in the amount of cash the prey initially holds, B1−1. I assume that parameters
are such that 0 < p¯0 < D, i.e.
Assumption 3 0 < X1−1D < V −B1−1
This assumption implies that the prey remains solvent if the asset trades at its expected
value. At time 1, all market participants are aware of whether the prey is in distress or not.
The following lemma summarizes the equilibrium at time 1, depending on whether the prey
is distressed or not.
Lemma 28 When the prey is solvent, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium at time 1,
given by:
∀i = 1, ..., n, xi1 =
−∑nj=1 xj0
n+ 1
(3.3)
When the prey is distressed, the unique equilibrium at time 1 is given by:
x11 = −X10
∀i = 2, ..., n, xi1 =
(
X1−1 + x
1
0
)−∑nj=1 xj0
n
(3.4)
Equation (3.3) shows that when the prey is solvent, strategic traders trade in the opposite
direction to the time 0 aggregate order flow,
∑n
j=1 x
j
0. Note that because of imperfect
competition, the total order nx1 does not completely offset the time-0 aggregate order-flow:
|∑nj=1 xj1| ≤ | −∑nj=1 xj0|. If the prey is distressed, she no longer behaves strategically and
liquidates her position by submitting an order x11 = −X10 at the prevailing market price. In
other words, the prey behaves as a liquidity trader. Equation (3.4) shows that the predators
take the opposite side of her trade and of the previous aggregate order flow,
∑n
j=1 x
j
0. They
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do so, however, only to a certain extent. Indeed, the predators gain market power and can
thus limit further the quantity they trade. This can be seen by comparing equations (3.3)
and (3.4): for a given supply, strategic traders’ aggregate order at time 1 is a fraction n
n+1
of the supply in the no-distress case and n−1
n
of the supply in the distress case, with for all
n ≥ 2, n
n+1
> n−1
n
. I denote this effect the rationing of liquidity provision. It implies that,
during a firesale, the predators do not completely offset the selling/ buying pressure of the
distressed prey. Hence, in equilibrium, the hedgers will have to absorb some of the prey’s
asset firesale. Because there is still uncertainty at time 1 about the fundamental value of the
asset, the hedgers are unwilling to hold large quantities. Therefore, at time 0, the hedgers
take into account the possibility of the prey’s distress when setting their demand.
3.3.2 Run and asymmetric (trader-specific) price impact
Since hedgers understand that predators will ration liquidity further during firesales, their
demand changes depending on whether they expect a firesale or not at time 1. This affects the
properties of the price schedule (i.e. the inverted demand schedule combined with market-
clearing) faced by the predators and the prey at time 0.
Lemma 29 Let pnd0 and p
d
0 denote the price schedule when hedgers expect no-distress and
distress, respectively. The price schedule depends on the hedgers’ beliefs about future distress
as follows:
pnd0 = D + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
n∑
i=1
xi0 (3.5)
pd0 = D + β
n∑
j=1
xj0 + β
1
n
(
n∑
j=1
xj0 −X10
)
(3.6)
Strategic traders’ identities are public information, hence, using the dynamics of asset hold-
ings, X10 = X
1
−1 + x
1
0, equation (3.6) can be rewritten as:
pd0 = D − β
1
n
X1−1 + β
n+ 1
n
n∑
j=2
xi0 + βx
1
0 (3.7)
Comparing equations (3.5) and (3.7) shows that when the hedgers believe that the prey
will be distressed, price impact becomes trader-specific. In particular, the prey’s trades now
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move the price less than predators’, while all traders have the same price impact when the
hedgers expect no distress.
The intuition for this result is that the price impact coefficients reflect the differential
marginal gains from trading across different types of strategic traders. If the hedgers think
that the prey will have to liquidate and anticipate that they will have to hold some of the
prey’s position in equilibrium (equation (3.4)), they believe that they will gain marginally
less from, say, selling to the prey than to predators at time 0. Indeed, selling to predators
has some advantage in terms of hedging: predators will keep this asset until time 2, i.e. until
the asset pays off and returns to perfect liquidity. This is not the case when selling to the
prey: if the hedgers are right, the asset sold at time 0 to the prey will return to the market
at time 1, while the predators will ration liquidity.
Further, equation (3.6) shows that hedgers are now ready to sell the risky asset at a lower
price than when they believe that the prey will stay in the market. For instance, consider
the following thought experiment: suppose that all strategic traders buy xˆ ≥ 0 in both cases.
The overal impact of the trades is β n
2+n−1
n
xˆ in the (anticipated) distress case, and β n
2+2n
n+1
xˆ
in the no-distress case. Since n
2+2n
n+1
> n
2+n−1
n
, and given that the constant is lower in the
bad scenario, the same purchase translates into a lower price in the distress case than in
the no-distress case. The intuition is simply that, in anticipation of the firesale, hedgers are
unwilling to hold a long position in the risky asset.
Another way to gain intuition in this effect is to assume that predators and the prey do
not trade at time 0, ∀i = 1, .., n, xi0 = 0. Then if the hedgers believe that the prey will be
solvent, the price is pnd0 = D. Since all the asset supply is initially the hands of the predators
and the prey, who are risk-neutral, the price must coincide with the expected value of the
asset. If the hedgers anticipate the prey to be distressed, the price is pd0 = D−βX−1n . That is,
the hedgers, anticipate that the prey will have to liquidate her position, X1−1 > 0, and that
because of the predators’ liquidity rationing, they will have to hold some of this additional
supply. Hence the price adjusts downwards at time 0 in anticipation of this supply shock.
In particular, the more concentrated the market is (i.e. the smaller n), and / or the more
risk-averse the hedgers are, the larger the discount the price will exhibit at time 0. More
concentration means that a tighter rationing of liquidity in the future, which will force the
hedgers to absorb more of the supply. Of course, their valuation for holding the additional
supply of risky asset decreases with their risk-aversion.I summarize these results as follows:
Lemma 30 When the hedgers expect the prey to be in distress at t = 1,
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• they are ready to sell at a lower price than when they expect no distress [run] :
pnd0 (xˆ) > p
d
0 (xˆ) , x
1
0 = x
j
0 = xˆ ≥ 0, j = 2, ..., n
• the prey has less price impact than predators [asymmetric price impact] :
∀j = 2, ..., n, ∂p
nd
0 /∂x
j
0
∂pnd0 /∂x
1
0
<
∂pd0/∂x
j
0
∂pd0/∂x
1
0
Note that the run effect is stronger when the prey has a large initial position in the risky
asset, since all else equal, its liquidation will hurt the hedgers more in case of distress. The
fact that price schedules depend on the hedgers’ expectations about the prey’s distress has
important consequences for the equilibrium determination: the predators’ ability to move
the price (and the prey’s ability to counter them) vary depending on the hedgers’ beliefs
about future distress.
3.3.3 Equilibria
Taking hedgers’ beliefs as given, I determine conditions under which no trading and predatory
trading arise in equilibrium.
No trading
Suppose that hedgers anticipate no trading, and thus no distress.15 It is never in the interest
of the prey, who is risk-neutral, to exit the market. The predators, however, may have
an incentive to deviate from the no-trading situation to push the prey into distress. This is
costly, because it requires to manipulate the price and tighten the prey’s financial constraint.
But a deviating predator may benefit from the increase in the asset supply resulting from
the prey’s firesale, and the decrease in competition among the remaining strategic traders.
Predators’ trade-off. Since all predators have price impact, each of them recognizes he
is pivotal for the outcome of the game. Deviating from the no-trading strategy can be
profitable, however, only if this leads to the prey’s distress, which require to push the price
15From equation (3.5), if all strategic traders do not trade (i.e. submit orders xi0 = 0), the asset will trade
at the fundamental value - and therefore the prey will not be distressed.
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to p¯0. A predator thus faces a trade-off between manipulating the price and gaining from
the prey’s firesale. The predator’s problem is:
∀i = 2, ..., n, maxxi0 E0
(
Bi−1 − xi0p0 + CT i1
)
s.t. pnd0 = D + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
n∑
i=1
xi0
∀j 6= i, xj0 = 0
p0 ≤ p¯0 ⇒ x11 = −X1−1
CT i1 denotes the continuation payoff of the predator, which is contingent on the prey’s
distress. From equations (3.3) and (3.4), I get:
CT i1 =
 X i0D +
(−
∑
j 6=i x
j
0−xi0)
2
(n+1)2
if p0 > p¯0
X i0D +
(X1−1−
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0−xi0)
2
n2
if p0 ≤ p¯0
Using the price schedule and the conjectured strategy for the other strategic traders, the
predator’s problem can be rewritten as follows:
∀i = 2, ..., n, max
xi0
Ei−1 + β
−n+ 2n+ 1 (xi0)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
t = 0 cost
+
(−xi0)2
(n+ 1)2
Ip0>p¯0︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit if solvent
+
(
X1−1 − xi0
)2
n2
Ip0≤p¯0︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit if distressed
 ,
with Ei−1 = B
i
−1 +X
i
−1D, the expected value of the predator’s endowment, and Ic a dummy
variable that equals one when the condition c is satisfied. This maximization problem illus-
trates the predator’s trade-off. If the predator chooses xi0 = 0, the price will be above the
prey’s distress threshold p¯0, and the predator’s profit is thus 0
16. If the predator chooses to
push the price down to p¯0, he can benefit at time 1 from the decreased competition and the
prey’s firesale - the numerator of the profit in the distressed case is n2 instead of (n+ 1)2,
and the numerator increases by X1−1 > 0, the prey’s initial position in the asset. However,
to trigger the prey’s distress, he must short the asset, and this involves a quadratic cost at
time 0, n+2
n+1
(xi0)
2
.
16Note that since ∀n ≥ 2, n+2n+1 > 1(n+1)2 , all other strategies leading to p0 > p¯0 are dominated by xi0 = 0.
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Ruling out “self-fulfilling” distress. By inspecting the maximization problem, one can
also see that the prey’s distress can be “self-fulfilling”. Namely, ex-ante, it is optimal to take
a short position in the asset if one expects a negative supply shock in the future (i.e. the
prey’s firesale).17 Since the predators’ trades affect prices, the anticipation by a predator
that the prey will be distressed at time 1 may indeed lead to a price below p¯0 and trigger
the prey’s distress. The self-fulfilling distress can be defined more formally as follows:
Definition 2 Suppose that strategic traders −i choose x−i0 = 0. The prey’s distress is self-
fulfilling if p0 (xˆ
i
0) ≤ p¯0, where
xˆi0 = arg max
xi0
Ei−1 + β
[
−n+ 2
n+ 1
(
xi0
)2
+
(
X1−1 − xi0
)2
n2
]
To focus on predatory trading as a strategy aiming at eliminating a rival trader, I rule out
self-fulfilling distress by imposing the following condition throughout:
Lemma 31 There is no self-fulfilling distress if and only if β < β¯nd, where
β¯nd =
D − p¯0
hnX1−1
, with hn =
n+ 2
n3 − 2n2 − n+ 1
On this parameter interval, inducing distress requires a predator to trade
xi0 =
n+ 1
n+ 2
p¯0 −D
β
< 0 (3.8)
To rule out self-fulfilling distress, one must focus on situations in which the hedgers’ demand
curve has a flat enough slope, i.e. if β < β¯nd. Intuitively, in this case, the price is not
responsive enough to trades, such that a short position taken by a trader anticipating distress
does not automatically lead to the prey’s firesale. The predator’s order, given by equation
(3.8) is just enough to push the price to p¯0.
17More specifically, if the predator “anticipates” the prey’s distress, he expects an increase in the asset
supply and less competition in the future. Therefore the marginal cost of buying one more unit at time 1
decreases. Hence it is optimal for the predator to buy less at time 0 (i.e. here, short the asset) and exploit
the negative price pressure exerted by the prey’s firesale at time 1.
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Proposition 18 There exists a no-trading equilibrium in which the prey remains solvent if
and only if β < β
nd
, with 0 < β
nd
< β¯nd. Equilibrium prices are:
p0 = D (3.9)
p1 = D + 1 (3.10)
This result shows that the no-trading equilibrium holds in the presence of financial con-
straints only if the slope of the hedgers’ demand curve is flat enough. Intuitively, if the slope
is steep, a predator can easily move the price against the prey - see equation (3.5) - and this
reduces the cost of predation - equation (3.8). Further, a steep slope means that hedgers are
reluctant to bear risk (or equivalently that the asset is very risky), implying that the firesale
exerts a strong negative pressure on the price at time 1.
Predatory trading
I now assume that the hedgers believe at time 0 that the prey will be distressed in the future.
As shown above, the price schedule in this case is:
pd0 = D + β
n∑
j=1
xj0 + β
1
n
(
n∑
j=1
xj0 −X10
)
(3.11)
I conjecture that there exists an equilibrium with predatory trading in which the prey’s and
the predators’ strategies are given by:
x10 = X¯ −X1−1 (3.12)
∀i = 2, ..., n, xi0 =
1
n− 1
[
X1−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
with R = p¯0 −D (3.13)
These strategies are constructed in a way that, in equilibrium, (i) it is too costly for the
prey to stay in the market (i.e. keep the price above p¯0); (ii) in particular, the prey’ leverage
constraint is binding, and (iii) the predators push the price to the distress threshold p¯0.
Further, I continue to assume that the prey’s distress is not self-fulfilling. Since the price
schedule is different, the condition under which one can rule out self-fulfilling distress are
also slightly different:
Lemma 32 Denote a = X¯
X1−1
the prey’s leverage capacity (i.e. a ≥ 1). Predatory trading is
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• never self-fulfilling if a > a¯n, where ∀n ≥ 2, a¯n > 1.
• not self-fulfilling if and only if β < β¯d, if a ≤ a¯n, where
β¯d =
D − p¯0
ρ0,n−1X1−1 − dnX¯
,with a¯n =
(n+1)2
n2−n+2
The lemma shows that the prey’s distress can not stem from a self-fulfilling predatory trading
strategy if her leverage capacity, a, is large enough. If the prey has enough dry powder, she
does not “automatically” fall into distress, because her trades support the price sufficiently.
If the prey has little dry powder, i.e. a low, the prey’s distress is not self-fulfilling as long as
the hedgers’ demand curve is not too steep, i.e. if the price is not too responsive to trades.
The prey’s problem. The predators’ strategy implies that it is too costly for the prey
to stay in the market: holding more that X¯ in a bid to push the price above p¯0 and avoid
distress is infinitely costly for the prey. As a result, the prey’s problem is to maximize the
proceeds of liquidating her holdings. Taking predators’ strategy as given, the prey’s problem
is:
max
x10
B1−1 − x10
[
p¯0 − β
(
X¯ −X1−1 − x10
)]
+X10
[
D − β 1
n+ 1
(
X¯ − R
β
)]
The prey’s liquidation problem involves a simple trade-off between liquidating at time 0 at
p¯0−β
(
X¯ −X1−1 − x10
)
, or at time 1 at (on average) D−β 1
n+1
(
X¯ − R
β
)
. Of course, the prey’s
trade moves the price. If she starts selling from time 0, she will push the price below her
distress threshold p¯0. At time 1, however, the average price depends on the prey’s position
only through predators’ strategy, i.e. X¯ in this case. This is because trades impact the price
permanently.18 Since the prey exactly offsets her time 0 position, X10 = X
1
−1 + x
1
0, at t = 1,
her time 0 trade has no effect on the equilibrium price at time 1. It is optimal for the prey
to be fully leveraged under the following condition:
Lemma 33 (prey’s optimal liquidation strategy) The prey’s best response to predators’ con-
jectured strategy is x10 = X¯ −X1−1 if β < βF , with βF = D−p¯0n+2
n
X¯−n+1
n
X1−1
.
When β ≥ βF , the prey’s trade is nn+1 D−p¯0β + n2(n+1)X¯− 12X1−1, i.e. the prey either buys a small
amount (if n
n+1
D−p¯0
β
+ n
2(n+1)
X¯ ≥ 1
2
X1−1) or starts liquidating her position. It is easy to see
18This can be seen from equation (3.28) in the appendix.
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that this leads to a price below p¯0. This strategy, combined with the predators’ conjectured
strategy, cannot form an equilibrium: the predators would have an incentive to deviate and
sell a bit less while keeping the price below p¯0, because their benefit would be unchanged.
19
Similarly, there cannot be an equilibrium in which the strategies are such that the prey holds
less than X¯, the predators more than equation (3.13), and the price is less than or equal to
p¯0. In this case, the prey would have an incentive, and enough financial slack, to deviate
and outbid predators in order to stay in the market. Hence, the only possible predatory
equilibrium strategies are those given by equations (3.12)-(3.13). From Lemma 32 and 33,
the relevant parameter space for these strategies is β ∈ ]0, β¯d ∧ βF [. I show in the appendix
that in the special case where X0−1 = 0, βF < β¯d, so that the relevant interval is β ∈ ]0, βF [.
Equilibrium. In the conjectured equilibrium strategy, the prey is fully leveraged and has
no interest in holding less than X¯ (since β < βF ). Hence it is enough to analyze predators’
trade-off to determine the equilibrium conditions. Using the same notations as before, and
the results of the preliminary analysis, I get the trade-off faced by a predator:
∀i = 2, ..., n, max
xi0
E1−1 + β
[
x0
n+ 1
n
(
X1−1 −
n∑
j=2,j 6=i
xj0 − xi0
)]
+β
(
−∑nj=2,j 6=i xj0 − xi0)2
(n+ 1)2
Ip0>p¯0
+β
(
X1−1 −
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0 − xi0
)2
n2
Ip0≤p¯0 (3.14)
s.t. ∀j 6= i, xj0 =
1
n− 1
[
X1−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
The first line of the maximand shows that, at time 0, the predator faces a quadratic cost,
β n+1
n
(xi0)
2
. The second line represents the benefit from deviating from the predatory attack.
Since other predators’ trades exert negative pressure on the price,
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0 is different
from zero. If the predator joins the attack, he will, however, benefit from the firesale and
the reduced competition in liquidity provision at time 1. Thus a predator “trades-off” the
negative price pressure exerted by other predators at time 0,
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0, against the future
price pressure exerted by the prey in the following period. If the predator decides to buy
while other predators attack the prey, he will rescue the prey, and therefore loses the benefit
19Hence, a more “continuous” constraint, in which the amount of selling would depend on the severity of
the price drop, may lead to some early liquidation for the prey.
164CHAPTER 3. RUNS, ASYMMETRIC PRICE IMPACT AND PREDATORY TRADING
of the firesale.20 The equilibrium is as follows:
Proposition 19 There exists a predatory trading equilibrium characterized by equations
(3.12)-(3.13) iff β ∈
[
β
d
∧ βF , βF
[
, with β
d
> 0.
The intuition for this result is simple. If the hedgers’ demand curve is steep enough, inducing
the prey’s distress is not too costly, hence predators engage in predatory trading against the
prey. Further, in this case, the prey’s firesale is likely to exert strongly negative price pressure,
since the hedgers have a limited risk-bearing capacity.
The following comparative static obtains:
Corollary 23 The equilibrium threshold β
d
is lower when the prey is more exposed to the
risk of forced liquidation (high V) or has less cash (low B1−1).
If the prey is more constrained, the cost of the predatory trading strategy is lower, hence
the condition on β is less strict.
Since the interval
[
β
d
∧ βF , βF
[
is potentially empty, there can be a concern about the
existence of this equilibrium. More generally, given that equilibria depend on the hedgers’
beliefs, both types of equilibria may coexist, reducing the predictive ability of the model. To
illustrate the results and address these concerns, I study a numerical example.
Coexistence of no-trading and predatory trading equilibria
From Proposition 18 and 19, I get:
Proposition 20 When X0−1 = 0,
• The no-trading equilibrium is the only equilibrium for β ∈
]
0,min
(
βF , βd, βnd
)]
.
• It coexists with the predatory trading equilibrium on
]
min
(
βF , βd, βnd
)
,min
(
βF , βd, βnd
)[
.
• Predatory trading is the only equilibrium on
[
min
(
βF , βd, βnd
)
, βF
[
.
20I show this point formally in the proof of Proposition 19. Observe also, that since each predator
is pivotal, there is no possibility of free-riding on the attack of other predators, especially because the
conjectured predatory trading strategies are such that the first-period price reaches exactly p¯0. Predatory
trading requires full coordination of the predators in the model.
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To understand further in which circumstances equilibria may coexist and when predatory
trading is the only equilibrium, I consider:
β¯d − βF = D − p¯0
X¯
f (n, a)
where the function f is given by equation (3.86) in the appendix. The predatory trading
equilibrium is the only equilibrium on a non-empty interval if f (n, a) > 0. Since f is
monotonically increasing in a, the function implicitly defines a cutoff a∗ (n) such that:
f (n, a∗ (n)) = 0
Hence the predatory trading equilibrium exists if a ≤ a∗ (n). Panel (a) of Figure 1 plots the
cutoff a∗ (red dotted line), and shows that the predatory trading equilibrium exists when
both the number of predators and the prey’s leverage capacity are small. Intuitively, if
there are many predators, fierce competition during the prey’s firesale will quickly erode
the benefit of predatory trading - and more quickly than it decreases the cost per predator.
Hence coordination on the predatory trading equilibria is more difficult to obtain. When
the prey has a high leverage capacity, the cost of inducing distress is high, hence predatory
trading is less likely.
The panel (a) of Figure 1 also features a second cutoff aˆ∗ (n) defined as
g (n, aˆ∗ (n)) = 0,where β
nd
− β
d
= D−p¯0
X¯
g (n, a)
Since g is monotonically decreasing in a, the no-trading and predatory trading equilibria
coexist (that is, β
nd
> β¯d) when a ≥ aˆ∗ (n), i.e. in the region above the full dark blue
line. Hence, it is only when the prey is very constrained in terms of leverage, and the group
of predators very concentrated that predatory trading is the only equilibrium. The model
therefore delivers a clear prediction in this case, in spite of the self-fulfilling nature of the
equilibria.
In the region defined by a ≤ aˆ∗ (n), the model produces the “net” probability of predatory
trading (i.e. excluding the region where both equilibria coexist). The following comparative
obtains:
Corollary 24 Suppose that a ≤ aˆ∗ (n) and denote q (n, a) = 1− βnd
βF
. q decreases linearly in
a, the prey’s leverage capacity.
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It is costly to engage in predatory trading against the prey if she has a lot of dry powder.
Hence the probability of predatory trading q decreases in a. To understand the effect of the
number of predators, I plot q in Panel (b) of Figure 1. The graph shows that the probability
decreases with n, the number of predators, and decreases faster when n is small, a non-linear
effect. This is because the benefit of predatory trading decreases as 1
n2
.
3.3.4 Changing liquidity and the cost of predatory trading
The cost of predatory trading is to push the asset price to the prey’s liquidation threshold
p¯0, while there are no other motives to trade, if only to short the asset, which has a positive
expected payoff. Hence we can define the cost of predation as the distance between the
predators’ aggregate trade Q =
∑n
i=2 x
i
0 and zero. To understand how the change in price
schedule affects the cost of predatory trading, it is interesting to compare the cost that
prevails when the hedgers (correctly) anticipate distress, and the cost that predators would
have to bear if the hedgers mistakenly believed that the prey will not liquidate. To make
this comparison, I fix the prey’s strategy and assume that she is fully leveraged, as it is a
feature of any predatory equilibrium.21
Lemma 34 Suppose X10 = X¯, and let Q
d denote the cost of trading when hedgers anticipate
distress and Qnd when they do not. For all parameter values, predators must short less when
the hedgers anticipate distress, Qd ≥ Qnd, with Qnd < 0.
This result shows that it becomes cheaper for predators to push the prey into distress when
hedgers anticipate that the prey will eventually be forced to liquidate her positions. Each
unit bought by the prey pushes up the price less than an opposite order by a predator. The
asymmetric price impact reflects the hedgers’ perceptions of the different traders’ financial
strength. It depends on the prey’s financial condition being known by other traders. Al-
though this effect has not been tested yet, there is some incidental evidence in Cai (2009),
who finds that LTCM’ price impact was on average lower in the months before receiving
margin calls in September 1998 than during the crisis itself.
Another interesting implication of the change in liquidity is that the size of the prey’s
initial position has an ambiguous effect on predators’ time 0 trade, i.e. on the cost of
21The condition for this strategy to be optimal given that predators engage in predation would be different.
In particular the interval on which this strategy is optimal would decrease. Denoting β˜F the threshold under
the incorrect beliefs, I show in the proof of Lemma 34 that β˜F < βF . I also show that β¯
d > ˜¯βd, i.e. there is
a larger interval under which distress is not self-fulfilling. Because equilibrium conditions change, my result
is about the cost of predatory trading, and not the probability of predatory trading.
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predatory trading:
Corollary 25 Denote X¯ = aX1−1, with a ≥ 1. Then from equation (3.13), the effect of a
change in the prey’s initial size on predators’ aggregate order Qd is:
∂Qd
∂X1−1
= 1︸︷︷︸
run effect >0
+
n
n+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
diff. price impact “multiplier” < 1
[
−a+ 1
β
∂R
∂X1−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
collateral effect <0
where R = p¯0 −D.
Corollary 25 describes the impact of a small change in the prey’s position on the amount
predators must trade to push her into distress. The corollary shows that holding a large
position in the risky asset may either decrease or increase the cost of predatory trading.
Holding a large position strengthens the run effect, because the hedgers anticipate a larger
firesale in the following period, and the price has to adjust further downwards ex-ante. This
makes it easier for predators to trigger financial distress. At the same time, a larger position
means that the prey is richer and that her distress threshold is lower - see equation (3.2),
which makes predatory trading more costly. Interestingly, the run effect is 1, while the
collateral effect is multiplied by n
n+1
< 1. This is a consequence of the decrease in price
impact the prey experiences in this regime. Hence the decrease in price impact reduces the
benefit of holding a large position.
3.3.5 Implications for liquidity measures
Our analysis has interesting implications for liquidity measures and liquidity proxies. First,
from the example above, it is clear that turnover cannot be used as a proxy for liquidity.
In the absence of the prey’s financial constraints, it is optimal not to trade since the more
risk-tolerant investors (the prey and the predators) initially hold the entire asset supply.
In that sense, the mere presence of the financial constraint generates “excessive” trading
volume. There is a large literature on trading volume and excess trading volume. Hetero-
geneous information (e.g. Karpoff, 1986) or career concerns (Dasgupta and Prat, 2006) can
increase trading volume, among other mechanisms. Here it is the financial constraint and
the possibility of default that leads to an increase in trading volume. Interestingly, it is
precisely when risk-aversion is high, that is when hedgers are the most unwilling to hold the
asset that they end up with some in their hands.
As shown in Lemma 29, predators’ price impact increases and the prey’s decreases in the
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predatory trading equilibrium relative to the no-trading equilibrium. Further, the aggregate
price impact decreases in the sense that if all traders submit the same order, it pushes up
the price less when the hedgers expect a firesale than when they do not. In spite of this, one
cannot conclude that the market is more liquid. In our context, trading volume and market
depth can thus be misleading indicators of market liquidity. The only consistent measure is
the deviation of the transaction price from the risk-neutral value of the asset E (D2).
3.4 Predatory trading vs liquidity provision
I now move on to the case where the hedgers start with a long position in the risky asset,
i.e. X0−1 > 0. Strategic traders hold the remainder of the supply, and the prey has a
long initial position X1−1 > 0. The main effect of strictly positive endowments for the
hedgers is to introduce a trading motive between strategic traders and hedgers based on
risk-sharing. Thus the no-trading equilibrium is replaced by an equilibrium with imperfect
liquidity provision but no distress. In addition, I show that (i) the run effect increases with
the hedgers’ endowment, decreasing the cost of pushing the prey into distress for predators.
At the same time, an increase in the hedgers’ endowment increases the benefit of providing
liquidity to the hedgers. Because of these conflicting effects, an increase in the hedgers’
endowment has an ambiguous impact on the probability of predatory trading. (ii) Run and
predatory trading can be so mutually-reinforcing that predators may not have to sell in
order to induce the prey’s distress: it may be enough for them to hoard liquidity and let the
hedgers’ run decrease the price.
3.4.1 Equilibria
Liquidity provision
I conjecture that there exists an equilibrium in which all strategic traders buy the asset from
the hedgers, thereby providing them with liquidity (that is allowing them to swap the risky,
illiquid asset for the safe, liquid asset).
Proposition 21 Suppose 0 < β < β¯nd. On this interval, there exists a unique (symmetric)
no-distress equilibrium given by
∀i = 1, ..., n, xi0 = c0,nX0−1 (3.15)
xi1 = c1,nX
0
−1 (3.16)
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iff β < β
nd
∧ β¯nd and c0,nX0−1 ≤ X¯ −X1−1.
Equilibrium prices are:
p0 = D − βρ0,nX0−1 > p¯0 (3.17)
p1 = D + 1 − βρ1,nX0−1 (3.18)
with, ∀n ≥ 1, c0,n > c1,n, ρ0,n > ρ1,n, n (c0,n + c1,n) < 1.
The coefficients c0,n, c1,n, ρ0,n and ρ1,n are given by equations (3.42)-(1.51), and the
thresholds β
nd
and β¯nd by equations (3.56) and (3.47) in the appendix.
The equilibrium conditions on β given in Proposition 21 are similar to those of Proposition
18, except that the thresholds β
nd
and β¯nd are now evaluated for X
0
−1 > 0.
22 The condition
c0,nX
0
−1 ≤ X¯ −X1−1 ensures that the equilibrium strategy is feasible for the prey, in spite of
her leverage constraint.
The equilibrium has two main features. First, strategic traders ration liquidity in the
market. In total, they buy an amount n (c0,n + c1,n)X
0
−1, which is lower than the hedgers
endowment (n (c0,n + c1,n) < 1, ∀n ≥ 2). This follows from the oligopolistic nature of the
liquidity supply side of the market. Nevertheless, the liquidity rationing is not such that
the prey is distressed: the equilibrium price is above p¯0. Second, strategic traders buy the
asset slowly, i.e. they spread their trades over both periods. Since trades move prices in
a permanent manner, a strategic trader lowers his average purchase price by splitting up
trades. However, even with limited competition, there is some pressure to buy ahead of
other strategic traders while the price is low. As a consequence, the first period trade is
higher than the second period trade: c0,n > c1,n for all n ≥ 2, and even more so as n
increase, as shown by Figure 1.4.
While strategic traders do not engage in predatory trading for β ≤ β¯nd, the market is
not perfectly liquid on this parameter interval. The risky asset trades at a discount because
of imperfect competition and the ensuing rationing of liquidity provision. This discount
decreases over time because of the gradual purchases of the strategic traders, and varies as
follows:
Corollary 26 The illiquidity discount in period t is Γt = Et (D2) − pt = βρt,nX0−1 > 0
(t = 0, 1).
22I should have written β¯0ND in the zero-endowment case of the previous section. I use the same notations
in this section, by a slight abuse of notation.
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• At each period, the discount is larger for a higher risk-aversion coefficient α, a higher
riskiness of the asset σ2, a larger hedging need X0−1, a smaller number n of strategic
traders.
• The discount decreases faster when n is small.
The effect of the number of strategic traders on the speed at which the discount decreases
is illustrated by Figure 1.4. The slow adjustment of the price is typical of a “gradual
arbitrage”, as in Oehmke (2010), except that the illiquidity of the market is endogenous in
the present setting. The main driver of this phenomenon is imperfect competition. The
perfect competition case, which obtains in the limit case n → ∞, offers an interesting
benchmark:
Corollary 27 When n → ∞, the strategic traders’ total first period purchase converges to
X0−1, the hedgers endowment. Their second period total purchases converges to 0. As a
consequence, the illiquidity discount goes to 0, strategic traders’ trading profits go to 0 and
the hedgers certainty equivalent converges to the expected value of his endowment.
Hence when perfect competition among strategic traders obtains, the market becomes per-
fectly liquid.
Predatory trading
Price schedule. Suppose that the hedgers believe that the prey will be in distress at time
1, then the price schedule is:
pd0 = D − β
n+ 1
n
X0−1 − β
1
n
X1−1 + β
n+ 1
n
n∑
i=2
xi0 + βx
1
0 (3.19)
Equation (3.19) shows that the constant of the price schedule decreases when hedgers have
positive endowment. Hence I obtain the following comparative static:
Corollary 28 The run effect is stronger when hedgers have a positive endowment in the
risky asset.
The intuition is that the hedgers now have a lower marginal valuation for the asset and are
thus more eager to oﬄoad their risk ahead of the prey’s firesale.
3.4. PREDATORY TRADING VS LIQUIDITY PROVISION 171
Equilibrium. The conjectured predatory trading equilibrium strategy is:
x10 = X¯ −X1−1 (3.20)
∀i = 2, ..., n, xi0 =
1
n− 1
[
X0−1 +X
1
−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
(3.21)
The only difference with the no-endowment case is for predators’ trade. It needs not be as
low, as can see by comparing equations (3.21) and (3.13). This is because the hedgers’ run
is stronger, pushing the price down further.
I now study the trade-off faced by predators. The predator’s maximization problem is
the same as 3.14 except that the hedgers’ endowment affect the cost, as well as the relative
benefit of predatory trading.
∀i = 2, ..., n, max
xi0
Ei−1 + β
[
xi0
n+ 1
n
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
n∑
j=2,j 6=i
xj0 − xi0
)]
+β
(
X0−1 −
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0 − xi0
)2
(n+ 1)2
Ip0>p¯0
+β
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0 − xi0
)2
n2
Ip0≤p¯0 (3.22)
s.t. ∀j 6= i, xj0 =
1
n− 1
[
X0−1 +X
1
−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
By comparing the maximization problems 3.22 and 3.14, one can see that the cost of preda-
tory trading will be lower (first line). This is caused by the fact that the hedgers run more
strongly when they have positive endowments. The benefit from resucing the prey (second
line) is higher, and the benefit from predatory trading too. I show in the appendix that the
trade-off faced by predators has a simple quadratic form. A predator joins the predatory
trading attack if and only if
adβ
2 + bdβ + cd ≥ 0 (3.23)
where the coefficients are given by equations (3.71)-(3.73) in the appendix. I obtain the
following result.
Proposition 22 Denote θ =
X0−1
X1−1
and a = X¯
X1−1
, the prey’s leverage capacity. There exists an
equilibrium with distress given by equations (3.21)-(3.20) iff β ∈ IP , where IP is as follows:
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• If a ≥ max
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ βF , βF
[
• If a ≤ min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, then IP =
[
β
d
, β¯D
[
• If min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
< a < max
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, then
– If θ > θ∗, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ βF , βd,2 ∧ βF
[
,
– If θ ≤ θ∗, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ β¯d, β¯d
[
.
with β
d
and β
d,2
the positive roots of equation (3.23).
The equilibrium price is:
p0 = p¯0 (3.24)
p1 = D + 1 − β X¯
n+ 1
− |R|
n+ 1
(3.25)
Proposition 22 shows that the equilibrium is driven by three factors: the prey’s leverage
capacity, a, the ratio θ =
X0−1
X1−1
, and the number of predators (since the coefficients m1, m2,
κ2 are functions of n)
23 . Intuitively, θ measures the selling pressure caused by the hedgers
willingness to share risk relative to that caused by the prey’s firesale. The result suggests
that predatory trading can occur in equilibrium whether θ is large relative to a or not, i.e.
θ plays an ambiguous role. The following comparative statics confirm this observation.
3.4.2 Implications
Hedgers’ endowment and probability of predatory trading
Using the results of Proposition 22, I can calculate the probability of predation. The “gross”
probability is unadjusted for the fact that the liquidity provision equilibrium can coexist
with the predatory trading equilibrium. The “net” probability does take into account the
possible coexistence of equilibria. I obtain the following comparative statics with respect to
θ.
23Note that ∀n ≥ 2, 1κ2 ≤ 1, and max
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
= m2. Hence, given that a ≥ 1, in the special case
X0−1 = 0, i.e. θ = 0, the equilibrium condition is β ∈
[
β
d
∧ βF , βF
[
, as in Proposition 18.
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Corollary 29 The gross and net probabilities of predation vary as follows.
• If a ≤ min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, denote κ = θ+1
a
and define the gross probability of
predatory trading qˆ as
qˆ (κ, n) =
β¯d − βd
β¯d
qˆ decreases in κ, i.e. qˆ decreases with θ on this interval.
• If θ is small, such that a ≥ max
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, the equilibrium thresholds are
ordered as follows: β
nd
< βF < β¯d ∧ β¯d. Hence the net probability of predation q is
given by
q (θ, n, a) = 1− βnd
βF
Then for θ small, q increases with θ.
The effect of θ on the probability of predation is non-monotonic24. If the hedgers’ initial
positions relative to the prey’s are sufficiently large, then increasing θ decreases the likeli-
hood of predatory trading. However, if θ is initial small, then increasing it may increase
the probability of predatory trading. There are two conflicting effects at work here. First,
the hedgers’ initial position determines the equilibrium illiquidity discount. A high discount
makes it easier to push the prey into distress. Second, a large endowment raises the op-
portunity cost of pushing the prey into distress. This is because predatory trading aims at
decreasing the price at which strategic traders can buy the asset. However, if the price is
already low because the hedgers have large positions to oﬄoad, there is a low incentive to
engage in predatory trading.
Runs, predatory trading, and short-selling
In Corollary 28, I showed that when X01 is large, hedgers run more. Interestingly, the run
can be so strong that the predators may not have to short the asset to trigger the prey’s
distress.
24I checked numerically the “net” probability of predation, i.e. taking into account equilibrium overlap,
has typically the same properties as the “gross” probability.
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Corollary 30 (liquidity hoarding) The predators’ aggregate order at t = 0 is Qd =
∑n
i=2 x
i
0 =
X0−1 +X
1
−1 +
n
n+1
(
R
β
− X¯
)
.
• If θ = 0, then ∀β < βF , Qd < 0, i.e. predators must short the asset to push the prey
into distress.
• If θ > 0, then if the prey has a small enough leverage capacity (a small enough), there
exists βh > 0 such that for β ≥ βh, Qd ≥ 0, i.e., it is enough for predators to hoard
liquidity to push the prey into distress.
The second part of the corollary does not state whether βh satisfies the conditions required on
β for predatory trading to occur in equilibrium. However, it is easy to calculate the various
thresholds numerically. For instance, when θ = 0.3 and a = 1.05, parameters are such that
predatory trading is the only equilibrium for β ∈
[
β
nd
, β¯d ∧ βF
[
as long as the number of
predators is between 2 and 8. Further, for these parameters, βh < β¯d ∧ βF , implying that it
is sufficient for predators to restrict liquidity provision, and that they do not have to short
the asset. Therefore, when the hedgers are sufficiently risk-averse, they behave as predators’
(involuntary) accomplices. More precisely, the possibility of predatory trading induces the
hedgers to run, which in turn facilitates predatory trading. Therefore the model provides a
natural link between predatory trading and financial market runs. Contrary to models of
financial market runs (e.g. Bernardo and Welch (2004), the liquidity shock triggering the
run, i.e. the prey’s firesale, is endogenous in the model.
An interesting empirical implication of the model is that it may be misleading too look
at the trade direction (i.e. buy or sell) in order to identify predators. This implication is
in contrast to Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s model, in which predators always sell during
the predatory phase (time 0 here). Another interesting implication is that short-selling bans
may not always be effective in curbing predatory trading. In particular, when the hedgers
are sufficiently risk-averse (β ≥ βh), what pushes the prey into distress is that they quickly
oﬄoad their endowment and predators restrict the quantity they buy.
Price effects
Predatory trading involves a price manipulation in the first period in order to push the prey
into distress. Therefore the illiquidity discount is larger than in the no-distress case at time
0 when predators engage in predatory trading. The price effects of predatory trading at time
1 are as follows:
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Corollary 31 In the equilibrium with distress,
• The illiquidity discount at t = 1 is larger when the prey has a larger capacity, ∂Γ1
∂X¯
< 0,
and when the prey has more cash or a less severe constraint V, ∂Γ1
∂|R| < 0.
• The price rebounds on average at t = 1 and the average rebound is stronger when the
prey is less exposed to forced liquidations (e.g. has more cash, or a looser constraint
V), E0(p1−p0)
∂|R| > 0, and stronger if the prey has a smaller capacity,
E0(p1−p0)
∂X¯
< 0.
If the prey has a large capacity constraint, there is a large firesale at time 1, hence a large
discount and a low price rebound, on average. When the prey is not very exposed to forced
liquidation, inducing distress requires to push the time 0 price to a very low level. Since
price impact is permanent, the time 1 price is also lower in this case. Nevertheless, the
average rebound is larger. This is because decreasing the price involves to take low or short
positions at time 0, therefore predators must buy more aggressively at time 1, leading to a
higher rebound on average.
3.5 Conclusion
I study predatory trading in a model where smart competitive investors (hedgers) under-
stand that capital-rich strategic traders may prey upon a financially constrained competitor.
I show that the hedgers’ reactions to the possibility of predatory trading can make predation
cheaper. This reaction manifests itself through a change in market liquidity, which allows
predators to move prices more easily than the prey and increases downward pressure on the
price. An important determinant of predatory trading is the hedgers’ risk-bearing capacity,
because it determines their ability to take the other side of predatory trades and eventu-
ally to absorb firesales without causing large market disruptions, and this determines the
profitability of predatory trading.
An interesting research avenue is to study the systemic risk created by predatory trading
between traders with different levels of capital. Given the mechanisms at work with one prey,
one can imagine that the mere prospect of a cascade of failures could trigger a liquidity dry-
up which in turn would facilitate predatory trading on multiple preys. At the same time,
the possibility of becoming a prey as a result of future market disruptions may limit the
willingness of traders with intermediate capital to engage in predation. Hence introducing
spillovers from one prey to the other in the analysis should lead to interesting coordination
problems. This is left for future research.
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3.6 Proofs
The following proofs are given in the case where the hedgers’ endowment is X0−1 ≥ 0. Section
3.6.4 of this appendix contains additional derivations related to the special case where the
hedgers have no endowment (X0−1 = 0). In my derivations of the equilibrium, I use Lemma
2 in Fardeau (2011). (chapter 1 of this dissertation)
3.6.1 Time-1 subgame equilibrium and price schedules
Lemma 28
Proof. I solve the model backwards. Given the CARA-normal framework of the model,
it is convenient to work with certainty equivalents to solve the hedgers’ problem.
Date 1. From the viewpoint of date 1, the first innovation 1 is known, hence E1
(
D˜2
)
=
D + 1 and the hedgers’ maximisation problem is
CE1 = max
xC1
BC0 − xC1 p1 +XC1 (D + 1)−
1
2
β
(
XC1
)2
,with β = ασ2 (3.26)
The hedgers’ demand at t = 1 is thus XC1 =
D+1−p1
β
. Inverting the demand curve and
imposing market-clearing,
∀t = 0, 1, S = XCt +
n∑
j=1
Xjt (3.27)
yields the price schedule faced by strategic traders:
p1 = D + 1 − β
(
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj1
)
Using Xjt = X
j
t−1 + x
j
t gives:
p1 = D + 1 − β
(
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0
)
+ β
n∑
j=1
xj1 (3.28)
There are two states of the world at t = 1, with and without distress. If there is distress, the
prey must liquidate her entire portfolio, i.e. X11 = 0, which implies x
1
1 = −X10 . Otherwise,
the prey is free to choose her position.
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- First case: no distress (nd). A strategic trader’s value function is defined as
∀i = 1, ..., n, J i,nd1 = max
xi1
E1
[
Bi0 − xi1p1 +X i1D˜2
]
s.t. p1 = D + 1 − β
(
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0
)
+ β
n∑
j=1
xj1
Plugging the constraint in the maximand gives:
∀i = 1, ...n, J i,nd1 = max
xi1
Bi0 +X
i
0 (D + 1) + x
i
1
[
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0 −
n∑
j 6=i
xj1 − xi1
]
,
where, ∀j = 1, ..., n, Xj0 has been determined in the previous period. Taking the first-order
condition, solving for its zero and rearranging terms, we get:
∀i = 1, ..., n, xi1 +
n∑
j=1
xj1 = S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0 (3.29)
Collecting the n equations and using matrix notation gives
(I + 1) .x1 =
(
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0
)
.1,
where 1 is a (n, n) matrix of 1’s, x1 = (x
1
1, ..., x
n
1 ) and 1 is a vector of 1’s. The lines and
columns of the matrix A = I+1 are linearly independent. Thus the matrix is invertible with
inverse A−1 and multiplying on both sides from the left by A−1 gives the unique equilibrium
in the subgame:
∀i = 1, ..., n, xi1 =
S −∑nj=1 Xj0
n+ 1
(3.30)
Plugging this quantity into the strategic trader’s value function J i,nd1 gives
J i,nd1 = B
i
0 +X
i
0 (D + 1) + β
(
S −∑nj=1 Xj0)2
(n+ 1)2
(3.31)
The strategic trader’s value function is the expected payoff on his date 0 positions in the
riskfree and risky assets, plus the continuation payoff β
(S−
∑n
j=1X
j
0)
2
(n+1)2
. Using equations (3.26)
178CHAPTER 3. RUNS, ASYMMETRIC PRICE IMPACT AND PREDATORY TRADING
and (3.30), the hedgers’ certainty equivalent is:
CEnd1 = B
C
0 +X
C
0
(
D + 1 − β
S −∑nj=1Xj0
n+ 1
)
+ β
(
S −∑nj=1 Xj0)2
2 (n+ 1)2
(3.32)
- Second case: prey is in distress (d).
In this case, X11 = 0, hence x
1
1 = −X10 . Given that X11 = 0, the problem of a predator is
∀i = 2, ..., n, J i,d1 = max
xi1
E1
(
Bi0 − xi1p1 +X i1D˜2
)
s.t. p1 = D + 1 − β
(
S −
n∑
i=2
X i1
)
Repeating the same steps as above, I get the unique equilibrium in the subgame:
x11 = −X10 (3.33)
∀i = 2, ..., n, xi1 =
S −∑nj=2 Xj0
n
(3.34)
Strategic trader’s value function and the hedgers’ certainty equivalent are given by:
∀i = 2, ..., n, J i,d1 = Bi0 +X i0 (D + 1) + β
(
S −∑nj=2 Xj0)2
n2
(3.35)
CEd1 = B
C
0 +X
C
0
(
D + 1 − β
S −∑nj=2 Xj0
n
)
+ β
(
S −∑nj=2 Xj0)2
2n2
(3.36)
Lemma 30
Proof. Date 0. I now solve for the hedgers’ demand at date 0, depending on the
hedgers’ beliefs about the state at t = 1.
- First case: The hedgers believe that the prey will be solvent at t = 0. The hedgers’
maximisation problem at t = 0, using BC0 = B
C
−1 − xC0 p0 and equation (3.32), is
max
xC0
E0 − exp−α
−xC0 p0 +XC0
(
D + ˜1 − β
S −∑nj=1Xj0
n+ 1
)
+ β
(
S −∑nj=1Xj0)2
2 (n+ 1)2
 ,
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where ˜1 is random. Using the projection theorem for normals, the problem simplifies to
maximising the hedgers’ date-0 certainty equivalent:
CE0 = max
xC0
−xC0 p0 +XC0
(
D − βS −
∑n
j=1 X
j
0
n+ 1
)
+β
(
S −∑nj=1Xj0)2
2 (n+ 1)2
− 1
2
β
2
(
XC0
)2
(3.37)
From the first-order condition I get the hedgers’ demand function at t = 0:
XC0 =
D − β S−
∑n
j=1X
j
0
n+1
− p0
β
Inverting the demand, imposing market-clearing (equation (3.27)):
pnd0 = D − β
n+ 2
n+ 1
[
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0
]
Using the accounting identity:
S = X0−1 +
n∑
j=1
Xj−1 (3.38)
gives the date-0 price functional when the hedgers anticipate no distress:
pnd0 = D − β
n+ 2
n+ 1
X0−1 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
n∑
j=1
xj0 (3.39)
With X0−1 = 0, equation (3.39) corresponds to equation (3.5) given in the text.
- Second case: Suppose that the hedgers believe the prey will be in distress at t = 1. Using
equation (3.36), solving for the hedgers’ date 0-maximisation problem and using equation
(3.38), I get:
pd0 = D − β
n+ 1
n
X0−1 + β
n∑
j=1
xj0 + β
1
n
(
n∑
j=1
xj0 −X10
)
Strategic traders’ identities are public information, hence, using the dynamics of asset hold-
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ings, X10 = X
1
−1 + x
1
0, this equation can be rewritten as:
pd0 = D − β
n+ 1
n
X0−1 − β
1
n
X1−1 + β
n+ 1
n
n∑
j=2
xi0 + βx
1
0 (3.40)
Setting X0−1 = 0 gives equation (3.6) in the text. Lemma 30 follows immediately from
equations (3.39) and (3.40) and arguments given in the text.
3.6.2 Liquidity provision equilibrium
Lemma 31
Proof. Suppose that the hedgers believe that the prey will not be distressed. Since the
hegders are rational, their beliefs must be correct in equilibrium. I now determine under
which condition strategic traders’ actions are consistent with the hedgers’ beliefs.
At date 0, a strategic trader’s problem is:
∀i = 1, ..., n, J i,nd0 = max
xi0
E0
Bi−1 − xi0p0 +X i0 (D + ˜1) + β
(
S −∑nj=1Xj0)2
(n+ 1)2

s.t. pnd0 = D − β
n+ 2
n+ 1
X0−1 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
n∑
j=2
xj0 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
x10
B10 +X
1
0p0 ≤ V ⇒ X11 = 0
X10 ≤ X¯
The second constraint corresponds to Assumption 1 (marked-to-market wealth constraint),
the third constraint to Assumption 2 (leverage constraint). I first derive the equilibrium
that would prevail in the absence of these two financial constraints, and then derive under
which conditions this equilibrium holds in the presence of the constraints.
Ignoring the second and third constraints, plugging the first constraint into the maximand
and using equation (3.38) gives
J i,nd0 = max
xi0
Ei−1 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
xi0
(
X0−1 −
n∑
j 6=i
xj0 − xi0
)
+
(
X0−1 −
∑n
j 6=i x
j
0 − xi0
)2
(n+ 1)2

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with Ei−1 = B
i
−1 +X
i
−1D. From the first-order condition, I get:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, xi0 +
n2 + 3n
(n+ 1)2
n∑
j=1
xj0 =
n2 + 3n
(n+ 1)2
X0−1 (3.41)
Solving this system of n equations with n unknowns, I get the unique equilibrium in this
subgame (in absence of constraints)
∀i = 1, ..., n, xi0 =
n2 + 3n
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
X0−1 = c0,nX
0
−1 (3.42)
From equation (3.30), I find the date 1 equilibrium trade:
∀i = 1, ..., n, xi1 =
n+ 2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
X0−1 = c1,nX
0
−1 (3.43)
After some simple algebra, I obtain the equilibrium prices:
p0 = D − β (n+ 2)
2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
X0−1 = D − βρ0,nX0−1 (3.44)
p1 = D + 1 − β n+ 2
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
X0−1 = D + 1 − βρ1,nX0−1 (3.45)
Further, using (3.42) and (3.43), I compute the payoff (skipping two lines of algebra):
Jnd0 = E
i
−1 + βpi0,n
(
X0−1
)2
(3.46)
with pi0,n =
(n2 + 3n+ 1) (n+ 2)2
(n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
Let us now consider the problem with the financial constraints. I conjecture that the
equilibrium trade is given by equation (3.42). An obvious condition on parameters is that
X1−1 + c0,nX
0
−1 ≤ X¯.
In the presence of the financial constraints, one must check for two types of deviations.
First, the prey may opt for a voluntary liquidation. The prey being risk-neutral, it is easy
to show that she will never voluntarily liquidate, therefore I skip the proof.
Second, a strategic trader may turn predator and exploit the prey’s constraints to trigger
a forced liquidation25. Doing so affects strategic traders’ continuation payoff, which becomes
25Note that since the equilibrium is unique in the absence of financial constraints, this is the only deviation
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(S−
∑n
j=2X
j
0)
2
n2
.
Let’s compute the payoff from exploiting the prey’s financial constraints for predator i:
J i,nd,dev0 = max
xi0
Ei−1 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
xi0
(
S −
n∑
j=1
Xj0
)
+
(
S −∑nj=2Xj0)2
n2

s.t. ∀j 6= i, xj0 = c0,nX0−1
p0 ≤ p¯0
where i ∈ {2, ..., n}. Using (3.38), this problem can be rewritten as
maxxi0 β
n+ 2
n+ 1
xi0
[
X0−1 −
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj0 − xi0
]
+ β
[
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
∑n
j=2,j 6=i x
j
0 − xi0
]2
n2
s.t. ∀j 6= i, xj0 = c0,nX0−1
p0 ≤ p¯0
Note that in the second constraint, p0 depends on the strategy of predator i and on the
postulated strategy of other strategic traders, ∀j 6= i, xj0 = c0,nX0−1. I first determine under
which condition a predatory deviation is costly, i.e. under which condition the Lagrangian
of the second (price) constraint is strictly positive.
Let’s first ignore the constraint p0 ≤ p¯0 and solve for the zero of the first-order condition.
I get:
xi,dev0 =
n5 + 5n4 + 4n3 − 10n2 − 11n− 2
(n3 + 2n2 − n− 1) (n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)X
0
−1 −
n+ 1
n3 + 2n2 − n− 1X
1
−1
As a consequence,
n+ 2
n+ 1
[
X0−1 −
n∑
j=1
xj0
]
= H1X
0
−1 +H2X
1
−1
with H1 =
n(n+2)(n4+5n3+8n2+6n+3)
(n+1)(n3+2n2−n−1)(n3+4n2+3n+2) and H2 =
n+2
n3+2n2−n−1 . This, in turn, implies that
one must check for.
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p0 ≤ p¯0 iff
β ≥ β¯nd = |R|
H1X0−1 +H2X
1
−1
,with R = p¯0 −D (3.47)
Therefore, I will now focus on the parameter space β < β¯nd.
On this interval, pushing the prey into distress requires for a predator to set:
pnd0 = p¯0
That is, predator i must choose xi,dev0 such that
D − βn+ 2
n+ 1
X0−1 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj0 + β
n+ 2
n+ 1
xi,dev0 = p¯0
where ∀j 6= i, xj0 = c0,nX0−1. Rearranging the terms, I get:
xi,dev0 =
n+ 1
n+ 2
R
β
+
2 (n2 + 3n+ 1)
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
X0−1 (3.48)
This achieves the proof of Lemma 31
Proposition 21
Proof. Building on Lemma 31, I calculate the new continuation payoff of the strategic
traders.
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
n∑
j=2
xj0 = X
1
−1 +
n2 + 3n
n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2
X0−1 −
n+ 1
n+ 2
R
β
(3.49)
Therefore, using equations (3.48) and (3.49), and developping and rearranging terms, preda-
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tor i gets the following payoff from pushing the prey into distress:
J i,nd,dev0 = E
i
−1 + β
(n+ 3)2
(n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)2
(
X0−1
)2
+β
[
1
n2
(
X1−1
)2
+
2 (n+ 3)
n (n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)
X1−1X
0
−1
]
−R
[
2 (n4 + 5n3 + 8n2 + 6n+ 3)
n (n+ 2) (n3 + 4n2 + 3n+ 2)
X0−1 +
2 (n+ 1)
n2 (n+ 2)
X1−1
]
−(n+ 1) (n
3 + 2n2 − n− 1)
n2 (n+ 2)2
R2
β
(3.50)
Hence, predator i prefers buying over preying iff J i,nd0 ≥ J i,nd,dev0 . Using equations (3.46)
and (3.50), it is equivalent to:
andβ
2 + bndβ + cnd ≥ 0 (3.51)
where and = λ1
(
X0−1
)2 − λ2 (X1−1)2 − λ3X1−1X0−1 (3.52)
bnd = R
[
λ4X
0
−1 + λ5X
1
−1
]
< 0 (3.53)
cnd = λ6R
2 > 0 (3.54)
with λ1 =
n4+7n3+16n2+10n−5
(n3+4n2+3n+2)2
, λ2 =
1
n2
, λ3 =
2(n+3)
n(n3+4n2+3n+2)
, λ4 =
2(n4+5n3+8n2+6n+3)
n(n+2)(n3+4n2+3n+2)
, λ5 =
2(n+1)
n2(n+2)
, λ6 =
(n+1)(n3+2n2−n−1)
n2(n+2)2
. Note that for all k = 1, ..., 6,, for all n ≥ 2, λk > 0.
The discriminant of the LHS of inequality (3.51) is
∆nd = R
2
[
A1
(
X0−1
)2
+ A2
(
X1−1
)2
+ A3X
1
−1X
0
−1
]
(3.55)
with A1 = λ
2
4 − 4λ1λ6 =
4(3n6+39n5+104n4+170n3+125n2+36n+4)
n2(n+2)2(n3+4n2+3n+2)2
> 0, A2 = λ5 + 4λ6λ2 > 0,
A3 = 2λ4λ5 + 4λ6λ3 > 0. Hence for all n ≥ 2, ∆nd > 0, which guarantees that there are
always two real roots, β1, β2. Since the sign of bnd and cnd is known, the sign of equation
(3.51) depends on the sign of and.
Using θ =
X0−1
X1−1
, I rewrite equation (3.52) as
and =
(
X1−1
)2
[λ1θ − λ3θ − λ2]
The discriminant of the equation in parenthesis is ∆a = λ
2
3 + 4λ1λ2 > 0. Since λ1 > 0 and
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−λ2 < 0, there is a positive and a negative root. The positive root is given by
θ¯ =
λ3 +
√
∆a
2λ1
and since θ ≥ 0, the sign of and is striclty negative iff θ ∈
[
0, θ¯
[
and positive iff θ > θ¯.
I can now determine the equilibrium:
• If 0 ≤ θ < θ¯, the no distress equilibrium exists iff β < β1 ∧ β¯nd, with β1 = − bnd+
√
∆nd
2and
.
• If θ > θ¯, the no distress equilibrium exists iff β < β1 ∧ β¯nd or β > β2 ∧ β¯nd, with
β2 =
−bnd+
√
∆nd
2and
.
Using equations (3.52)-(3.54), equation (3.55), and the change of variable θ =
X0−1
X1−1
, the
roots are given by
β1 =
|R|
X1−1
(λ4θ + λ5)− [A1θ2 + A3θ + A2]
1
2
2 (λ1θ2 − λ3θ − λ2) ≡ βnd (3.56)
β2 =
|R|
X1−1
(λ4θ + λ5) + [A1θ
2 + A3θ + A2]
1
2
2 (λ1θ2 − λ3θ − λ2) (3.57)
I now show that in the second case (θ > θ¯), the second root, β2, does not satisfy the
parameter restriction β < β¯nd, where β¯nd is given by equation (3.47).
Since the denominator of β2 is strictly positive when θ > θ¯, β2 − β¯nd < 0 is, after
rearranging terms, equivalent to:
(λ4H1 − 2λ1) θ2 + (λ5H1 + λ4H2 + 2λ3) θ + (λ5H2 + 2λ2) + (H1θ +H2)U
1
2
θ < 0
where Uθ = A1θ
2 + A3θ + A2. Since for all n ≥ 2, λ4H1 − 2λ1 > 0 and since all other
coefficients are also positive, this condition is never satisfied for any θ ≥ 0, hence for any
θ > θ¯. Hence β2 > β¯nd.
As a result, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the no distress
equilibrium is β < β
nd
∧ β¯nd.
Corollaries 26 and 27
Proof. The results follow directly from calculations in the proof of Proposition 21.
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3.6.3 Predatory trading equilibrium and comparative statics
I conjecture that the predators’ equilibrium predatory trade is
∀j = 2, ..., n, xj0 =
1
n− 1
[
X0−1 +X
1
−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
(3.58)
Using equation (3.34), this implies that their date-1 trade is
∀j = 2, ..., n, xj1 =
1
n+ 1
(
X¯ − R
β
)
(3.59)
which leads to the following price:
p1 = D + 1 − β
n+ 1
(
X¯ − R
β
)
I assume that the hedgers believe that the prey will be distressed. I first determine condi-
tions under which the prey’s conjectured strategy is optimal given the predators’ conjectured
strategy.
Lemma 33
Proof. The prey’s problem. The predators’ conjectured strategy implies the following
first-period price (as a function of the prey’s trade):
p0 = p¯0 − β
[
X¯ −X1−1 − x10
]
(3.60)
Since the predators’ strategy is constructed so that the prey can not outbid predators,
the prey’s problem given predators’ trade is to maximise the proceeds of liquidation. Hence
the prey’s maximisation problem is:
max
x10
E0
[
B1−1 − x10p0 − x11p1 +X1D2
]
(3.61)
s.t. X11 = 0
x10 ≤ X¯ −X1−1
p0 = p¯0 = D − β
[
X¯ −X1−1 − x10
]
p1 = D + 1 − β
n+ 1
(
X¯ − R
β
)
Plugging the first and last two constraints into the maximand, this problem can be rewritten
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as:
maxx10 B
1
−1 − x10
[
p¯0 − β
[
X¯ −X1−1 − x10
]]
+X10
[
D − β 1
n+ 1
[
X¯ − R
β
]]
s.t. x10 ≤ X¯ −X1−1
Writing the Lagrangian of the problem and solving for the zero of the first-order condition
gives:
x10 =
{
n
2(n+1)
|R|
β
+ 1
2
[
n
n+1
X¯ −X1−1
]
if β < βF
X¯ otherwise,
where βF =
|R|
n+2
n
X¯ − n+1
n
X1−1
(3.62)
⇒ A necessary condition for the conjectured strategy to be a Nash equilibrium is β < βF .
Lemma 32
Proof. The predators’ problem. The predators’ conjectured strategy (3.58) is con-
structed assuming that predation is costly and that predators behave symmetrically. I.e.,
the conjectured strategy is such that predators choose a quantity leading to pd0 = p¯0, with
x10 = X¯ −X1−1.
A necessary condition for this conjectured strategy to be a Nash equilibrium is that the
Lagrangian of the first constraint in the following problem is zero.
maxxi0 βx
i
0
[
n+ 1
n
(
S −
n∑
j=2
Xj0
)
−X10
]
+ β
(
S −∑nj=2Xj0)2
n2
s.t. p0 ≤ p¯0 (3.63)
X10 = X¯
The problem can be rewritten as
max
xi0
βxi0
[
n+ 1
n
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
n∑
j=2
xj0
)
− X¯
]
+ β
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
∑n
j=2 x
j
0
)2
n2
s.t. p0 ≤ p¯0
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After writing the Lagrangian of the problem and solving for the equilibrium, I get:
xi0 =
{
1
n−1
[
X0−1 +X
1
−1 +
n
n+1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
if a > ρ0,n−1
dn
or if β < β¯d when a ≤ ρ0,n−1dn
n2+n−2
n3+n2−2n+2
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− n2
n3+n2−2n+2X¯ otherwise,
with β¯d =
|R|
ρ0,n−1
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− dnX¯ (3.64)
where ρ0,n−1 =
(n+1)2
n3+n2−2n+2 , dn =
n2−n+2
n3+n2−2n+2 , and a =
X¯
X1−1
is the prey’s spare leverage
capacity. Note that symmetry is imposed when the Lagrangian of the constraint is zero,
while it is the unique outcome when the constraint is not binding.
⇒ A necessary condition for the conjectured strategy to be a Nash equilibrium is β < βd
if a ≤ ρ0,n−1
dn
.
Propositions 19 and 22
Proof. The payoff of the conjectured strategy for predators is, using equations (3.58)
and (3.59):
J i,D0 = E
i
−1+β
X¯2
(n+ 1)2
−R
[
1
n− 1
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− n2 − n+ 2
(n− 1) (n+ 1)2 X¯
]
− n
2 + 1
(n− 1) (n+ 1)2
R2
β
(3.65)
Payoff from deviating: “rescuing” the prey. Predator i may not join the predatory
attack and “rescue” the prey. All predators are pivotal, hence this rescue implies a change
in the continuation payoff from
S−∑nj=2 Xj0
n2
to
S−∑nj=1 Xj0
(n+1)2
.
The strategy of a deviating predator solves the following problem:
J i,d,dev0 = maxxi0 βx
i
0
[
n+ 1
n
(
S −
∑
j=2
Xj0
)
−X10
]
+ β
(
S −∑nj=2Xj0)2
(n+ 1)2
s.t. ∀j 6= i, xj0 =
1
n− 1
[
X0−1 +X
1
−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)]
X10 = X¯
p0 > p¯0
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Using equation (3.38), and plugging the first and second constraints into the maximand, the
maximisation problem boils down to
J i,d,dev0 = maxxi0 βx
i
0
[
n+ 1
n (n− 1)
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− n− 2
n− 1
R
β
− n+ 1
n
xi0 −
1
n− 1X¯
]
+
β
(n+ 1)2
[
1
n− 1
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− n (n− 2)
n2 − 1
R
β
− 2n− 1
n2 − 1 X¯ − x
i
0
]2
s.t. p0 > p¯0
Writing the Lagrangian and solving for the first-order condition (ignoring the price constraint
for now), I get the strategy of a deviating (“rescuing”) predator:
xi,dev0 =
n3 + 3n2 + n+ 1
2 (n− 1) (n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 1)
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)
− n (n
3 + 3n2 − n+ 3)
2 (n2 − 1) (n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 1)X¯ −
n (n− 2) (n3 + 3n2 + n+ 1)
2 (n2 − 1) (n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 1)
R
β
(3.66)
It is easy albeit algebraically tedious to check that β < β¯d implies that p0 > p¯0, so that the
Lagrangian of the price constraint is always zero.
To compute the payoff of the rescue for predator i, it is convenient to calculate the
following quantities:
n+ 1
n
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1 −
n∑
j=2
xj0
)
− X¯ = z1
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− z2X¯ − z3R
β
(3.67)
where z1 =
(n+1)(n3+3n2+3n+1)
2n(n−1)(n3+3n2+2n+1) , z2 =
n3+3n2+5n−1
2(n−1)(n3+3n2+2n+1) , z3 =
(n−2)(n3+3n2+3n+1)
2(n−1)(n3+3n2+2n+1) . and
X0−1 −
∑
j=1 x
j
0
n+ 1
= z′1
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− z′2X¯ − z′3Rβ (3.68)
with z′1 =
n3+3n2+3n+1
2(n2−1)(n3+3n2+2n+1) , z
′
2 =
3n4+7n3+3n2−3n−2
2(n−1)(n+1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1) , z
′
3 =
n(n−2)(n3+3n2+3n+1)
2(n−1)(n+1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1) .
From equations (3.66)-(3.68), skipping some algebra, the payoff of rescuing the prey is:
J i,d,dev0 = β
[
w1X¯
2 + w2
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− w3 (X0−1 +X1−1) X¯]
−R [w4 (X0−1 +X1−1)− w5X¯]+ w6R2β (3.69)
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with w1 =
n10+9n9+43n8+114n7+155n6+98n5+41n4+50n3+28n2−15n+4
4(n−1)2(n+1)4(n3+3n2+2n+1)2 , w2 =
(n+1)4
4n(n1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1)
, w3 =
n6+9n5+23n4+24n3+7n2+n−1
2(n−1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1)2 , w4 =
(n−2)(n+1)3
2(n−1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1) , w5 =
n2(n−2)(n5+9n4+23n3+25n2+10n+4)
2(n+1)(n−1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1)2 ,
w6 =
n(n−2)2(n+1)2(n4+4n3+4n2+3n+1)
4(n−1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1)2 .
The conjectured predatory trades form a Nash equilibrium iff ∀i = 2, ..., n, J i,d0 ≥ J i,d,dev0 .
From equations (3.65) and (3.69), this is equivalent to
adβ
2 + bdβ + cd ≥ 0 (3.70)
with ad = e1X¯
2 − e2
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)2
+ e3X¯
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)
(3.71)
bd = −R
[
e4
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)− e5X¯] (3.72)
cd = −e6R2 (3.73)
and e1 =
1
(n+1)2
− w1, e2 = w2, e3 = w3, e4 = 1n−1 − w4, e5 = n
2−n+2
(n−1)(n+1)2 − w5, e6 =
n2+1
(n−1)(n+1)2 + w6
e4 =
n4 + 3n3 + n2 + 3n
2 (n− 1)2 (n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 1) (3.74)
e5 =
n9 − 4n7 + 24n6 + 79n5 + 56n4 + 14n3 − 12n2 − 10n− 4
2 (n− 1)2 (n+ 1)2 (n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 1)2 (3.75)
It is clear that cd < 0. Let us now study the signs of bd and ad.
Sign of bd
bd ≥ 0⇔ κ ≥ e5
e4
, where κ =
X0−1 +X
1
−1
X¯
(3.76)
Further, from equations (3.74)-(3.75), ∀n ≥ 2, e5
e4
= n
9−4n7+24n6+79n5+56n4+14n3−12n2−10n−4
(n+1)2(n3+3n2+2n+1)(n4+3n3+n2+3n)
and
e5
e4
≤ 1.
Sign of ad
Using the variable κ =
X0−1+X
1
−1
X¯
, I rewrite equation (3.71) as:
ad = X¯
2
[
e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ
]
For n = 2, e1 < 0, e2 > 0, e3 > 0. When n > 2, all coefficients are strictly positive. Thus,
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• If n = 2, there are two positive roots, κ1 = e3−
√
δ
2e2
and κ2 =
e3+
√
δ
2e2
, where δ = e23 +4e2e1.
• If n > 2, there is a positive and a negative roots, with κ1 < 0 and κ2 > 0.
Hence, ad > 0 ⇔
• κ ∈ ]κ1, κ2[, if n = 2
• κ ∈ ]0, κ2[, if n > 2.
Discriminant
The discriminant of equation (3.70) is:
∆d = R
2
[
r1
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)2
+ r2X¯
(
X0−1 +X
1
−1
)
+ r3X¯
2
]
i.e., ∆d = R
2X¯2
[
r1κ
2 + r2κ+ r3
]
(3.77)
with r1 = e
2
4 − 4e6e2, r2 = 4e6e3 − 2e5e4, r3 = e25 + 4e6e1. ∀n ≥ 2, r1 > 0, and r2 > 0.
Further, r3 < 0 for n = 2 and r3 > 0 for n > 2.
26
Hence if n = 2, the equation r1κ
2 + r2κ+ r3 has two solutions:
κd1 =
−r2 +
√
∆d
2r1
≈ 0.1
κd2 =
−r2 −
√
∆d
2r1
< 0,where ∆d = r
2
2 − 4r1r3
If n > 2, then all coefficients ri being strictly positive, ∆D > 0 for any κ. Hence,
• If n = 2, then ∆d < 0 for κ ∈
[
0, κd1
[
. If κ > κd1 ≈ 0.1, then ∆d > 0.
• If n > 2, then ∆d > 0.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by the sign of equation (3.70) and the parameter restric-
tions βF and β¯d, given by equations (3.62) and (3.64), respectively.
26For the sake of brevity, I did not reproduce the analytical expression of the coefficients ri. I check the
signs numerically for n = 2 to n = 150.
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When ∆d > 0, equation (3.70) has two real roots given by
β
d
=
√
∆d − bd
2ad
(3.78)
β
d,2
= −bd +
√
∆d
2ad
(3.79)
It is easy to see that if ad > 0, β2 < 0, and if ad < 0, β2 > βd > 0. Using κ =
X0−1+X
1
−1
X¯
,
equations (3.78) and (3.79) and (3.71)-(3.73), the roots can be rewritten as:
β
d
=
|R|
X¯
Z
1
2
κ − (e4κ− e5)
2 (e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ) (3.80)
β2 = −|R|
X¯
Z
1
2
κ + (e4κ− e5)
2 (e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ) (3.81)
where Zκ = r1κ
2 + r2κ+ r3.
I first study the sign of equation (3.70) independently of the parameter restrictions.
If n > 2, ∆d > 0, hence the equation has two real roots. From the signs of ad and bd,
there are two thresholds for κ in this case: κ2 and
e5
e4
. Since for all n ≥ 2, κ2 ≥ 1 and e5e4 < 1,
it is clear that κ2 >
e5
e4
. Then the sign of equation (3.70) is as follows:
• If κ ∈
[
0, e5
e4
[
, ad > 0, bd < 0, cd < 0, hence β2 < 0, βd > 0 and adβ
2 + bdβ + cd ≥ 0⇔
β > β
d
• If
[
e5
e4
, κ2
[
, ad > 0, bd > 0, cd < 0, then β2 < 0, βd > 0 and adβ
2+bdβ+cd ≥ 0⇔ β > βd.
• If κ > κ2, then ad < 0, bd < 0, and cd < 0 and adβ2 + bdβ + cd ≥ 0⇔ β ∈
[
β
d
, β
d,2
[
When n = 2, there are four thresholds κd1, κ1,
e5
e4
and κ2, in increasing order. For κ ≥ e5e4 ,
the analysis is similar to the case where n > 2. For κ < e5
e4
, the intervals are as follows:
• If κ ∈ [0, κd1[, ad < 0, bd < 0, cd < 0, and ∆d < 0, hence adβ2 + bdβ + cd < 0 and there
is no predatory trading equilibrium.
• If κ ∈ [κd1, κ1[, then ∆d > 0, but since ad < 0, bd < 0, cd < 0, there are two negative
roots, and therefore, there is no predatory trading equilibrium. This case can be
grouped with the previous one.
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• If κ ∈
[
κ1,
e5
e4
[
, then ad > 0, bd < 0, cd < 0 and ∆d > 0. Then β2 < 0, βd > 0 and
adβ
2 + bdβ + cd ≥ 0 ⇔ β > βd. Thus this case can be grouped with the one in which
κ > e5
e4
.
⇒ The n = 2 case is thus the same as the n > 2 case, except for κ < κ1.
I now determine the intervals of the predatory trading equilibrium, taking into account
the parameter restrictions βF and β¯d, given by equations (3.62) and (3.78), respectively.
Position of βF relative to β¯d
From equations (3.62) and (3.78):
β¯d > βF ⇔ a ≥ m1θ +m2 (3.82)
with m1 =
n(n+1)2
n4+4n3−n2+4 and m2 =
n4+3n3+n2+n+2
n4+4n3−n2+4
Note that m2 = 1 when n = 2 and m2 < 1 when n > 2.
⇒ If θ = 0 (i.e. X0−1 = 0), β¯d > βF ⇔ a ≥ m2, which is always true since a ≥ 1.
⇒ Proposition 19 follows from this remark and the analysis below.
Intervals of the predatory trading equilibrium
The analysis of equation (3.70) gives necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the
variable κ, whereas the parameter restrictions for βF and β¯d are expressed in terms of θ.
Noting that27:
κ =
θ + 1
a
(3.83)
I rewrite all the conditions in terms of a and θ.
The thresholds in terms of κ are κ1 (for n = 2 only),
e5
e4
and κ2. Hence using equation
(3.83), the corresponding thresholds in terms of a are, in increasing order, 1
κ1
θ+ 1
κ1
, e4
e5
θ+ e4
e5
and 1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
.
27Using the definition of κ (3.76) and the following notations: θ =
X0−1
X1−1
, a = X¯
X1−1
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I now compare these thresholds to the condition (3.82). For all n ≥ 2, e4
e5
> m2 > m1,
1
κ1
> m2 > m1. Therefore, ∀n ≥ 2,{
e4
e5
θ + e4
e5
> m1θ +m2
1
κ1
θ + 1
κ1
> m1θ +m2
Further, 1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
> m1θ +m2 is equivalent to
θ > θ∗ =
m2 − 1κ2
1
κ2
−m1
Since ∀n ≥ 2, m2 > 1κ2 > m1, θ∗ > 0. Hence, combining the equilibrium conditions and the
parameter restrictions yields, ∀n > 2
• If a ≥ max
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ βF , βF
[
• If a ≤ min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ β¯d, βd,2 ∧ β¯d
[
• If min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
< a < max
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, then
– If θ > θ∗, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ βF , βd,2 ∧ βF
[
,
– If θ ≤ θ∗, then IP =
[
β
d
∧ β¯d, β¯d
[
.
If n = 2, there is an additional case: if a ≥ 1
κ1
θ + 1
κ1
, there is no predatory trading
equilibrium.
In the second case, a ≤ min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, it is possible to refine the bound-
aries of the interval IP and show that it is non-empty, thereby proving the existence of the
equilibrium in this case.
Existence conditions
I first show that β
d
< β¯d. This case is interesting for a ≤ min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
,
hence the interval I consider is κ > κ2. Using (3.80) and (3.64), and rearranging terms, I get
β
d
− β¯d = |R|
X¯
g2 (κ)
(ρ0,n−1κ− dn) (e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ) (3.84)
with g2 (κ) = (ρ0,n−1κ− dn)Z
1
2
κ +B1κ
2 +B2κ−B3 (3.85)
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where ∀n ≥ 2, B1 = 2e2−ρ0,n−1e4 < 0, B2 = e5ρ0,n−1 +dne4−2e3 < 0, B3 = 2e1 +dne5 > 0.28
The denominator of equation (3.84) is negative when κ > κ2, thus βd − β¯d < 0 iff
g2 (κ) ≥ 0. To determine the sign of g2, I first study its first derivative:
g′2 (κ) = ρ0,n−1Z
1
2
κ + (ρ0,n−1κ− dn) Z
′
κ
Z
1
2
κ
+ 2B1κ+B2
The first term of the derivative is positive for any κ > 0. The second term is also positive,
because ∀n ≥ 2, dn
ρ0,n−1
< κ2 and Z
′
κ = 2r1κ + r2 > 0 for any κ > κ2 > 0 (r1 and r2
being positive for any n ≥ 2). The third term, however, is negative, because B1 and B2 are
negative. I will show that ∀κ > κ2, g′2 (κ) > 0. To show this, it is enough to show that
ρ0,n−1Z
1
2
κ + 2B1κ+B2 ≥ 0.
Since Zκ = r1κ
2 + r2κ+ r3 (see equation (3.80)), the following holds for any κ > κ2:
Zκ ≥ r1κ2 + r2κ2 + r3
and therefore ρ0,n−1
√
Zκ ≥ ρ0,n−1
√
r1κ+ r2κ2 + r3, which implies that
ρ0,n−1
√
Zκ + 2B1κ+B2 ≥ ρ0,n−1
√
r1κ2 + r2κ2 + r3 + 2B1κ+B2
Given that ∀n ≥ 2, ρ0,n−1√r1 ≥ −2B1, the function on the RHS of the inequality is increasing
in κ. Hence for κ > κ2, ρ0,n−1
√
Zκ+2B1κ+B2 > ρ0,n−1
√
r1κ22 + r2κ2 + r3 +2B1κ2 +B2. The
right-hand side of the inequality is positive for all n ≥ 2, hence ∀κ > κ2, ∀n ≥ 2, g′2 (κ) > 0
and g2 is increasing on this interval. As a result, one can minor this function by g2 (κ2), with
∀n ≥ 2, g2 (κ2) > 0.
Hence ∀κ > κ2, βd < β¯d.
Using a similar reasoning, one can show that β
d,2
> β¯d when κ > κ2. From equations
(3.81) and (3.64), β
d,2
< β¯d is equivalent to h2 (κ) > 0, with
h2 (κ) = − (ρ0,n−1 − dn)
√
Zκ +B1κ
2 +B2κ−B3
The function − (ρ0,n−1 − dn)
√
Zκ is always negative, as well as B1κ
2 + B2κ − B3. Thus
∀κ > κ2, βd,2 > β¯d.
28For the remainder of the proof, I rely again on calculations for the coefficients which are functions of n.
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Corollary 29
Proof. Suppose that a ≤ min
(
1
κ2
θ + 1
κ2
,m1θ +m2
)
, and consider p (κ) = 1−qˆ (κ) = βd
β¯d
.
From equations (3.80) and (3.64), we can write
p (κ) =
(ρ0,n−1κ− dn)
(
Z
1
2
κ − (e4κ− e5)
)
2 (e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ)
Hence the first derivative w.r.t. κ, after regrouping terms, is
p
′
(κ) =
(e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ) (ρ0Zκ + (ρ0 − dn) (2r1κ+ r2))− (e3 − 2e2κ) (ρ0κ− dn) 2Zκ
2Z
1
2
κ
+ (e5ρ0 + e4dn − 2e4ρ0κ)
(
e1 − e2κ2 + e3κ
)
+ (2e2κ− e3)
(−e4ρ0κ2 (e5ρ0 + e4dn)κ− dne5)
It is enough to show that p is increasing when κ ≥ κ2. I start by developing and rearranging
terms of the numerator in the first line. Using that Zκ = r1κ
2 + r2κ + r3, I get after a few
calculations that the numerator is equal to H1κ
4 +H2κ
3 +H3κ
2 +H4κ+H5, with
H1 = e2r1ρ0; H2 = 2e2ρ0r2 − 2r1d2e2 + r1e3ρ0
H3 = 3r3e2ρ0 − 2r2dne2 + 3r1ρ0e1 + e3ρ0r2; H4 = 2r2ρ0e1 − r3e3ρ0 − 4r3dne2 − e1r1dn
H5 = 2r1e3dn − e1r2dn
Now consider the second line in p
′
and rearrange terms. This gives: H6κ
2 −H7κ+H8, with
H6 = e2 (e5ρ0 + e4dn) + e3e4ρ0; H7 = 2e4e1ρ0 + 2e2dne5; H8 = e1 (e5ρ0 + e4dn) + dne5e3
Hence the sign of p
′
is the same as the sign of
φκ = H1κ
4 +H2κ
3 +H3κ
2 +H4κ+H5 + 2Z
1
2
κ
(
H6κ
2 −H7κ+H8
)
Calculating the coefficients Hi, which are functions of n, we find that H1, H2, H3, H6 and
H8 are positive for any n ≥ 2. However, for n ≥ 2, H4 is negative, H7 is positive and H5
becomes negative for n ≥ 4. Given the signs of the coefficients, to show that p′ is positive
for κ ≥ κ2, it is enough to show H3κ2 +H4κ+H5 ≥ 0 and H6κ2−H7κ+H8 on this interval.
First, consider H3κ
2 +H4κ+H5 ≥ 0. Since H3 > 0, it is increasing for κ ≥ − H42H3 , which
calculations show is smaller than κ2. Further, I find that for any n ≥ 2, H3 (κ2)2 + H4κ2 +
H5 > 0. Next, consider H6κ
2 − H7κ + H8 and apply the same steps. H6 is positive and
the function peaks in H7
2H6
, which I find is smaller than κ2 for n ≥ 2. Further, I find that
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H6κ
2 − H7κ + H8 > 0. As a result, p′ is positive for κ ≥ κ2, hence qˆ is decreasing on its
interval.
Corollary 30
Proof. I start with θ > 0:
Qd ≥ 0 ⇔ X0−1 +X1−1 +
n
n+ 1
(
R
β
− X¯
)
≥ 0
⇔ X0−1 +X1−1 −
n
n+ 1
aX1−1 ≥
n
n+ 1
|R|
β
, using X¯ = aX1−1
With a small enough, X0−1 +
(
1− n
n+1
a
)
X1−1 > 0. Hence,
Qd ≥ 0 ⇔ β ≥ βh ≡ n
n+ 1
|R|
X0−1 +
(
1− n
n+1
a
)
X1−1
If θ = 0, we need to prove that βh ≥ βF . Using the expression for βF from Lemma 33, we
get:
βh ≥ βF ⇔ n+ 1
n
− a ≤ n+ 2
n
a− n+ 1
n
⇔ 2 (n+ 1)
n
≤ 2 (n+ 1)
n
a
Since a ≥ 1, this inequality is always satisfied.
Corollary 31
Proof. Using Proposition 22, we get:
E0 (p1 − p0) = D − p¯0 − β
n+ 1
X¯ − |R|
n+ 1
=
n|R|
n+ 1
− β
n+ 1
X¯
Thus E0 (p1 − p0) ≥ 0⇔ n|R|−βX¯ > 0 ⇔ β < n|R|X¯ . Sinceβ < βF = n|R|(n+2)X¯−(n+1)X1−1 , and
βF ≤ n|R|X¯ ⇔ X1−1 ≤ X¯, we have E0 (p1) ≥ p0. Clearly, E0 (p1 − p0) increases with —R—
and decreases with X1−1.
The illiquidity discount at time 1, Γ1 = −βX¯+|R|n+1 . Hence Γ1 is decreasing in X¯ and |R|.
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3.6.4 Additional derivations for the no trading case
Proposition 18
Proof. From Proposition 22, the driver of the equilibrium is the position of a relative
to max
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
and min
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
.
If X0−1 = 0, then θ = 0, and the equilibrium condition simplifies as follows:
• Since ∀n ≥ 2, m2 > 1κ2 and since 1κ2 ≤ 1 ≤ a, the case a < min
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
does not
exist.
• Further, ∀n ≥ 2,m2 ≥ 1, hence the case min
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
< a < max
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
does not
exist either.
The only remaining case is thus a ≥ max
(
m2,
1
κ2
)
= m2. Since
1
κ2
< m2 ≤ 1 for all
n ≥ 2, the condition on a is always satisfied. Hence if θ = 0, the equilibrium condition for
the equilibrium with predatory trading is β ∈
[
β
d
∧ βF , βF
[
.
Proposition 20
Proof. The equilibrium with distress occurs on a non-empty interval iff β
d
< βF . Using
equations (3.80) and (3.62):
β
d
− βF = |R|
X¯
f (n, a)
with f (n, a) =
(u1 − u2a)
(√
γ3a − γ5a
)− 2γ6a
2γ6a (u1 − u2a) (3.86)
Similarly, using equations (3.80) and (3.56), I get:
β
d
− β
nd
=
|R|
X¯
g (n, a)
with g (n, a) =
λ2
(√
γ3a − γ5a
)− aγ6a (√A2 − λ5)
2γ6aλ2
(3.87)
The no-trading and predatory trading equilibria coexist iff g (n, a) > 0.
Lemma 34
Proof. We can recover Qd from equation (3.13): Qd = n
n+1
R
β
− n
n+1
X¯ +X1−1. Using p
nd
0
from Lemma 29, pnd0
(
Qnd, X¯
)
= p¯0 ⇔ Qnd = n+1n+2 Rβ − X¯ +X1−1. Thus
Qnd ≥ Qd ⇔ 1
(n+ 1) (n+ 2)
R
β
≥ 1
n+ 1
X¯
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The left-hand side is strictly negative, while the right-hand side is strictly positive. Hence
Qnd < Qd. Further, note that since X¯ > X1−1, Q
nd < 0.
To understand this impact of the change in price schedule on the equilibrium conditions,
I redo the analysis of Lemma 33 based on the no-distress price schedule, following identical
steps. The prey’s problem is
max
x10,x
1
0≤X¯−X1−1
B1−1 − x10
[
p¯0 − βn+ 2
n+ 1
(
X¯ −X1−1 − x10
)]
+X10
[
D − β
n+ 1
(
X¯ − R
β
)]
I write the Lagrangian of the problem and solve for the zero of the first-order condition
(assuming the Lagrangian multiplier is 0). I get:
x10 =
n
2 (n+ 2)
|R|
β
+
1
2
(
n+ 1
n+ 2
X¯ −X1−1
)
Hence the constraint on the prey’s position is not binding if n
2(n+2)
|R|
β
+ 1
2
(
n+1
n+2
X¯ −X1−1
) ≤
X¯ −X1−1, which is equivalent to β < β˜F ≡ |R|n+3
n
X¯−n+2
n
X1−1
. In the proof of Lemma 33, I show
that βF =
|R|
n+2
n
X¯−n+1
n
X1−1
, hence βF > β˜F .
Similarly, one can predict how the condition for ruling out self-fulfilling distress would
change. Since predators have less price impact when the price schedule is pnd0 , it will harder,
conditional on distress, to trigger it, thus there should be a larger interval on which predatory
trading is not self-fulfilling. In other words, ˜¯βd > β¯d.
200CHAPTER 3. RUNS, ASYMMETRIC PRICE IMPACT AND PREDATORY TRADING
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
n
a
No predatory trading (PT) 
equilibrium
PT and NT 
coexist
Only PT
(a) Equilibria with or without distress
2
46
8
1 0
1 2
1 4
1 6
1 8
2 0
S 1
S 3
S 5
S 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
q
n
a
(b) “Net” probability of predatory trading
Figure 3.1: Coexistence of equilibria and “net” probability of predatory trading as a function
of the number of predators n, and the prey’s leverage capacity, a = X¯
X1−1
. In Panel (b), a
varies from 1 (S1) to 1.07 (S7). The calculations assume that β is uniformly distributed
between 0 and βF .
3.6. PROOFS 201
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47
n
n
c 0
,
n
,  
n
c 1
,
n
1st period 2nd period
(a) Equilibrium trades
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
n 
Γ
1  
-
 
Γ
0
(b) Convergence
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium trades and speed of convergence of the price towards the funda-
mental value of the asset as a function of the number of strategic traders in the no-distress
equilibrium.
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